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PREFACE
The central purpose of this dissertation is to trace

and analyze Arthur Balfour's response to the complicated
and controversial Irish Question during his lengthy and

distinguished political career «

Balfour is often reputed

to have made an objective, rational and realistic ^.d^ust-

ment to the dynamic forces of the modern world.

His

contributions to the evolution of the British Conuncnv^ealth,
through his work on the Coirimittee of Imperial Defense and
at the imperial conferences following World
led to

evaluation*

tliiG

V/hile

tMs

study of Balfour and

Ireland is not pxiiiarily intended to challenge

tory assessments it

v^'ill^

I

have

V/ar I,

xhi?i la.uda-

believe, add some ucieful

perspective;^ on Balfour's ability to adapt to derrccratic
nationaiisrat cultural diversif icaticn as wsXl as

decline of

Br.Tt5.i~h

iriperialii-m*

tlio

This analysis of Balfour's?

role in the Ivish ^iuostion may provide farther insights
on the Brltis;h Estabiishnont 's general attitudes to

Ireland and
this

the

h<;w

Ii-i^h

affairs influenced Britain.

Finally^

ludy of Balfour may help explain the longevity of
Jtr-'icir,

Qucf-Jtion in

British politics and the violent

and tragic denouonent of
Arnon.^;

tiic

1919-^'1'»

irr.portant t-heraos that

are the impact of Balfour

"s

actions and

will be examined
idear.?

on Ireland

from the late 'eighties
Irish Treaty in 1921.

ur).til

the signing of the Anglo-

Special consideration

v/ill be

directed to his motives and accomplishments as Irish ChiefSecretary, and subsequently as Leader of the House of
Coriimons,

Prime Minister* and Unionist party leader.

liis

role in the critical events between I9IC and 1914 v;ill

examined in dets.il.

\:-q

The dis^iertaticn v;ill concludu v/ith

a description 3nd analysis of Balfour's posture when event's
in Ireland as well as v/artime and diplomatic pressures

called for empathy, imagination and bipartisan compromise
to solve the Irish imbroglio.
To the

r.iany

people

v^hcr>e

help and encouragement have

made the completion of this project possible,
fiincere gratitude.

Particular

sors T, r^esmond Williamnp
Nowlar^ and the la"e
Dut^liiJ

for

ivirs*

?.,

I

express my

are owed to

thanl'^s

Profet":-

Dudley iidvards, Kevin B,

I>;aure?n

initi?<..lly o/j':;oura;n;ing

Wall of University Coj.legc,
my invectigaticnr> on

research

facilitated greatly

Balfour and

I'nionj.cm.

by th?

cooperation extended to me by the staffs of

Jiind

I-iy

v/as

the follov;ing libraries and repositories

Divinicn cf the British Museum^
of England,

Northerr. Ir^rla\]d

Plunkett House in London^

th^-i

ar.a

>

The Manuscripts

Public Record Offices

the Hapublic of Ireland,

the Ka'cional Lib'-s.ry of Irol?j^d,

the Docurnents Division of 3^amcnt Library at Harvard Univer-

Bity, and the University of :vlassachusettc Library.

to thank Professor

JGov;?:h

1

wish

Kernon for r^orving as my

adviser and dissertation o>iairman

af.^

v/ell

as Professors

Franklin V/ickwire and Michael Wolff for their help,

I

wish to thank those of my colleagues in the History Department at Westfield State College

assisted
studies.

nie

v/ho

have helped and

in a variety of ways to complete

ray

graduate

Professor Elizabeth Teall deserves special thanks

for reviving my occasionally flagging enthusiasm,

I

am

grateful to Mrs. Helen Ganney for typing the manuscript
and for her technical advice.

Special thanks arc due to

my parents and my family for their help and enco\iragement
during the research and writings and especially for

patiently enduring whatever anrioyancos
in the course of this work.

I

have caui:ed

tlvvr.i
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Arthur Balfour and the Irish Question, 18?i|-1921
December

197^1-

Catherine B. Shannon, B.A,, University of Toronto
M.A,, National University of Ireland

Directed byi

Frof, Joseph M. Kernon

Arthur Balfour's parliamentary career coincided
neatly with the most dynamic and controversial eras in
modern Anglo-Irish relations.

Beginning with his appoint-

ment as Irish Chief-Secretary in March 1867, Balfour

played a significant role in formulating the Irish policy
of the Unionist Party.

Although the yoMr.g Chisf-Sor-rc- t.p.ry

quickly attacked rural disorder and crimes he introduced
a positive and progressive iwrte to a hitlierto negative and

Believing that poverty and dis-

repressive Irish policy.

satisfaction with the dual

owner-oh:. p Xarid

real catalysts of the Home

Rule-

sys':,..!i.x

v/ere

the

movement, Balfour devel-

oped a policy "best 'ie;icribed as 'contrtructlvo iin.ionism

'

o

The most important component of thin policy was the Ir^nd

purchase program v/hich enabled IrhSn sonants to purchase
thf-tir

holdingfj with the aid of

Treasury guaranteed

l?ari.-?»

U'he

.1

ov/-:

ntrroct, long-ten.i

cufuuia».iv3

effect of the

Unionist purchase program developed and encouraged by

Balfour

dov/n to 190.?

v;r...3

to revolutioni2^e Irish landholding

and destroy the Gcci-u. ir:'iMuence of the AngJ

o-

ish

viii

Ascendency.

Other planks in Balfour's 'constructive

unionism' were state aid for railway construction, fishery

development, and agricultural and technical instruction.
The establishment of the Congested Districts Board under

Balfour's Land Act of I89I brought aid to the severely

depressed areas of Connaught and Western

H'.unster,

Balfour's

ameliorative measures were intended to inculcate in the
Irish people those values and virtues v;hich he associated

with the prosperity and progress of late Victorian England.
Self -help, thrift, sobriety, initiative and independence
of thought he believed v;ould ultimately lift the Irish

people out of poverty and bring them into the
world',

Kis

'rrtcdern

'modern world* was, of course, an Anglo-Saxon

Although this program of social and economic con-

world.

ciliation had some success in developing these Anglo-iSaxon
values, it did not destroy Irif'h political aspirations for
a national legislature. The domccratization of Irish local
governiTjent under Gerald Balfour in IB93 further stimulated

the Home Rule movement.

It tr.ught inciependencG and pro-

vided yet another blow to the political and social monopoly
of the Protestant A*5oendency,
V/hcn.
v'ltj?lr,.

'ffii^

19C9--1G DuCget crisis b:x>ught

RuJ.e

realm cf possibility, Balfour led the Unionist

Tarty in re;iectin<g any Irish ccmpromise.
of the

."oino

Fa.rj.iamo2:,t

Alter the passage

Act in 1911» IBalfour enthui^iah^tically

joined other Unionists in attempting to uss the Ulster

issue to defeat Home Rule and precipitate a Liberal defeat.

ix

The results of this policy were to paralyze the Army and

virtually destroy the Home Rule Bill by early 1914,
The growth of Sinn Fein republicanism in Ireland

after I916 clearly demonstrated that the Irish were not
content to emulate British values and institutions as

Balfour hoped they eventually would.

With the exception

of the six counties of Protestant Ulster* Balfour thus

abandoned all interest in maintaining the Union,

He played

an important role in developing the legisilation that ulti-

mately led to the partition of Ireland in I920,
Although he made significant contributions to the
economic and social improvement of Ireland, Balfour

o>±ibited many of the anti-Irish and anti-Catholic attitudes that v^ere characteristic of late Victorian England,

Despite evidence to the contrary» Balfour never substan-

tially modified his conviction that the native Irish were

politically untrust^vorthy and intellectually and socially
inferior.

Balfour's role in and response to the Irish

Question from 18?^ to 1922 subst«nt3.ates the degree to
which a peaceful soiutlca was hindered by class
pre^iudices as well as by partisan pclitics.

av:d

naticn-l

While the

•constructive unionism' originally exocuted by Balfour

helped to chape the contours of modorn Ireland, tho unc unpromising resistance of Balfour and the Unionist Party to
Irish political aspirations and pleas lor national unity
was an important factor in precipitating the violent
in Anglo-Irish relations between 1916 and 1921.

The

clirr-ax

X

political and sectarian violence v/hich periodically has
scarred twentieth century Irish life must also be included
in the Balfourian and Unionist legacy to Ireland,
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BALFOUR AND THE EMERGING IRISH QUESTION, 187^^-188?

Arthur James Balfour was born at vVhittingehame in
East Lothian, Scotland to the wealthy and influential
James and Blanche Cecil Balfour on 25 July 1848.

James

built up a considorable fortune during the railroad boom
as Director of the North British Railway «

Arthur's

Lady Blanche, was the daughter of the second

rcoth-.jr.

Marcuej.iJ3

of

Salisbury, and the sister of Lord Robert Cecil, later the

third ivlarquess of Salisbury.

Although his father died

when Arthur was only eight years old, tha family inheritance and promj-nencs as v/ell as his mother's training and

discipline proved valuable assets to young Balfour durir.g
his ri88 to preeminence in the Conservative i-arty and the

House of

CoiTimons,

Like his father, after finishing Kton

Arthur went to Trinity College, Cambridge,

'where he read

for the nev/ly estjiblished Moral Science Tripos, v;hich
included philosophy and political economy*

Having acquii-ed

his degree and control of a isif,OOOtOOO fortune in I869r

young Balfour spent the next

lev; yec.r^

enjoying the care-

free existence of a v;rialthy and v;'ell-connected bachelor.

London society, rnusiCf tennis

^

tra^f-el

and weekend

p3,r'^;5es

at V/hittingehame and other ariarooratic country houses

absorbed Balfour's

quent to his

tiirie

liiotl'ier'G

and i.aterest until IB72.

death in that

;y'ear,

Subse-

Balfour curtailed

his social activities to surf rviso the fiinily business and

2

financial affairs in Scotland.
of his

In 187^4, at the invitation

'Uncle Robert', now the third Marquess of Salisbury,

Balfour stood as the Conservative candidate for Hertford,
and was returned unopposed in the January I874 election.-^

Arthur Balfour's parliamentary career coincided
rather neatly with the most dynamic and disruptive eras
in the bitter and rancorous Anglo-Irish imbroglio of Kodern

times.

Although the abortive Fenian revolt had occurred

when he was a young man, there is no evidence that Balfour
displayed any interest in the Irish Question in the 1860's
and 18?0's,

Balfour and his political contemporaries soon

found that English indifference to the Irish Question

becaitie

increasingly impossible and dangerous as each year of the
last quarter of the nineteenth century unfolded.

eight years of Balfour's parliamentary debut in

>Vithin
l8?^-f

the

gravity of the Irish situation was dramatically forced
upon the consciousness of the English ruling

clasf'-^es

and

the public hy the assassinatio-'i of the Chief -Secretary,

Lord Frederick Cavendishs and his assistant,

Ivir.

Burke, in Phoenix Park» Dublin, on 6 May 1882,

'

T. H,

inorcover,

the effective application of Joiseph .Bii>gar"s obstruction-

ist tactics in the Hou:?e of

Goimnoj:)...!

by the Irish Parlia-

Kontary Party j^'^blicised as never before

Irit^h

grievances.

-^These details of Balfc^jr's early life are taken from
Sydney Zebel, Iliifour* A jPiOltiCLSl J^io,g:£..^£iy (Carwbi'idge
University Press, 1973) • PP« 1"13^ Hereafter citf^d -iebel.
$

3

This parliamentary agitation under the direction of
Charles

Stuart Parnell was matched by a campaign of rural agita-

tion of boycotting, rick-burning and rent strikes in the
Irish countryside under the supervision of the ex-Fenian

Michael Davitt and his lieutenants in the Land League,
This coordinated program of parliamentary and rural agitation» known as the "New Departure", compelled both Liberals

and Gon.servatives to search for a definition of the Irish

Question and for appropriate policies to cure this festering cancer in British political and parliamentary life.
vVhat

was the Irish Question which Balfour and his

contemporaries faced in 1880-1?

The Irish Question then,

as now, was not easily defined.

The intertwining and over-

lapping of political, economic, religious and social
grievances was further complicated by the bitter historical
Lieraories of

cutions,

land confiscations, famines and religious perse-

Ever since the seventeenth century the Irish

Question had encompassed these diverse elements, but by
1880 Irish alienation from the British government and the

Ascendency system which it supported readied new and unprecedented proportions.

The causes of this heightened

exacerbation were varied, and a brief description of these
factors is crucial to an objective assessment of Arthur
Bo.lfour*9 response to, and role in, the Irish Question in

the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.

English Tory indifference to Ireland during the I870's
was an important cause of increased alientation.

3

Notwithstanding his astute definition of the Irish problem
in IQkk as '...a starving population, an absentee aris-

tocracy, and an alien church, and in addition the weakest

executive in the world.,,,* Disraeli once perched on the

greasy pole paid scant attention to Ireland and her problems.

2

Lord Salisbury, Balfour's political mentor, never

displayed much interest in Ireland until the strength of
the Irish Parliamentary Party forced him to do so in the

1880 's.

Salisbury visited Ireland only once, in 1893

p

"to

participate in an anti-Kome Rule demonstration at Belfast.
The growing political power of the Irish Parliamentary

Party and the land agitations had turned Salisbury's indifference into bitter disdain by 1391 v/hen he declared:
The revelations of the experience of the last
five years is that Vife know the Irish cause to
The English people know the
be what it is.
setimy character of Irish heroism, and they know
th£it" the character of men to wnom xhey are
asked to hand over their friends and brothers
in Ulster is such as to cover with disgrace
any nation who for any cause made such tremendous sacrifices and exertions.

Balfour's aunt, lady Salisbury, seems to typify this indif--

ference and later disdain in her comment:
...as to Ireland I have made a vow never to read
any speeches on the subject on either side, there
is nothin'-- much to be said but lies on ons side

£amn£, rev. ed. aoYvion
^F. S. L, Lyons, :i>3.ianii gincs
cited Lyons, lZ2liinfl
Hereafter
Fontana, 1973). P. l^^'
^•Shsi liiiii?^,

22 April 1891.

and contradictions on the other, and as I never
believe the first, why should I trouble about'
the last.^
This Tory indifference, along with Ascendency appre-

hensions over the consequences to their privileged
position
of Gladstone's Irish Church Disestablishment Act
and the

Land Act of I870, helped to generate Issac Butt's Home
Rule movement in the early 1870's.-

Westminster's attitude

became more exasperating as the disastrous effects of
v^orld-v;ide depression and agricultural competition became

apparent in the late 1870' s and early 1880's.

while Ascen-

dency financial difficulties were undoubtedly genuine,^
the consequences of government neglect were more acutely

felt by the Irish tenant farmers.

Faced with the worst

economic situation since the ISkO'St the tenant farmers

responded to the agrarian theories and leadership of
Michael Davit;t and John Cillon in their efforts to redress
the grievances of those on the bottom rung of Irish society.

Under the leadership of Charles Stuart Parnell, by

M

Frances Balfour,
0]2llYiS£iiriS . DXum £ori:ei (i>ondon»
Hodder and Stoughton, 1930). 11, p. 5^i, hereafter cited
Frances Balfour, iia pbliviscarlv'::
On one occasion lady
Balfour suggested, "The only cure for the evils of Ireland
io the total oxterinination of the inhabitants," A, B.
Cooke and J. Vincent, SJjJi Goyernlng i^Si-llom QsMm^t
>

QsC£!irjm^ii. r,ud lisx.ty, ZgIIIlIxis.,
Harvester i-ress, 197^)9 p. 65,

and Vincent,

!Sh3.

Governing

2MSzM

(Brighton,

Jin,?!

land.

Hereafter cited, Cooke

£aS£Lii2Il.

best description of Butt's career and his founding of
the Home Government Association is David Thornley's Issac
jOiLtl and Home KiiJji (London: KacGibbon and Kee, 196^).

'The

bM

'Barbara Solow, The LsDil
llifJ. Jrisii
(Cambridge! Harvard University i^ress, 197^).

t^onsm

6

1879 the tenant farmers and their advocates succeeded in

usurping control of the hitherto aristocratic Home
Rule
movement.

For the next quarter century the Hone Kule

movement was closely bound up with the economic aspirations of the Irish farmers, and the Irish Parliamentary

Party effectively impressed this upon the previously indif-

ferent Tories and public.
The depression of the ffiid-l870"s

v.-as

the first

serious interruption in mid-Victorian prosperity.

Ireland,

hov/ever, was even more severely affected ovdng to her

'

lower ability to cushion temporary reverses through savings

o

The combined impact of free trade plus American,

Canadian, Russian, and Argentinian agricultural competi-

tion drove the value of Irish agricultural produce down by
4.14,000,000 betv.'eon 18?6 and I879.

The depression in

English agriculture along with the beginnings of farm

mechanization eliminated the opportunities for the poorer
peasants to supplement their meagre incomes as migrant

agricultural workers.

Cormaught, inhabited by the poorest

and most debilitated peasants, lost in 187^ -^2505000

\\y

migrant wages which usually were earned in England by Connaught laborers.

To mal^e ma.tters worse, the last barrier

against starvation for the poorer families was eliminated

when in 1879 Ireland experienced the worst potato failure
since the Great Famine.
tons

v,'as

The 1879 potato crop of 1 million

valued at t3, 500, 000 whereas in I876 it had

b«>en

^ raillicn tons valued at i-12,500,OOo7

With tenant fanr.prs

deeply in debt and often starving, even moderate rents
fell into abeyance so that by the end of the decade arrears
heights,

reacbciJd nev/

IHany

lajridlordG, bui-dened

with over-

populated and encumbered and often archp.icaliy managed
estates* responded to the agricultural crisis by resorting
to widespread evictions.

The sequel to these evictions

was a ri^e in agrari.<m outrages across the country.

The

eviction and crirae statistics of the late 'sevc'nties and
the early 'eighties evidence the seriousness of the situation,

V/hilG

doubled in

in 1879 1000 families were evicted, the rate

1680,.

arid

two years later 5201 families werv^

The agrarian outrages or felonies rose in direct

evictfid.

proportion, frcm 2500 in 1660 to

3-'i-32

in 1832.*^^

Although

many of the evicted fsunilies subsequently returned to
their holdings, the evictions

given

thoip

th'.^r-'Vvelve!a

and the pubJ.lcity

had a profound impact upon public opinion both

in Ireland and in iingland,
vfhile BritiM^h

Irish alienation increased

fear and distrust of the Irish

External factors

v/ere

the depressed state of the

Although GladGtcne'v^

X^and

rr.ounted.

not completely responsible for
Iri?-.h

economy in the

Act of I870 gjranted

J.G80':>»

coi/;].''er:.sation

for tenant-conctructed iinproveuienta and pade landlords pay
Lyons,

^lyons,
S:i;ii^y

Eimim.* pp.

^imji
Ir!:i.i:iM

Xa

iiiiM

Sir^.

pp. l68"70f

l.

p.

Curtiii,

i-Tince^:on
^}.lXkonX^ (irrinceton:
Hereafter cited Curtis,
1963)» P«

Oo/UiliU:x^:;.S,YO

UriiYorBity .^Teas,

itha

-'6'J'5.

8

dearly to evict for causes other than nonpayment of
rent,
landlords were still free to raise rents. Tanants
v.-ith

arrears enjoyed no protection under the I870 legislation.

Faced with falling markets and prices, landlords hiked up
rents and tenants defaulted

»

Even had Ireland not been hi

with the agricultural depression, poor transportational
facilities, archaic agricultural methods, and lack of any
cor'rective schemes of technical education joined with

exacerbated landlord- tenant relations to make Irish

mercial agriculture a risky business.

coi^.~

Gladstone's second

land bill, drawn up in response to Davitt's agitation of
I879-I88O, granted the 3 f 's, fixity of tenure, fair rents

and free sale of improveraents ,

However,

thirj laeasur'i;

seemed successful only in flooding tha newly-establishsd
lajid

courts with increased litigation, expensive to the

lajidlordfs

and tenants as well as to the governw'jnt.

over ^ Gladstone's 1881 measure did

agitation^ cv^ing to the exclusion
280 J 000 leaseholders

axid

More-

elimina'ce rural

i?ot

froro its

provisions of

occupiers in arreax's*

ciencies of the I^nd Acts of I870 and 1381
of the Irish economic probleiis in general

The defi--

rind tlie
v,'^re

gravity?"

indicated

by the persistence of the land issue in xh^ political
activities of the Nationalist forces throughout the next
tv/o

decades.
The political components of

passed every Isvel of government
Kostt

obvious ir.Eae waa tha demand

-zhe

Irish question encom

p.nd aa;/iini strati on.
ff)r a

natiorial

The

9

legislature on the lines of Grattan's parliament.

This

had been the principal aim of constitutiomil political
moveraents ever since the Repeal campaigns of Daniel

O'Connell in the ISifO's,

The failures of Repeal, of the

IQkQ Rebellion and the abortive Fenian revolt in 186?

stimulated, rather than dampened, the de ::ermination of
Irish nationalists to secure a Dublin parliament.

More-

over, ever since 1868 the Irish Republican Brotherhood in

Ireland and the Clan na Gael in America tried clandes-

tinely to push the constitutional movement in a more radical direction tov;ards republican nationalism.

Even under

Butt's leadership, Fenians managed to infiltrate the Home
Rule mo\'ernent,^ and Parnell had to walk a thin line between

constitutional nationali£'in and Fenianism during the first
years of his leadership.

Forced to masquerade much of his

iimato consei'vatisra, Parnell never repudiated the Fenian

goal of complei;o independence.

In addition, the Irish

bishops, disappointed by Gladstone's failure to provide a
«atisracjto).y univei.\3it5'' bill for

Irifc?h

Roman Catholics and

fionsitiva to the dL^sperate economic situation of their

people

f

moved steadily tovjard active support for the Home

Rule gofil.

The impact of

V/,

E, Fornter's two coercion

bills, the effectiveness of obstruction at Westminster

from 1880-02, cmd of Davitt's agrarian agitation, combined
to attract many of the previously politically apathetic
9

lyons, irjilsuod

^in^

ihs.

Emin&r

p.

15C».

10

people to the Home Rule banner by 18B2.

Parnell's support

for tenant demands from I879 to 1881 convinced the Irish

farmers that Home Rule would solve their economic grievances.

In short, by the mid-eighties, notwithstanding their

different motives, the political aim of the Irish Parlia-

mentary Party commanded the sympathy and support of the
majority of Irishmen,
The absence of a national legislature was not the

only political grievance of the Irish population by I885.

Throughout the United Kingdom the franchise reforms of 186?
and 188^ along with the Secret Ballot Act of I872 stimulated interest in replacing the oligarchic grand juries

with democratically elected county officials.

The politi-

cal motivation to abolitih the grand juries was reinforced

by the tremendous pressures which

n2v.r

sanitary and public

health legislation had thrust upon local authorities.
Centraliz-ation and uniformity had to be brought to the
Biultifarious and often overlapping organs hitherto entrusted

with local affairs.

While in Ireland the administrative

confusion was no less serious* reform was politically
imperative because the grand juries were the bastions of
the Protestant landlord Ascendency, and hence entirely out
of sympathy with the majority of the population.

Since

grand jury eligibility depended upon holding freehold lands
of -hSO value of leasehold lands or ilOO value the majority
of Irishmen v/ero eliminated when the county high sheriff

appointed the grand jurors.

These financial qualifications

«

coupled with the fact that the high sheriff usually owed
his own appointment to the patronage of the county lord-

lieutenant insured that grand jury lists were confined to
the lan.ded gentry.

Hence it was almost inevitable that

an era of rising national consciousness v/ould produce
increasing demands for the abolition of these Ascendency-

dominated grand juries.

Irish Nationalists had seen how

the democr?.tically elected i-oor Law Guardian Boards could
be used to publicize and forward Home Rule, and they loo]cPd
to democratic local government reform as another step

towards the restoration of legislative independence.

More-

over, since the grand juries were notorious for their

parsimony, Irish local services in housing, health and

education were seriously deficient.

Democratic local

government reform was essential if the economic and social
needs posed by late nineteenth-century developments wone
to be met successfully.
Tlic

wide administrative and semi-legislative powoni

exercif^ed by numerous Dublin Ca*3tle officials and bc.irds

represented yet another facet of the Irish political grievance.

Joseph Chamberlain summarized the general Irish

attitude to the Castle system v^hen he described it

ar.

.eea system as completely centi\.4.1i7.ed nnd
bureaucratic as th-^-t wliich Rusuia governs
Poland, or as that which was con)mon at Venice
under the Austrian^?. An Irishman at this moment
cannot move a step, he cannot lift a finger
in any parochial, municipal, or educational
work without being cora'^ronted, interfered with,

controlled by an English official appointed by
a foreign governments and without a shadow or
shade of representative authority. 10
The religious and social components of the Irish

Question derived from and emphasized the political and
economic factors described.

Similar to the Negroes in

late nineteenth and early t-v/entieth century America, the

majority of Irish Roman Catholics occupied the lowest
social and economic status, and suffered from inadequate
and often nonexistent opportunities for technical or uni-

versity education,

Disml housing conditions abounded

in

the countryside for tenant farmers, and most especially

for the large class of agricultural laborers.

The Dublin

urbaji dv/ellers lived in slums universally described by

contemporaries as the worot in Europe,

Other cities v/ith

serious housing deficiencies for the laboring classes were
Corkf Limerick, and Ennis.

While high unemployment was a

big factor in the Dublin situation, in industrialized
Belfast competition betv/een Catholics and Protestants for

housing tended to escalate rents to exorbitant

leve3.s for

the ordinary worker, and most espejcially for the Catholic

operatives.

Poor nutrition, disease and high mortality

rates, post especially amoiig the children, were the natural

^^Chamberlain at Islington, ThO. Ilffiiia* 18 June I885.
Chamberlain's comparison of Dublin Castle to these
repressive regimes wacj the prelude to his attempts to
forward the national councils scheme in the summer of
C. D, H. Howard, "Joseph Ghamberlnin, Parnell and
1885,
the Irish 'central board' scheme, 1884-5," IriuJi iiXzt Qrical Studies , 8, No. 32 (September 195.3). PP. 324-61.

sequels to these horrendous economic and social
conditiono.

Given these grim realities of Irish life, the bitter
historical memories harbored by both Catholics and Protestants as well as the Ascendency's anxieties over their

eroding economic status and the rise of democratic national
isra,

it was inevitable that the innate religious tensions

between Catholics and Protestants would be seriously
exacerbated in the late 1870' s and 1880
v/as

's,

^'hile

there

a strong democratic tradition among many Ulster Presby-

teriaiis in the 1870' s and the early 1880 's,

once the Home

Rule movement gained momentum, fears of Roman Catholic

domination drove these more liberal Ulstermen into alliance
with the Ascendency.

Other explanations for the Ulster

Presbyterian loyalty to the Union have been the subject of
long and lengthy debate.

Suffice to say that Ulster, with

its different religious, economic, and social cliaracter-

istics, constituted an explosive component to the already

critical Irish Question by 1880,

Since the Ulster situa-

tion was central to the v/hole question of Irish nationalis'm

Balfour's

viev.'s

toward it will be considered in details

A final factor which helped to ripen the Irish Quest5.on

by the «;id~8ighties was the gradual democratiaation

of the parliamentary franchise by the acts of I867,

and the Redistribution Act of the following year.
important than the

haJ.f -raillion

3

884

More

now Irinh voters were the

large nuraber of newly enfranchised English and Scottish

voters who had an interest in settling the Irish question.

While Irish immigrants to Britain and their
descendants

were naturally quite sympathetic to the New Departure,

many English working-class voters and even middle -class
voters were anxious for a solution so as to free west-

minster from long and contentious Irish debates.

Ivlany

believed that the Irish Question was preventing Jr-arliament

from directing its energies to housing, educational, industrial and local political reforms,

A great portion of the

English electorate had a vital interest in settling the
Irish Question.

Parnell, therefore, by 1884-5 had a tre-

mendous bargaining power within Great Britain, and the

taciturn Irish leader quickly demonstrated his recognition
of this advantage in late 1885 when he used the Irish vote

in Great Britain as bait to dangle before Libenil and Con-

servative politicians.

By the 1880

's

English politicians

and statesmen, under the pressure of a variety of political,
economic, and social factors, were forced to focus atten-

tion on Ii'ish problems and grievances,

Similar to his Uncle Robert until the risB of the
Home Rule •ovement, Balfour displayed little concern for
the Irish Question, and he typified his class and family

in his negative attitude toward the Irish.

He deemed the

Irish multitudes as more potentially dangerous

tVian

English

multitudes, asserting that the former were more easily led

by demagogues.

The English at least demanded some external

appearances of reason from their agitators according to

15

the young Cecilian.^^

When Gladstone's second adrainistra-

tion was beseiged with Irish difficulties
generated by the
economic depression and the land war, Balfour's
comments
on Ir-ish affairs were directed chiefly to
embarrassing
the

Liberals rather than to any deep or probing analysis
of
the multiple causes of Irish discontent or to any
recom-

mendations for solving the difficulty.

The rising pattern

of rural violence impelled Balfour, a strong advocate
of

law and order and parliamentary tradition, to support

Foroter's Coercion Bill in 1881, thereby disappointing

Randolph Churchill who wished to turn the Liberals cut by
an Irish-Conservative-Radical alliance. -^"^

whan Irioh

obstructionist tactics in the Commons dr?.ined the patience
even of the sympathetic Prime Minis t^^r, Balfour supported
Crladstone'B closure resolutions,"^^

Once Gladstone reverted

back to conciliation with the land bill of 1881, which
established dual ownership for landlord and tenant, Balfour

abandoned his nonpartisan stance toward the Liberal's
Irish policy*

In the second reading debate on

measure Balfour echoed his uncle's firm belief

't\•^^

1881

thci; the

prinoiplas inherent in the measure were destructive of
'•••the pla3-n principles of property and freedom of
^''Arthur J. Balfour,

"Cobden and the fenci.ester School,"
Essays and Addresses (iidinburgh: David Douglas, 1893 )»
p. 189.

3

2

i^ebel, ££UX<2iiC. p.

3'^.

16

contract...' for the whole kingdom.

He showed anxiety

that the rent-fixing powers of the land court
might establish a precedent for interfering with freedom of
contract
in other industries.

Besides condemning these allegedly

socialistic aspects of the bill, Balfour sarcastically

reminded the Commons of the past Liberal assurances that
Church disestablishment and later the I870 Land Act would
settle the Irish Question.

He questioned the Liberal

assumption that one bill could remedy the deep seated and
long standing ills of Ireland.

He condemned Gladstone's

measure as a capitulation to, and a reward for, agitation.

Characterizing the government's Irish policy as '^..well

meaning administrative weakness, followed by a Coercion Act
of unexampled severity, followed by wild legislation,..,'

he asserted that any permanent improvement in Ireland would

come only slowly and gradually.

Balfour, however, did not

suggest any program of gradual and slow reform,
Because the 1881 bill did nothing to i^eliove tenants
in arrears p Parnell acquiesced in contirmed boycotting and

intimidation in the countryside.

Gladstone responded by

authorizing the impris onjnent of Parnell and the other
leaders of the agitation.

When the incarceration of those

leaders failed to curb the rural violence, in May 1882,

Gladstone granted Parnell 's release

aiid

pi-omised an arrears

bill in exchange for the Irish leader's promise to check
"^^3 tlan^f^xd,

cclx, I61I-15.
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tha land agitation.

This agreement, known as the Kilmain-

ham Treaty, precipitated another attack
by Balfour upon
the governraent for its apparently inconsistent
Irish
policy.
A fortnight later, in the wake of Forster's

resignation and the murders of Cavendish and Burke
in
Phoenix Park, Balfour's indignation led him to
charge the
Liberals with 'negotiating with treason'. The

Kilraainham

Treaty p he predicted, would cripple every future governlaant in

dealing with Irish disaffection and disloyalty.

Gladstone's policy was teaching Irish agitators that by

alternating threats of violence and promises of peace, they
could exact whatever legislative measure they desired from

English ministers,
By 188 3 the previouis four years of rural violence as

well as the legal and administrative complications of the
1881 act stimulated Balfour to venture beyond partisfm

attacks on the Liberals.

He heartily endorsed Lord George

Hamilton's June 1883 resolution that the purchase proviSiions of the 1881

Act be eased by full treasury-guaranteed

loans and extended payment periods.

Convinced that the

land question was the 'alpha and omega' of Irish politics,
he criticised dual ownership as a stupid attempt to return

to tribal ov/nership.

lishment of
"'^3

a.

According to Balfourj only the estab-

peasant proprietorship v/ould free Ireland of

Hani-ard. cclix,

I63-6,

^^3 Hanaarja, ccixix, 83^-37.
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the semi-socialistic agitation.

Once the Irish farmers

became owners, they would uphold the law and the
inviolable

principles of private property.

Balfour's advocacy of

peasant purchase derived in part from an anxiety over the
lessons which ringlish urban and country poor were drawing

from the theories and actions of the Irish rural agitators,
"The safety of society", he said,

"in this country abso-

lutely depended on the solidity of those sentiments about

property which were the permanent basis of our society".'^''
To tamper with them in Ireland was to expose the whole

kingdom to infinite harm.

Wage-earners as well as land-

lords, he predicted, would suffer from the spread of Irish

property theories.

Three years later, when heading the

Scottish Office, Balfour attributed the Crofter no-rent

campaign to the contagious example of Irish rural agitators.^^

Criticism of the Liberals' Irish policy was easy and

politically advantageous for occupiers of the Opposition
benches.

Once Balfour and his Conservative colleagues

carried the weight of the Irish Question upon their own
shoulders practical politics required that thoy deal
17
3
J

Emi^j:^, cclxxx, 426,

o

Lord Cranbrook shared Balfour's
3 Umi?i?.Jl^t cccviii, 9^2.
belief that Irish agitation was contagious. After a
summer holiday in the highlands in 1885 he wrote (regard"The same lawing the National League) to Carnarvon
lessness is being reproduced in the highlands and impunity
will increase the evil in both countries and possibly
extend it to r^n.Tland," Cranbroo): to Carnarvon, 3 January
1886, cited. in Cooke and Vincent, Xh2. fifiYSrains AOlSsloil,
j

p.

299.

delicately with the Irish Parliamentary Party, and
ultimately devise, as an alternative to Home Rule, a
program
to diminish rural crime and economic chaos.

Indeed,

despite his natural inclination tov/ard a strong law and

order policy, Salisbury let coercion lapse during the Care-

taker Ministry of late I885.

To have done otherwise would

have sacrificed the Irish support which had helped to

precipitate the defeat of Gladstone's government in June
1885 .

Moreover, at this juncture, there was some sympathy

for trying a conciliatory approach within the upper echelons of the Tory party,

Carnarvon, Randolph Churchill

and Kicks Beach were the most conspicuous in their .desire
to have the Conservatives reap the benefits of appeasing,
if possible,

Irish disaffection."^^

Salisbury was not

especially enthusiastic about any new conciliatory approach.

Balfour ssems to have been in substantial agreement with
his uncle.

There is no evidence that Balfour considered

Lord Carnarvon's recommendations for a federal solution of
the Irish Question appropriate or practical.

During the

Caretaker Ministry, Salisbury and Balfour were so absorbed
in quashing the federalist sympathies of Carnarvon and the

more pronounced Home Rule sympathies of his top Dublin
Castle administrators,

G,

Jenkinson and Sir Robert

Hamilton, that conciliation hardly received a fair trial.

Although later in his career Balfour made notable efforts
^Curtis

r

C^rciODt

p.

35v

20

in

-the

cause of university education for Ireland, there
is

no indication that he gave Carnarvon any support in
his
efforts to get the Prime Minister and the Cabinet to

approve a i6000 grant to finance Roman Catholic Higher
iiducation. 20

The sole conciliatory measure of any sig-

nificance to emerge from the brief Caretaker Ministry was
the Ashbourne Act of 1885 which provided

finance peasant purchase.

i-S,

000^000 to

To Balfour, the advantages

of this legislation, which enabled the tenants to borrow

the entire purchase price at

cant.

kfo

for 49 yeara, were signifi-

This arrangement preserved the principles of private-

property and freedom of contract which Gladstone's 1881
legislation had defied.

Similar to his uncle, Balfour

believed that single ownership was the real aim of Parnell
and the driving force behind the Irish tenants
??

the Irish Parliamentary Party,''

'

loyalty to

Salisbury's 7 October

1885 Newport speech revealed the paucity of the Tories'

IriKh program.

The Prime Minister's promise to introduce

democratic local government to Ireland was so hedged with

conditions regarding the disappearance of rural agitation
that a long postponement
20
?]
'

Curtis,

inevitable.

In any event,

p. ^5.

Churchill did pilot the Irish Educational F-ndowment Bill
through the Commons in August, and there was a limited
measure providing for 99 year compulsory leases to facilitate the building of laborers' cottages, Curtis, CQ^roii^Q,
p.

22

C^^jrnii2Ii»

v/as

46.

Curtis, C oercio n, p. 45.
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Salisbury was not disposed to beg publicly for
Irish votes
in the approaching election by promises of political
and

social amelioration.

After the November 1885 elections convinced Gladstone that an immediate solution of the Irish Question

along Home Rule lines was essential to the preservation of
the two-party parliamentary system, Balfour exercised a

critical role both in informing Salisbury of Gladstone's
Home Rule proclivities

ejid

in reinforcing his uncle's oppo-

sition to Gladstone's suggestions of a bipartisan effort
to frame an Irish Home

I^^uie

Bill.

Balfour was convinced

at this point that Home Rule would bring havoc to whatever

English party espoused it.^^

Firstly, he was cognizant of

the anxiety which Carnarvon's federal proposals excited

among the Tory ministers in late summer.

He knew of his

uncle's belief that federalism no less than Home Rule would

ultimately produce separation dangerous to imperial unity.

"

In additionp the preservation of party unity was funda-

mental to both Salisbury and Balfourt and neither showed
Q.ny

inclination to endanger that unity by tinkering with

the Act of Union,

In November Salisbury had first rejected

Carnarvon's suggestions for an Irish solution through a

bipartisan approach and later Churchill's recommendations
^-^Balfour to Salisbury, 23 December I885, cited in Blanche
Dugdale, Aythur James Bal four (London: Hutchinson, 19^9
Ip

9^4-5.

Hereafter cited Dugdale,

^^Curtis, Qs^^JLisnii po 66

c

)»

2.Z

for a coalition on the grounds that he could
not imitate
Peel.^^rJven more central to Balfour's
recommendation for

rejection of Gladstone's December overtures was
his
ledge that the home Rule approach did not command

Icnow-

the full

support of Gladstone's former Cabinet colleagues.

Harting-

ton and Chamberlain in particular were known to be
opposed
to Gladstone's new departure.

Once convinced that Glad-

stone was too committed by the Hawarden Kite to retreat

from Home Rule, the Tory strategy was to keep silent on
Ireland and thereby force the Liberal leader to sacrifice

Liberal unity upon the Irish Home Rule program.

After

December it was only a matter of time before the Tories
would court a defeat and leave Gladstone free to split his
party.

Despite the political excitement generated by the

Giadstonian conversion, Balfour did not speak during the
1886 Home Rule debates.

His silence should not obscure

the deep impact which the dramatic and controversial devel-

opments from June 1885 to January 1886 had upon his per-

ception of the Irish Question and its relation to British
party politics.

As Salisbury's protege, Dalfour undoubtedly

shared his uncle's conviction that Gladstone's enthusiasm
•^^Curtis,

Ooerc ion

f

pp. 61, 65,

^*^Curtis, Coercion, ppc 73-55 Dugdale, BalfmiCt If 9^J
Catherine B. cihannon,
iiP^ramsul in ire land, tJio
i:flLli±JLcs aad M.adnirJ;j:.'iilan, unpub, M.A. thesis, UniversHereafter cited Shannon,
ity College, Dublin, I963.
iiimLniiioni Jin Jx-SiimiA.

«

for Home Rule derived more from office-hunger
than from any
moral principles or a genuine desire to satisfy the
out-

standing Irish political grievance.

Just before the

Kawarden Kite and during the period when Carnarvon and
Churchill

v/ere

pressing Salisbury to consider an Irish

compromise, the Prime Minister wrote to Churchill:
fact that Gladstone is mad

"The

to take office will force him

into some line of conduct which will be discreditable to

him and disastrous, if we do not prematurely gratify his
hunger."

27

This assessment was shared by other Tories, as

Lord Cranbrook's comments to Carnarvon after Hav/arden
illustrate
•I am all for letting him (Gladstone) try his
harid if he will.
All the world seeir.f? convinced

of the insatiable eagerness of the old man for
office and his is the hand which, having
destroyed the principle of property sacred and
profane, ohoula r.ttenpt the parricidal task of
putting an end to Imperxe.l unity in the socalled United Kingdom. '^^

Balfour's inveterate and consistent suspicion of the genuineness of the Liberal commitment to Irish national

aspirations surfaced twenty-five years later during the
Home Rule crisis of

1910-1^}',

He then painted Asquith and

the Liberals in the same colors which adorned Gladstone

in 1885~6.

Moreover, Salisbury's firm rejection of any

compromise on the Act of Union, either through federalism
"^"^Cited

in Curtis, Coercion, p. 68.

Cranbrook to Carnarvon, 1? December 1885, cited in Curtis,
Cosx^^ism, p. 69.

or a joint party effort for Home Rule,
provided a precedent

which Balfour was loathe to negate when he
leader.

v.as

party

Just as Salisbury had encouraged the Liberals
to

commit themselves fully on Home Rule as a
tactical device
to regain office, Balfour tried to pave the
way for the
return of the Unionists during 1912-U by manipulating
the
Ulster issue.
The Home Rule debates of 1886 need not detain us,

and it is convenient to focus attention on August 1886
when, following the July election, Lord Salisbury resumed
office, backed by a majority of 118, of whom

7^-

were

former Liberals who had deserted the Gladstonian ranks
over Home Rule.

The defeat of the Home Rule Bill did not

give the Prime Minister and his colleagues any respite from
the complications of the Irish Question,

As in the days

of the Caretaker Ministry, parliamentary realities demanded

that the Tories find an alternative to mere resistance to
Home Rule,

The Liberal Unionists, and especially those

from Ulster, although vehemently opposed to Home Rule,
were loathe to give up their commitment to comprehensive
land legislation and government-supported economic development.

Soon after Hicks Beach assumed the Irish Office,

the Ulster Liberal Unionists sent a deputation to Dublin

Castle requesting that the government adopt as its policy

extended land purchase, development of Irish resources

through drainage schemes and transportational improvements,
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1881 legislation.

Both Hicks Beach and his undersecretary.

Sir Redvers Buller, discreetly attempted to convince
Irish

landlords to reduce voluntarily rents in order to avoid
all
the local and parliamentary difficulties associated with
evictions.-"32

The Chief-Secretary 's admonitions to the

Irish Isjidlords did little to quiet the countryside, and
in October 1886 the rent boycott known as the Plan of Cam-

paign was initiated by Timothy Harrington,
and John Dillon of the National League,

v/illiara

O'Brien,

when H:»cks Beach

pressed for action on the Catholic University Question and
on local government in late 1886, Salisbury's anxieties

about his Irish chief increased. -^-^

By the end of 1886 the

Prime Minister was as disenchanted with Hicks Beach's

general Irish policy and his reluctance to apply coercion
as he had been over Carnarvon's during the Caretaker Ministry.

By February he

vvas

convinced that Hicks Beach like

Carnarvon had gone green in Dublin.

It must have been with

some relief mixed with regret over a colleague's illness,

that Salisbury accepted the resignation

of- hir>

Irish Chi'sf-

Secrctary in early March 188?.
The increasing effectiveness of the Plan of Campaign,

pressures from government supporters, as well as Salisbury^,
own strong views on law and order, demanded that

tlie

next

Irish chief be a vigorous administrator and absolutely
32

Curtis, CoerciQn, PP. I26-30,

-^^ilU.^.,

pp.

166-69.

I'll,

sound on property rights, law enforcement and
the Union.
In Salisbury's opinion, Arthur Balfour was
the man who

possessed all these characteristics, a man who would
not
be deterred from applying the Gecilian formula of
resolute
government.

Between 188? and I89I, Salisbury had no cause

to regret his nephew's appointment to the Irish office.

Indeed, Balfour ventured beyond resolute government to

develop perhaps the most effective Irish policy of any

Chief-Secretary in the late nineteenth century.

The next

chapter will discuss how Balfour dealt with the complicated
and explosive Irish Question of the late 'eighties.

GHAPTjiR

II

ARTHUR BALFOUR AS IRISH CHIiiF-oECRn-'TARY

28

Arthur Balfour's appointment as Irish
Chief -oecretary
in March 188? shocked the parliamentary
world,
//ithin the

recent past, men of considerably more
political experience
and physical stamina such as W. r). Forster
and Sir Michael
Hicks Beach had cracked under the strains
of the Irish
office.

Consequently, the ministerial announcement was
not
greeted with much enthusiasm or confidence
in the Tory and
Unionist ranks. The Nationalist members seemed
rather sur-

prised but gleeful that Salisbury had obliged
them with such
an inexperienced and seemingly delicate target for
the par-

liamentary and political attacks traditionally launched
upon
Irish secretaries.

The Irish representatives and the politi-

cal pundits took delight in formulating sobriquets such as
'Tig3r Lily',

'Niminy-Piminy

'

,

'Daddy Long Legs' and 'Clara'

to describe the youthful delicate new Irish Secretary."^

Despite this initial ridicule, charges of nepotism, and

Balfour's relative youth, Lord Salisbury was confident of
his nephew's abilities and potential to grapple with the

difficult Irish Cluestion.
three considerations.

This confidence derived from

Firstly, close family ties as well

as a common political and intellectual perspective insured

that the Irish Office would be directed and managed along

29

lines that were agreeable to the lord
of Hatfield.
In other
words, the Prime Minister was quite
sure that his nephew
would not 'go green' in Dublin as Carnarvon
and Hicks Beach
had done earlier. Secondly, the coalition
discussions of

1685-6 indicated that Balfour was as sound
as the Premier on
the inviolability of the Union.
If under the pressure of
office Balfour deviated from postures
acceptable to Salisbury,
the close relationship between the two
facilitated a moder-

ating influence, or at least, insured an opportunity
to
settle differences privately, and thereby guard against
sures within the Cabinet.

fis-

This was no mean consideration in

light of the difficulties which the Irish Question had posed
to both Tories and Liberals in the previous four decades.

A third consideration accounting for Salisbury's

confidence undoubtedly rested upon his nephew's experience
as Secretary for Scottish affairs from August 1886.

Although

his tenure was brief, Balfour had demonstrated considerable

administrative skill in handling the Crofter agitation in
the Highlands.

In combatting the no rent agitation of 1886-?

in the Hebrides, he gave firm backing to the police and dis-

played some initiative in tackling the Crofter problem at
its roots by investigating immigration schemes.

Balfour's

parliamentary defense of his Scottisii administration, vhile
not brilliant, was more than adequate, and indicated potential

parliamentary abilities,

Moreover, the problems plaguing

many sections of Ireland were analogous in kind,

.if

not in

scale, to those the youn{/ Cecilian faced in Scotland.

•
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Balfour's short sojourn in the Scottish Office was an

appropriate and proraising apprenticeship for the new Irish
Secretary.

2

Within nine months of his appointment, Balfour proved
that his uncle's confidence had not been misplaced.

Sharing

Salisbury's view that peasant purchase was the only acceptable solution to the land question, the new Chief-Secretary

quickly directed his energies to studying the short and long,
term requirements for stimulating the purchase provisions
of the Ashbourne Act.

In dealing with the Plan of Campaign

and th2 rural agitation in general he proceeded quicJcly and
decisively.

The major barriers to effective law enforcement

were identified as an inability to obtain evidence from

victims of rural crime, and the impossibility of obtaining
jury convictions.

Intimidation and boycotting of witness

and jurors were the root of these difficulties.-^

Similar

in outlook to his uncle, Balfour thought 'resolvite government' the most appropriate immediate response.

Therefore,

in his first House appearance as Chief -Secretary, he intro-

duced a Crimes Bill which provided for summary justice with
a maximum of 6 months at hard labor for persons who engaged
in or incited offenses such as intimidation, boycotting,

Balfour, I» 107-119; Bernard Alderson, MifmjX
G. Richards, I903), chap. 1. Hereafter cited
Alderson, Balfour

^.Dugdale,

(London:

.

'h h2J:i^^» cccxii, 1633.
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rent conspiracies, unlawful assembly and obstruction
of
evictions. The bill was designed to establish

extraordinar;

justice only in those areas or counties where the
local

crime statistics caused the lord-lieutenant to request
its

application.

This eliminated the hostility which summary

justice would create in the more pacific counties.

Unlike

previous coercion bills, Balfour's was to be a permanent
feature of the Irish legal code.

Its permanency avoided

the parliamentary difficulties of reenacting coercion when

circumstances v;arranted it.
In defending the Crimes Bill Balfour dismissed the

idea that remedial legislation was the proper cure for the

current lawless condition of Ireland.

Not until respect

for the law and for the sanctity of contracts were restored

could remedial legislation effect any lasting benefit in
Ireland,

Otherwise, he predicted

...every tenant in Ireland will believe that
he has only to go upon the same linss which
they have been pursuing, and the property of
every landlord will be whittled down... and
ultimately by slow but sure degrees he will
get his land for nothing.^
The Chief-Secretary attacked the characterization of the

National League as an organization engaged in collective

bargaining similar to English trade unions.

He insisted

that the League was a reincarnation of the Land Loaguo

which Gladstone had labelled conspiratorial only six years
h.

3 Hansard

f

cccxii, 1184,

»

earlier."^5

If the Irish party entertained any hopes
that obstruc-

tionist tactics would defeat the coercion
bill, they were
sorely disappointed. For four months,
Balfour, always v/ell
equipped with criminal statistics and detailed
reports of
intimidations, boycotting, etc. gathered from Dublin
Castle,
and Assize reports, waged a tenacious but
successful par-

liamentary battle against his Irish and liberal
critics.
The Royal Assent for the Crimes Act was secured
on 18 July.
The Tims, expose on 'Parnellism and Crime', although
subse-

quently discredited by the forgery of

R,

ligott, materially

assisted the government in securing the votes of the J^iberal
Unionists whose natural inclinations went against coercion.

From August 188? until late I889 Balfour loft no
doubt of his determination to prosecute any person, irrespective of v/ealth, religion or position, vmo aided and

abetted the Plan of Campaign or the rural agitation encouraged by the National League*

Speaking at Manchester in

December, I887 he warned the Irish m. p.'s,
Mere abuse could be treated with contempt, but
advocacy of crime, when
men who come over here and speak sofxly to the
iinglish people, go back to Ireland and urge the
excitable peasantry of that country to resist
the law, then I say you have ceased to be politicians , and you have become criminals^ and as
criminals I shall proceed against you,^
yihen it comes to open

5

3 limsaxdr

^Alders on,

cccxii, 1181-2
Baii;.o_ui:*

p. 78,
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John Dillon and William O'Brien were
among the 26
Irish members who found Balfour true
to his word.
The
English Radical Home Ruler C. A. V. Conybeare
was incarcerated for his participation in eviction
obstruction,

while Wilfred S. Blunt, a cousin to Balfour's
secretary,
found that his acquaintance with the Chief -Secretary
in
the

'Souls' group did not exempt from conviction
his

inciting agrarian offenses.
Upon coming into office Balfour was disturbed by the

nervous reluctance of the Irish

Lav;

Office and the Irish

bench to prosecute and convict leaders of the National
League, most especially members of parliament and priests.

Declining morale within the Royal Irish Constabulary following the Gladstonian conversion and the renewal of

agrarian v/arfare were other barriers to

-^b

effective imple-

mentation of the Crimes Act, barriers which Balfour was
determined to break down»

The Chief-Secretary 's defense of

the police and the resident magistrates in the Mitchelstown

affair of

9

September 186?, irrespective of strong evidence

of police indiscretion and bad judgement, restored the con-

fidence of the Consta/bulary and the resident magistrates.''
"^Curtis, QmJZQj^Qiit 197-200.
The trial of William O'Brien
and John I.landeville (for inflamatory speeches) at Liitchelstown on 9 September 1887 precipitated a protest meeting by

the National League.
John Dillon and Henry Labouchere
were the keynote speakers for the occasion.
v*hen the
efforts of the local magistrates and the jjolice to clear
a way for the police reporter were resisted by the crowd,
fighting broke out between the police and the crowd. Outnumbered by 100 to 1, the police withdrew into the local
barracks, and took up defensive positions. Confused and

.

,

3^

Balfour and Under-Secretary Ridgeway
constantly prodded the
Law Office in Dublin Castle to end their
'eternal minuting'

of cases, sjid proceed with prosecutions.

indicate, the promotion to

tlie

As his name would

Attorney-Generalship of

•Peter the Packer' O'Brien in 1888 did much to
shore up the

administration of the Crimes Act.^

Not too many months

elapsed before the Irish replaced the sobriquet 'NiminyFiminy' for 'Bloody Balfour', while laudatory remarks
about

Balfour's administration circulated within the Cabinet and
Irish Unionist ranks. ^

In fact, on occasions Balfour vir-

tually outdid his uncle in advocating 'resolute government'.

Parliamentary and political exigencies impelled the Prime

Minister to intervene when his nephew planned to prosecute
Irish newspaper publishers-

and high ranking Catholic

clerics for supporting the Plan of

Campaign."''"^

panicked, they opened fire on the crov;d with the result
that tv;o were killed, and several were wounded. The episode had some striking parallels to the infamous "Peterloo
Massacre' of 1819.
8

9

Curtis,

pp. 186-208.
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fecGeagh to Hugh de F. Montgomery, 12 November 1888,
Montgomery Papers P R 0 N I
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Curtis, GasiKilQu, pp. 210-1^; Dugdale, Balf our
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Curtis, CQsxsilsmt pp. 2y^-6, When estimating the effect
of the Crimes Act on the league and on its utility in
getting the support of 'a better class of Roman Catholics',
Balfour corcmentedJ 'It is a curious fact that vigorous
Measures of suppression appear to produce a less exasperated frame of mind in the people than the impunity
v/hioh attended disloyal action during the period which
preceded the passing of the Bill.' Cabinet Memo on the
Crimes Act, n. d.p B. M. Add. MS ^I9>.822, f. lk-7
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While Balfour's rigorous law
enforcement produced
abundant Nationalist propaganda and
generated barrages of
protest from the Irish benches, it did
accomplish a substantial reduction in agrarian crime by
late 1088.
From
both a cabinet and parliamentary perspective,
this was a

necessary preliminary to the introduction of
conciliatory
legislation for Ireland, The Cecilian insistence
upon the
Irish first learning respect for the law was
a pragmatic
and realistic assessment of the mood of ^Vestminster
as much
as it was a product and reflection of Victorian
anti-Irish
prejudice.

Given the continued allegiance of many British

politicians to 'laissez-faire', and their deeply imbedded
,

suspicions of the Irish people, definite progress towards
•law and order'

v/as

essential before the canons of

r>Ian-

chesterian economics could be violated by Irish remedial
legislation.

As distasteful as Balfour's law enforcement

was to the Irish, it did create a parliamentary climate in

which desperately needed programs of land purchase and economic development could not be easily jettisoned on grounds
of 'intolerable state intervention' or 'crim.inal statistics'

Until recently the bitter parliamentary debates gener-

ated by 'coercion'

obscured the more constructive and

enduring aspects of Balfour's Irish policy."'"^
12

Only shortly

Curtis, CQgrc.ign» chaps, 13-15; Catherine B. shannon, Lpi;a
C o v g ri2.nifi. alc In Irslanii, ihs. i^ litj.c.s.
ihs. Admin istmti.oN
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after assuming office, the Chief -Secretary acknowledged
the need to temper Tory anti-Home Rule sentiment
and repres

sion with conciliation.

Defining Cromwell's mistake as

relying upon coercion alone, he promised to be
...as radical as any reformer in redressing the
grievances and especially in removing every
cause of complaint in regard to land.
It is
on the tv/o fold aspect of my policy that 1 rely
for success.
Hitherto the English governments
have stood first upon one leg and then UDon the
other.
They have either been all for reoression
or all for reform.
I am for both? repression
as stern a.s Cromwell; reform as thorough as
Mr, Parnell or anyone else can desire,J3

Over the next

tv/o

decades in his position as Chief-

Secretary and influential cabinet ministers Balfour was
generally faithful to the promise cited above.

Viewing the

land problem as the seed from which all the agrarian and

separatist agitation germinated, Balfour concluded that
only the abolition of dual ownership and the establishment
of peasant proprietorship could bring peace to Ireland.

His first months in the Irish office sealed his conviction

that the 1881 settlement had failed.

Home Rule sentiment,

he believed, would disappear in direct proportion to the
governiiient 's ability to secure,

in the short run, rent

adjustments consistent with the 1885-6 plunge in agricul-

tural prices, and in the long run? a comprehensive program
of land purchase.

The March 188? Report of the Cowper

Commission echoed Balfour's views in its lecommendation
T,

p.

^11.

Raymond, Mc. Balfour (London»

W,

CollAns, 1920),
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for a government sponsored and guaranteed
purchase program.
The Commissioners, the i:;arls of Cowper
and Kiltown, James
Caird, J. G. Neligan and Thomas iCnlpe
condemned dual ownership as absolutely destructive of industry,
initiative and
prosperity. This Commis£,'ion along with the First
Report
of the Royal Commission on Irish Public Works
also called

for extensive government action in initiating drainage
schemes and railway and harbour construction."^^

The Liberal

Unionists of Ulster had been pressing the Ministry for these
schemes ever since Hicks Beach

v/as

in

office.-^'-^

Despite the time consuming debates on the Crimes Bill^

Balfour's study of the various dimensions of the Irish land

question led to his Cabinet memorandum by early April 188?
in which he outlined a step by step policy designed to cure

Ireland's historic land ills.

Although stressing to his

colleagues the ultimate purchase solution, he recommended
a temporary measure along the lines of Darnell's Tenants

Relief Bill which Parliament rejected the previous year.

Plunging agricultural prices made an immediate reduction
of non-judicial rents absolutely essential if the government

1^

Hereafter cited'
pp, 9t 18 (c. 4969} H.'C. 188?', xxvi.
Cowper Comraicsion Report. See also Fj^xsi Rep_oxt £l\ the
-toal. CrujialiislQn on Irish Piil)JJji iiorJis (c."5038) h," c.
10 67, XXV.
i!l3iQr Mkpxal iinioiiisj; Asj?.QQ.ijktiont a ^iis@ie.h oL lis.
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was to check further expansion of
rent boycotts.
Indeed,
the government-appointed Gowper
Commission supported the
Nationalist contention that the judicial
rents fixed under
the 1881 legislation were exorbitant.
However. Balfour was
reluctant to interfere here lest the Irish
tenants conclude
that legal contracts could be suspended
whenever bad times
arose. 1^ Meanwhile the larger purchase
scheme and action
on the Congested Districts would have
to be postponed until
the combined effects of a tenants relief
measure and the

Crimes Bill restored order in the countryside.

The tenants'

relief measure that Balfour subsequently introduced
in July
188? recommended opening up the Land Courts to I50.OOO pre-

viously excluded leaseholders.

In an effort to reduce the

bad effect which newspaper reports of Irish evictions

v/ere

having upon English public opinion, Balfour recommended that
the

"first eviction' which was usually followed by a six-

month re-entry and redemption option, be replaced with a

written notice of intent to evict unless arrears were forthcoming.

The Chief-Secretary also planned to enable Irish

tenants to declare bankruptcy if their insolvency was not
of their own making.

Anticipating the objections of recal-

citrant -landlords and their Cabinet sympathizers who might
c3-aira

'violation of property rights', Balfour reminded his

colleagues that these proposals were an essential part of
16

Balfour's Cabinet Memorandum on land policy, 8 April I887,
M. Add. KS 49,822, ff. 38-50? Dugdale, Balfour
I, 128j
Curtis, Cpsssiim, p. 337
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.
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any plan to restore law.
The landlords must not consider it in isolation.
They must take it in connection with the whole
policy of the governrcenx; and they must feel
that the sacrifice asked of thera (if sacrifice it
bej IS absolutely required if. the Union and all
the union means to them, is to be maintained. 17

As expected, Balfour's proposals were attacked by the

Conservatives in both Houses for going too far, while the
Nationalists raised a hue and cry over the absence of any

provision to adjust the terms and prices of judicial rents, -^-^

After a long parliamentary battle concessions were granted
to both sides.

The Liberal Unionists and the Nationalist

demands for revision of judicial rents and a triennal term
were granted, while landlord anger

v/as

partially appeased

by the cancellation of the bankruptcy clause.

In an effort

to calm the tempers and turmoil which the Crimes Bill simul-

taneously produced in Parliament, Balfour instructed Under-

secretary Buller to defer until the passage of the relief
bill those evictions v/here it appeared the tenants had been

treated harshly by their landlords,

Although he kept it

hidden from public view, Balfour was extremely exasperated
by landlords like Clanricarde and O'Callaghan who pushed
their proprietory rights to the limit during the I887-8
17

'Balfour's Cabinet Memorandum on land policy, 8 April 188?
B. M, Add, r.:S -^^9.822, ff, ^9~50.

^^3 Hansara, cxxxvii, 372-90, S?2-7-^c

^^Dugdale, MlXsm^t I» 137: Balfour to Buller, 11 and 23
June 1887, cited in Curtis, Coerciony p. 243.

^0

crisis.

As he later recalled to Lord
Northbrook,

not unjuot, as far as

1

know, to his tenants

he
'''''''' a^d"cspeiia!ly

irritating at a tirae when it behoved
?rr!ta?in.^at'7t"'"^'i;'^'^
everybodv
interested
law and order to support the Govern^^^^^
difficulties of
^n^'^J'-^"^
other landlords
and the Government who had to

m

1

pro-cect them.'^O

In fact Balfour was so enraged by
Clanricarde

's

refusal to

forego evictions and to accept rents arbitrated
by Bishop
Healy of Clonfert that he drew up
legislation giving the
Land Court power compulsorily to take over
and manage the
estates of unreasonable landlords.

Cabinet hesitancy on

the basis of property rights was too strong to
overcome, and

this plan to reduce unnecessary evictions

v/as

lost.^-"-

Once passage of the Tenant's Relief measure was

assured, Balfour and Salisbury hoped to introduce a compre-

hensive land purchase bill as quickly as possible.
based their anxiety upon a number of considerations.
so long as dual ownership existed

^

They
First,

the Irish wordd have a

theatre to expound their socialistic property theories.
The demonstrations and riots connected with the agitation
of the Social Democratic Federation in the late summer and

fall of 1887 seemed to substantiate the contagious nature
of Irish property theories.

Men of Salisbury's and Balfour's

wealth and position could not be indifferent to this
20

21

Balfour to Lord I^orthbrook, 5 June 1S99» B. M.Add.
49,853. f. 13.
Curtis,

iLcimiifiii,

pp. 256-7.
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^1
situation, and they hoped to convert
tho peasants of Ireland
to capitalistic values through land
purchase.
Secondly,
many Irish landlords, in the face of
downward rent revisions,
boycotts and generally declining land
values, were anxious
to sell before prices sunk too low.
and before Nationalist
agitators convinced the tenants that their
holdings would
be obtained for nothing within a few
years. Lord i^nsdowne.
an old school chura of Balfour's and Hugh de
F. Montgomery,
were typical of many Irish landlords who
ultimately advo-

cated purchase in order to cut their losses.

The critical

situation of many landlords is exemplified by the losses
Lansdowne incurred on his Irish estates, v/here his net
rentals fell from i23,000 to ^500 by 1888.^^

In addition

to the pressure of vested interests, rapid action on pur-

chase was continually pressed upon the Tories by the Liberal

Unionists smarting under a coercionist label.

were repeatedly reminded

The ministers

by the Liberal Unionists and their

leader, Joseph Chamberlain

that the terms of the coalition

included land purchase, and remedial legislation for education, drainage, railways and democratic local government.
2?

-

North brook to Montgomery 26 February 1889,
r.R. O.N. I.
Dod/627A' 28/83? R. i-iacGeagh to Jiontgomery, 17 November
1888, Dod/62?A28/8l; Montgomery to G, de v/illis, 26 April
1889, Bod/627 A28/98s Saiiuel Black to Montgomery, 29 September 1888 f Dod/627/^28/56.
j.^ord

»
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Despite the urgency felt by Balfour and the
Cabinet,
a comprehensive scheme had to await the
settlement
of a

number of problems, such as determining a price
fair to
tenant and landlord alike, choosing the proper
machinery

to

supervise sales, setting up the necessary Treasury
guarantees,
and deciding upon the justification of compulsion on
those

estates where the landlord-tenant relations had been espe-

cially acrimonious.

The Congested Districts in the West

presented even greater difficulties since most holdings
there were inadequate in size or quality of soil to merit

purchase.

Not until late I889 were all these matters set-

tled, so that Balfour's first venture in land purchase was

fairly limited in scope.

The 1888 Act did prove the govern-

ment's commitment to purchase by providing

supplement the Ashbourne Act.
price from 18 year

3

i>3,

000, 000 to

The reduction of the purchase

months rental value to 1? years

insured that annuities

v/ere

not greater than rents, and

thereby induced more tenants to apply for purchase,
I890 purchase applications totaling

submitted by 23 p 348 tenants,

127,388 had been

26

Balfour's legislative efforts
land purchase.

tL9,

By

v/ere

not confined to

Partially in response to Liberal Unionist

Pomfret, Hi£
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^^John

FJ.

26 Curtis, Coercion, p,

350.

^3

pressure and an optimism generated by rising
farm prices
and a languishing of the Plan of Gampai-n,
Balfour laid

before Parliament a series of proposals designed
to augment
economic development. The Cowper Commission and
the First
Report of the Royal Commission on Irish Public Works
had
stressed the need for a network of drainage schem.es
to control the flooding of Ireland's many rivers.

Productive

farming was impossible in many areas without proper flood
control, most especially in those agricultural coiTununities

bordering upon the Shannon River and the Corrib,

Absence

of drainage schemes Balfour cited as an importajit barrier
to purchase by many tenants.

So he introduced drainage

bills for the Barrow, Eann, Sharjion and Suck Rivers on
31

I/iay

1888,

He intended to finance the schemes through a

combination of free grants and loans totaling jb380,000.
In the course of the debate

p

although aclmowledging

v^he

Radical complaint that English localities had to finance
their public works, the Chief-Secretary defended the e^^pendi-

ture of imperial funds as an historic deblr owed to Ireland
for the destruction of budding Irish industries prior to
the Union.

However, lest the Irish members expect massive

imperial financing, Balfour emphasized his conviction that
goverriment aid alone could not create economic progress,

A

great industrial enterprise, he said, was the product of
native skill, capital, and organizing ability.
that Ireland possessed
the last.

tJie

Maintaining

first two, he saw no evidence of

This lack of confidence in the Irish was

reflected in the small degree of popular
control over the
drainage schemes given to the occupiers
charged with the
repayment of loans. Although the Irish
members were not
overly enthusiastic about the bills,
the Radical opposition
led by A. C. V. Conybeare. Sir George
Campbell and S. Storey
destroyed them.^? Radical criticism of any
expenditures
on Ireland had been consistent, and Balfour
complained

bitterly to the Bishop of Selfordof his additional
obstacle.
You will observe the attitude that has been
taken up by the Radical tarty on the subject
of my Bills for the material improvement
of
Ireland - they are determined to do their best
to wreck them, the Irish members fi;ivin£;^ the
Government cold and reluctant support. 28
On the other hand, the Light Railway Bill providing
a

grant of L60 0,000 to facilitate the construction of linos
into the Congested Districts of the West was warmly received

by the Irish members.
m.S5l<?ja

m IxisJl

Th^

Sq.qs,ji^

iiljMixi vmrilS as

Rej^orJ; q£.

ihQ Roval Cpia-

well as the annual reports

of the Irish Fishery Inspectors had emphasized the urgency
of rail facilities for the struggling infant fishing indus29
i.ry.
The Chief -Secretary argued forcefully for the rails
as a much more important means of boosting prosperity than
3 HjJQOaLrd,

28
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drainage schemes. ^0

in addition to citing the potential

increase in the sale of Irish fish and
agricultural produce,
Balfour stressed the railways' utility
in exposing the Congested Districts to the 'outside world'.
Undoubtedly he
believed that anglicization and modernization
would be

stimulated.

He saw an additional blessing in the
rails'

potential for encouraging emigration.

-^^

The importance

Balfour attached to the rail scheme was roflected
in the
liberal credit arrangements for the proposed lines.
The

bill authorized the Treasury to make a direct
guarantee to
the rail companies rather than await a primary
guarantee

from the barony through which the line was to pass.

Tm

nyw

credit regulations enabled the required capital to be raised
at 3^ per annum rather than

5>'i.

If rr2cesf:ary» the Treasury

could loan all or part of the fc600,000 to rail compcxnies
unable to raise funds from private sources.

The Congested

Districts were not liable for any of the construction costs,

although a rate of 6d in the pound was authorized by the bill
if costs exceeded receipts.

With the exception of three

Irish members, the Irish benches found

attractive.

scheme very

Mr. Joseph CTillis Biggar (Cavan,

.'0

e.nd

Mr. Patrick Arthur Chance (Kilkenny) attacked the bill as

a bribe, while Arthur O'Connor (Donegal,

3 HanaaiL<^.»

i^.)

abstained

cccxxviii, 9^.

'^1

^
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from voting on the grounds that high
overhead would increase
taxes in his locality.
However, Rev. Michael Martin of
Killybegs rebuked O'Connor, and emphasized
to Balfour the
importance or the railways to Donegal.
I told him he assumed a most
unwarrantable
responsibility to make a false statement at
the very time that all the divisions of
the
country were crying out for railv/ays, I
said that he and his party were opposing
every good measure for Ireland, that no chief
secretary had ever done the one-twentieth
part of the good v/hich you do for the count-^y
.and that after you had passed your land
purchase bill no fair man could deny it. 32

The passage of the Light Railways Act in I889
greatly

facilitated the government's task of providing employment
in the congested districts during the potato failure of the

following year,

/^hen

reports of a probable blight reached

the government during early June I89O, Balfour moved to

incorporate rail construction into his general relief plans.

Construction in the areas dependent upon the potato began
in late November^ four months earlier than planned so as to

coincide v/ith the exhaustion of the good potatoes in midDecember.

Balfour threatened the Midland Railway Company

with cancellation of the government contract when they balked
at the financial arrangements offered by the government.

•^•^

Anxious to keep relief works to a minimum and to avoid the
K. Martin to Balfour, 9 March I89I, B. M. Add. MS
^9,848, ff, 95-6.
Many newspapers within the Congested
Districts recorded resolutions of local boards of^guardians
favoring the construction of railways,

-'"Rev,

^-^Gurtis, Coercior i. p.

366.
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Meinoralization' of outdoor relief, Ealfour
wanted to
employ as many men as possible on the
rails.
Sir West
Ridgeway, the Under-Secretary, estimated
that the wages
paid to from 7,000 to 8,000 men and boys
saved approximately
35 to ifO thousand people from virtual starvation during one
of the worst blights since the 18^0 's.^^
Ridgeway arrived
at the latter figures by including the
relatives of rail

workers who were sustained by rail wages.

Official figures

indicate that the 228 miles of rail constructed during
the

distress raised the economic potential of many congested
areas.

The Donegal-Killybegs line may partially explain

the increased fishing activity in the area between
1892 and

1903

e

The number of vessels engaged in fishing rose from

158 to 198

J

while the fishermen employed increased in numbers

from 3k6 to 10^5.^^
The government's relief schemes provided 7392 people

with work on road and bridge construction and repair.

The

seacoast population benefited from the construction of 18
piers, boatslips and landing areas.

The projects were

carefully planned to insure that only useful construction
was done.

Balfour demanded close supervision on the relief

West Ridgeway 's Draft Report on Relief of Distress,
I89O-I, B. M. Add. MS 49,823, f. 182.

oi.r

^%ii^Tnla mxsiLto:, 1894, p, 697;
p. 799.

tUqhIs Dirge tgrY, 1895,

Ridgeway 's Report on Distress, I890-I, B,
49,^23, f. 182.

ivi.

Add. KS

.
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works to insure that 'a day's work for a day's
pay' prevailed.-^"^

Besides alleviating the serious distress and

permajiently improving the economic resources of
the west,

Balfour hoped the relief works would lift the
inhabitants
out of '...the demoralizing slough of insolvency..,'
through

hard work, discipline and punctuality learned on the job.
The Chief -Secretary was convinced that his self-help lesson

would prove an asset as important as roads and rails in
averting a complete collapse in any future potato failures.

Education into Anglo-Saxon values was a fundamental aim of
moot of Balfour's ameliorative measures

c*^^

The road works and rail construction were not appro-

priate forms of relief for the sick, the old and the children
of the famine-stricken areas.
37

The government relied upon a

Balfour to Commissioner Tuke, 26 August I890, B. M. Add.
MS 49,817, f. 248.

-'^

30

18 November 1890.
TJtLa Times,
3 Himsard* cccxlix, 560
Indeed, the Chief -^Socretary would have reforraed Irish
eating habits, if possible. After conducting experiments
growing potatoes at his whitting hame estate on the
1890 failure, Balfour lamented in September I890 to Sir
James Caird, 'I v/ish to heaven we could induce the Irish
to grow some food of a more trustv/crthy character than
the potato, ., .The readiness to accept nev/ ideas and to
engage on new enterprises is precisely the characteristic
most wanting in the population. ... If it were not so they
would have refused to squat generation after generation
on the bogs and mountains of the inclement rtest,
Cited
A few weeks later Lord Zetland, the
in Curtis » p. 378.
Viceroy, expressed similar sentiments v/hen reporting on
'I grieve to say that my
his recent tour in the v/est,
experience of the Celts leads me to believe that .trovidonco
has not endowed him with sufficient energy to do much more
Zetland
than eat l-'otatoes that are put into his mouth.'
to Balfour, 2? October I89O, B. M. Add. iViS 49,602, f, 127
;

'
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strictly administered outdoor relief
program, seed distribu«
tion. and the efforts of private
charity to
take care of

this segment of the distressed
population.

The private

charity efforts of Lord and Lady Zetland,
the Viceroy and
his wife, helped to mitigate some of
the hostility which the
restrictions on outdoor relief caused.

Although the government's response to the crisis
of
I89O-I may appear niggardly and inadequate by
today's
standards, when measured by the climate of contemporary
opinion, Balfour's actions evidence a novel determination
to find a permanent remedy for the terrible poverty in
Con-

naught and Western Donegal.

Many of the people and the

priests later acknowledged his efforts,

while others com-

mented upon the improved efficiency and effectiveness of
the relief operations as a v/hole.^^

An explanation of this increased effort is not hard
to find.

In addition to his experience with the Crofter

problems in Scotland, Balfour's two week tour of Cormemara
and Donegal in October I890 impressed upon the Chief-

Secretary the serious consequences of the impending crop
failure, and also strengthened his conviction that even in

Turner to Balfour, 2? November I89O, B, M, Add.
MS 49,609, ff. 106-81 Rev. Michael Martin to Balfour,
9 March I89I, B, M. Add. MS 49,848, ff, 93-96j vvilliam
Doherty to Balfour, 4 June I89I, B, M. Add. WS 49,848,
f. 205? resolutions of Swineford Board of Guardians on
8 March 1892 reported in Hi)tas X):ijm Ir^lnnd, V, no. 4
(19 toch 1892)
Dublin ilerald, 13 August 1892.

^^-^Golonol

J

^^R» Rutledge Fair to Browning, 12 February I89I, B. M. Add.
MS 49,848, f. 63i ^'•yndham to Balfour, 26 November 1900,
B, M. Add. MS 49,80:3, f. 48
same to same 2 February I9OO,
f. 205, fjame to same, 20 September I90I, ff. 211-12.
j
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ordinary circumstances a heavy does of state
intervention
was necessary to render any improvement in the
Consested
Districts. As he told the National Conference
of Consorvative and Constitutional Associations in Liverpool
subsequent
to his tour, relief works alone would not teach
'...the
habits of continuous, painful, industry...' so essential
to
any significant or permanent progress
Balfour thought
a variety of means necessary to transform the Irish into

law-abiding, industrious, thrifty and independent citizens.
The crime statistics suggested that three years of resolute

government were effectively developing the first characteristic.

Hov/ever, since it would be many years before the

allegedly elevating effects of single ownership could be
fully realized, Balfour supported and encouraged any prograrns

or persons which premised to increase the self-reliance,

initiative, skills and general education of the people

»

The

establishment of the Congested Districts Board under his
Land Act of I89I perhaps best illustrates this approach*

From his earliest days in the Irish Office Ealfour
appreciated the special difficulties of terrain, isolation
and uneraplojTTient which plagued this land west of the Shannon
_

.

River.

Li.2

The conclusions of virtually every government

Iim££, 18 November I89O.
'^^Balfour to Buller, 12 March 188?, cited in Dugdalo,
B^JXeiir, I, pp. 128-9; i^alfour to .-Salisbury 3I October
I889, B, M. Add. MS ^9,689, f. 77? William l, Micks, A
lii^iory
Ih^ Qs}lXgesJL^ DinicifiiS. iistil^ (Dublin: i:.ason,
1925) contains the best description of the problems of
Hereafter cited iviicks, Con-Bested Dist ricts
the '.'/est.
^^•\TJia
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commif^sion and report between 188? and
I890 concerned with

Iri^h economic conditions emphasized these
exceptional

difficulties, and called for some paternalistic
,-overnment
action.
This official opinion was reinforced by
consistent
Liberal Unionist plaas for special attention
to the West.

Thie combination of personal conviction,
official recom-

mendations, and Liberal Unionist pressure, stimulated
Balfour
to advocate a considerable amount of paternalism
in his I891
Land Act.

Contrary to still widely held principles of

laissez-faire

p

his act conferred upon the Congested Districts

Board powers of compulsory purchase to facilitate the amal-

gamation of small holdings into economically viable units.
It further authorized aid and the development of forestry,

edmg,
ning in the

v/est.

as well as weaving and spin-

The encouragement of the fishing industry

throui^h the construction and improvement of piers and har-

bours as well as instruction in modern agricultural skills
and native crafts were important board responsibilities.
The board's jurisdiction spread over 3,608,569 acres in the

poorest sections of Donegal, Loitrim,
Galway, Kerry and Cork.

i^ligo,

Mayo, Rcscominon,

The annual interest on the Irish

Church Surplus Fund provided an income of ib^l,250 over which
the board had absolute discretion.

By staffing the board

with sympathetic men cognizant of conditions in

t)ie

West,

and by giving it financial independence, Balfour protected
it from the usual stigma of being 'just another Castle

s

board'. ^

«

The board's reconstructive efforts
displ^.yed

themselves in the expansion of their
jurisdiction to include
one-half the area of Ireland and one-third
the population,
as well as in the growth of its
income to 4-250,000 by I909,
A desire on the part of Gerald Balfour
and George Wyndhan,
as well as of the Nationalists to
facilitate the board's
amalgamation and migration operations, rather
than increased
poverty, was the chief reason for the
jurisdictional expansion,
vvhen the board was dissolved in I923,
approximately
1,000 estates comprising 2,000,000 acres had been purchased,

while 60,000 holdings were created

A total of

improved.

or-

£-2,250,000 had been spent on improving land, dwellings, farm

buildings, drainage, fences and roads.
Comments from many political quarters attest to the

accomplishments and esteem achieved by the Congested Districts Boc-rd*

Referring to Balfour's scheme as

'

enlightened

state socialism', the old land Leaguer Michael Davitt wrote
Though opinions differ as to the amount of
good done by tiiis body, there can be no
•doubt that much benefit has been conferred
by its labours upon the several districts
comprised v/ithin its area,^^
Con -eru;£.a
The original
pp. I6-I8,
board included the Bishop of Raphoe, Lr. O'Donnell, the
Rev, Charles Davis of Baltimore', Co. Cork v/ho aided fishery
development in V/est Cork, William Green of the Fishery
Board and Father Finlay and Horace Munkett of Irish
Agricultural Organization Society fame,
'^%ick3, ConzQslM Districl^s Baar^f p* 123.
^3r/licks,

•

J

^^Pomfret,

'Ms. strugrjXQ

Michael Davitt,
1904), p. 663,

Tfce

Xsx

FsXi

MM,

p.

310.

J2£ FfiUdaliiiia Jji

.Ireland

(

London
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Indeed Davitt was one of those who
urged the expansion of
the Board's jurisdiction to encompass
the eastern Connaught
grazing ranches during the height of the
United Irish
League's agitation of I901-3. John Dillon,
recently sentenced under Balfour's Crimes Act, was
friendly to the Board,
its author notwithstanding.^"^ Only two
years after the
Board's establishment. Sir Herbert Jekyll.
Lord Houghton's
secretai-y. following a trip through the west,
wrote:

The Congested Districts Board are doin.T excellent work, especially in fostering: and" extending
the fish?ries.
Here a^ain the difficulty is
mainly with the people themselves, who in come
districts do not take readily to seafaring life.
Much has been done to overcome these prejudices,
and much more may be done with patience and
better education. At many of the fish-curing
stations men are constantly employed at good
wages, while the fishermen find a steady market
for the fish which were formerly unsaleable....
The extension of the railways has greatly benefitted the fisheries, as it enable? the fish to
be taken to profitable markets ... ,^8

Official figures later confirmed the optimistic pre-

diction of better days for the people of the West,

Between

IC9I and 1903 the value of fish caught on the West Coast

increased from £62,631 to ^12/^300 while the quantity
increased from 138,000

cv/ts

to 289,3^2 cwts.

Between

Castletown Berehaven and Rathraullen, the number of fishermen increased from 12,022 in I89I to 13,168 in 1903.^^
hn
^Mviicks,
-oxr

.CoTiSi^riieii

Distxifils Bt^aca, p. 1?7.

Algernon west, Ths. imimte Pir.rie.s
Sir Ain^mon
ed, H. G. Hutchinson (London:
J, Murray, 1922),

}VQSt»

p.

180.

^^^-TiiOTiiVs

p.

798.

Director::;,

189'^ p. 686; -rhpm's Direg trr y, 1905,

5^

These figures ^niggest the financial
and social benefits
which the coastal population derived
from the combined

efforts of the Congested Districts Board
and the Fishery
Board, Balfour's enthusiasm for the
Board's work led him
to want to continue as a board member
after he left the
chief secretaryship in the fall of 1891.-5<^

Balfour's preference for improvement through
individual
initiative rather than through state-supported
schemes led
him to encourage and support Sir Jlorace Plunkett's
efforts
to modernize Irish farming and business practices
through

dairy cooperatives and educational schemes,

When he first

heard of Plunkett's plans and his hopes to promote cordial
relations between the Ascendency and the people through the

cooperative principle, Balfour

v/as

enthusiastic.

In early

I89I Plunkett requested a small government grant of -LkOO
to ^500 to launch his schemes, but so far no record of

whether that was cipproved by Balfour has emerged.

Never-

theless, once Plunkett's Irish Agricultural Organization

Society demonstrated its potential in for-warding

'

self-help'

values and in accruing profits for its members, Balfour

advised numerous officials and landlords to consult Plunkett.
In fact, Balfour showed his esteem for Plunkett and his

Balfour to Ridgev/ay,
ff. 315-16.

22 October I89I, B. M. Add. MS ^1-9,830,

^"'"Plunkett to Balfour, 18 September I889, B, M. Add.
MS 49.792, f 23; also same to same, 5 February I89I,
f, 2?
Plunkett Diaries, I5 April I89I, Plunkett House,
.

J

London,

wor.s in 1900 when the
former Chief-Secretary
intervened
in the South Dublin
election to rescue Plun.ett
from attacks
by ultra-Unionist landlords
highly suspicious of the
sincerity of Plunketfs unionism. 52
One Irish grievance which
Balfour hoped to solve was

the Roman Catholic University
question. Since Trinity
College was an Ascendency
dominated institution, and the

Royal University was principally
an examining and degree
granting body, there was little
opportunity for an Irish
Homan Catholic to obtain a
liberal university education.
The Chief-Secretary was anxious
to provide Irish Catholics
with higher education to develop
in them enough independence
of thought and action to counteract
the extreme deference
Which the Irish allegedly had for
thoir political and ecclesiastical leaders. Besides encouraging
political stability,
"

numbers of university- trained Catholics
would become valuable assets to the economy as engineers,
businessmen, and
as members of other professions.
Sympathy for university
reform had existed among some Unionists
since I885. Lord
Carnarvon and Sir Michael Hicks Beach both
had attempted to
produce a satisfactory scheme, but Salisbury
and the Cabinet
were reluctant to touch the issue for fear
of alienating
English Unionists and Presbyterians. At the height
of his

struggles with the Plan of Campaign in late 188?
Balf -ur was
,
urged by the Catholic Duke of Norfolk and Bishops
Healy and
This episode will be discussed in the next chapter.

0'I>.,er to begin direct
negotiations with Ro«e for a
state

subsidized

Romn

Catholic University.

However, the new

Chief-Secretary stated adai»anxly
that concessions or state
aid would be possible only
when '...the Irish priesthood
Shall have learnt the ten
ccnnandments. . . '53 and

joined the

government in arresting the land war.
at the time

As Balfour explained

J

...it is i-npossible to ask Parliament
or thp
""^^ any sacrifice in favour of *ihe
Ca'th^TL Church
Pbf
Cxathoiic
Ireland while all the
resources of that Church are beins
exhausted
in the cause of socialism and
Revolution. But
'"^^^ unhappy state of things
is
Drough-L to an end, the matter will
be^ taken
seriously
hand. 5^

m

T

m

It was mid-1889 before Ireland was
sufficiently pacified to impel Balfour to reopen the

Catholic educational

question as part of his general program of
constructive
unionism. He hoped to affiliate a Ronian
Catholic college
with the Royal University of Ireland, and to
endow it with
•fc33,000 a year.

Fifteen prominent Roman Catholic laymen

would compose the governing body.

Balfour's suspicions

about the quality and content of clerical education
led

Mm

to insist that a committee of arts and science
facultier.;,

rather than the governors or clergy, set the curriculuTiu

Admittedly Salfour's enthusiasm for Catholic higher education was not completely altruistic.
-^'Curtis,

Cs3j:iQlmt p.

IkLd.j p. 388.

276.

Part of his motivation

at this Juncture was to
win moderate bishops and
the Vatican
over as active allies in
the administration's war
a.ainst
rural disorder. The Catholic
university he kept danglin.
as
a possibility in the hopes
that a .ore rigid enforcement
of
the Papal Rescript would
result. ^5 However. Balfour's
plan
for a Ronoan Catholic University
floundered like earlier
proposals upon a combination
of cabinet reluctance and
rank
and file anti-Catholic
prej^.dice within the Unionist
coalition.
In any case, the Irish
bishops were not ready
to

sacrifice their independence by
accepting Balfour's plan,
iiqually difficult were the
slighted feelings which prospects
Of a government supported
Catholic university raised among
the Presbyterians of the North.
Consequently, the university question went into raothballs
for another decade.
Balfour's plans for improving elementary
education met
with more success. In I892. W. L.
Jackson, who replaced

Balfour as Chief -Secretary in late I89I,
carrica the National
Sducation (Ireland) Bill which provided for
a total of
•L290.000 to abolish fees in most
schools, and which increased

teacher pension and salary funds. -^^
In addition to formulating the land
purchase proposals

end administering the relief operations.
Balfour spent considerable time during his last year as Chief-Secretary

wrestling with the problem of
-^^Curtia.
^^^iliiii.,

£i?j:u:£Li2n ,

p» 391.

p.

jS8-9.

Irir;h

local government reform.

.
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The need for the democratization
of local government institutions throughout the United
Kingdom, and especially in
Ireland, had been generally
conceded by the Liberals, the
Irish, and moderate Tories as
far back as the early 'eightie.

Chamberlain's controversial proposals
for an 'Irish central
board', and later for national
councils in Ireland and

England was in part a recognition of
the archaic, inefficient and oligarchic character of
county administration
within Great Britain. Tory espousal
of democratic local
government reform originated in late I885
amidst the confusion of the break-up of Gladstone's
government. When
rumours of Whig opposition to Chamberlain's
local government scheme and of Gladstone's Home Rule
proclivities
spread throughout the parliamentary ranks
in August

J.885,

the Tories decided to steal the Liberal's
thunder on local

government reform.

In addition, they hild a small hope

that the Irish people might accept democratic county
government as a viable alternative to Home Rule^-^^ Speaking
at
Newport on 7 October I885, Salisbury pledged his party
to

abolish the grand jury system throughout the kingdom.

His

intentions were reaffirmed by Sir Michael Hicks Beach in
the Queen's Speech in the following January,

However, the

Prime Minister and Hicks Beach both insisted that an Irish

reform would be deferred until the political and social
67

-^'Catherine 3, Shannon, "The Ulster Liberal Unionists and
Local Government Reform, 1885"98," Irisil Historical
Slii^iii:iii 18, No. 73 (iviarch 1973 )f pp. ^>^07-9.

condition Of Ireland ceased
to threaten imperial
security
and the lives and property
of the

-loyal minority.

Con-

sidering that Salis^urys
aristocratic prejudices caused
hxm to delay the English
and Scottish measures
until 1888.
it is hardly surprising
that he wanted to jettison
the IrLh
pledge.
The dictates of iJidcticai
practical ,,oH
+ f^c made
^
politics
that impossible.
The realignment of parties
with the defeat of Home
Rule and the Spring election
of 1886 meant that the
Tories

"

could not permanently disregard
the legislative priorities
Of the
former Liberals who had deserted
the Gladstonian
ranks for the preservation of
the Union. A belief in democratic local government was. of
course, one of the strongest
articles in the political creed of
the Liberal Unionist
leader, Joseph Chamberlain. After
the failure of the Round
Table conference Chamberlain
consistently pressured the
Tory ministers to prove their good
faith by introducing the
local government measures, and the
introduction
of the

English and ScottisJi biJls in 1888 was
largely the result
Of that pressure.
The Ulster 3.iberal Unionists
toolr

to make sure that Ireland did not
lag far behind.-

steps

After

finding a sympathetic ally in Chamberlain
at the December
1886 Conference of Liberal Unionists, the
Ulstermen sent a
deputation to Hicks Beach outlining their
legislative priorities as democratic local government,
land
purchase, and

railway and drainage schemes for economic development.
ever, the Chief -Secretary

's

failing health and the Prime

JIow-

60

Minister's insistence upon
'law and order' militated
against the introduction of
any portion of the Ulster
Liberal Unionists' suggestions .^^
A second Ulster Liberal
Unionist campaign to get an
Irish measure simultaneously
with the English and Scottish
bills was mounted in early
1888, but the young Chief -Secretary
was as adamant as his
uncle had been earlier thatt
...different circumstances and
behaviour are essential before different
loca! seLgovernment can be proposed with
hoDe of
^''^ ^^^^^^^^
Ire'aSinst'^f .r^^f
cannot be described as political?59

Balfour's refusal to contemplate
an Irish measure before
he had developed his land
purchase proposals and while he
was fighting the Plan of Campaign,
had the backing of
Chamberlain. Hartington and the majority
of the hnglish
Liberal Unionists.
From the government --s perspective,
it v/as essential that the power
of the National League be
broken first. Otherwise, the governraent
feared thcit
Leaguers, inspired by confiscatory property
views, would'

dominate the councils and use them as weapons
in the land
agitation. Balfour did not want to jeopardize
further the
landlord class, many of whom had already
incurred severe
58
Uls^^z i.d]-.erai i^nionisj^ Asso£jUn^on,
J^h^.
p. 22.
^^3 .Haasiii:^, cccxxv,
503.

60
^p'r^o ^^t'^^^'h '^/.o^^^o'^';

^''^^"tf^omery,

29 January 1888,

financial losses fro. the
Plan an. the general
rural agitation.
„hile Balfour was not
opposed to Liberal Unionist
suggestions for remedial
legislation, his opposition
to
local government reform
lasted till mid-1889.
In early I890.
the Chief-Secretary told
the parliamentary draftsmen
to
prepare an Irish local
government measure. Three
considerations prompted Balfour's
switch.
The decline in the rural
agitation and the government's
success in extending
the

•

Ashbourne Act tended to lessen
his anxieties about League
domination and manipulation of
the prospective county councils.
Secondly, as he told A. V. -Dicey,
some action was
inevitable owing to the originaJ
pledge and the promises
made to the liberal Unionists
back in 1886 and
I887.

Kepudi-

ation might, in Balfour's opinion,
risk the break up of the
Unionist party.62 ^^^^.^^ conservative
strength in recent
elections emphasized the importance
of strong Liberal Unionist support in the next general
election.
Thii-dly, the

comprehensive land purchase scherce upon
which Balfour
insisted local government reform was
conditional, was ready
for introduction to the Commons. By
early 1691 the successful passage of the Land Act as well,
as the disruptions
threatening trie Irish party had strengthened
Balfour's
resolve. A local governcent bill offered
an irresistible

^"^i^f 68o"'"r--*to-?n^°"''*

62

"

J^""^ry I889, B. K. Add. Mi

opportunity for capitalizing
on the divisions an<i
disillusion,„e„ts Which tho
exposure of the Parnell-0..hea
affair
engendered within the Irish
party and Ireland.
I„ fact.
Sir west Ridgeway, the
Undersecretary, expressed see
hlpe
that many priests would
gratefully accept local government
in place of Home Rule.^^

Following Balfour's 10 August
I89I announcement that
an Irish local government bill
would be introduced
in the

next session, the Irish Office
was inundated with letters
from irate Irish Unionists and
landlords who predicted that
•the National League would
make havoc and mayhem of the
councils.
The Unionist press voiced loud
demands for protective
devices su.ch as minority representation
or special franchise
qualifications, f.xtremely bitter over
this eruption of
unionist opposition, Balfour wrote one
disenchanted Unionists

consider that I have a real grievance
against
party, for the pledge has been ^iven
over
and oyer again.
It has been introduced in one
queen s speech after another, and so far as
I
Unow not a smglo serious expression of
disapproval has been received durini^ all these
yoars by any responsible member of the
government,
I do not imow whether the
party take the
view that promises are made to be broken,
if so,
I cannot agree with them. ok
I

tiie

*

Balfour to Ridgeway, I'y October I891, B, M. Add.
MS
f
^"'^^ Ridgeway
282,
uiugeway to Balfour, I9
October 1891.
19 Octob
:;J9,8^0,
r/'^yf
B. M, Add. MS ^9,812, f. 199,
.

*
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Add^°v/^ 49
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2 ^September

I89I, B. M.

Two „.el.s later, citing
the support of t«o Ulster
l-.ie.bors.
Saunderson and. Macartney, the
Chief-Secretary told the
Duke Of Aberoorn.one of
the .ost influential
Irish Unionists,
that retreat was i^possible.^S
,^^1,
^^^^.^^^^

pathetic to landlord anxieties,
Balfour saw great difficulty
in securing minority
representation acceptable to Liberal
Unionists and Nationalists .^6
i„ an effort to counteract
ultra-Unionist demands for stringent
safeguards, the ChiefSecretary requested the Marquis
of Waterford.
one of his

few enthusiastic supporters, to
impress upon his fellow
landlords the futility of franchise
qualifications as safeguards
j

They irritate one party without
Drotectin^ the
other.
They destroy all appearance of eqSalUy
^
betvreen the treatment of England
and Ireland'
and they would certainly be swept away
in the
ixrst s-corm.
I am very anxious for
minority
representation if that can be obtained an
this
will ensure some good men upon every
county
council, which is absolutely on democratic^
lines,

Despite these pleas, the campaign to secure
stringent
safeguards was successful. As a result the
Irish local
government bill introduced by Balfour on 18 February
1892
was so halting and inadequate that many
Irish members
as

Abercorn.
Lo^iSn^
J5 229-30.
'^ytOjOt ff.

9 iJeptember I89I,

B.

M. Add,

hiS

66
ro-^fS"oo^'' I'^^PI^'^'^^^
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l^^i^Q^ f^

September I89I, B. M. Add.

^aterford, 22 October I89I, B. M, Add. MS

6if

well as English liberals
demurred fro. taking it
seriously.
The long-awaited bill
provided for county and district
councils, elected on a parliamentary
franchise.

Grand jury

responsibilities relating to road
maintenance, sanitation
and the administration of
local revenues would
go to the

proposed councils.

The four main safeguards,
incorporated

in deference to landlord anxieties,
practically obscured the
democratic aspects of the bill. A
cumulative vote for thoce
paying the highest county cess was
written in. The grand
jury's right of traverse was retained
enabling any taxpayer
to challenge a council presentment
before a judge and jury.
The third and most controversial
safeguard provided for the
dismissal of county and district councils
for dis^cbedience
to the. law. corruption, or consistent
malversation and

opprescuon.

The fourth safeguard, which had no Jinglish
or

Scottish precedent, provided for a joint committee
of council members and grand jurors to have a supervisory
vote on

all capital expenditures as well as on the
appointment of
all new loc:al government officers.
The Irish benches condemned root and branch Balfour's

attempt to redeeui the Newport pledge, for it preserved,
even if in limited form, the oligarchic grand juries and
their controversial powers of granting compensation for

malicious injuries.

The Irish members called the bill an

insult to the Irish people

^'^^ir

Mns^^,

i,

? 26-95.

.xnd

a coercion bill

in

disguise.

3
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Whxlo Balfour's local
government measure mi^ht oonceivably have been satisfactorily
amended, nationalist
support was impossible owing
to the increasing
possibility
Of a general election,
v,uxun,
Wherpa<5
«nereas this circuinstance
obligated
the Tories to introduce
the bill, the strong
livelihood of
a Liberal victory obligated
the Irish to expedite

the Unionist fall by opposing any
local government bill,
irrespective
Of its merits. At this
juncture, the Irish had their
signts
on Home Rule, and they had
to expend all their political

energy in convincing the English
Liberals of the justice of
the HoBie Rule demand.
Not surprisingly, then, after
attacks
from both Unionists and the Irish,
the government dropped
Balfour's bill without regret or
ceremony.
In explaining the origins of
Balfour's progressive

uidonism betiveen 188?

ajid

1892, it is perhaps teinpting to

attribute his conciliation chiefly to a
Iv!achiavellian desire
to preserve and perpetuate the Liberal
Unionist Tory

alliance,

Certainly, the introduction of the Local
Governrent Eill in
1892 was largely a tacit recognition of the need
to keep
Liberal Unionist support in a potentially close
election.

Balfour's correspondence bears witness to this important

consideration.

VJhile it

would be naive to eliminate these

pragraatic considerations, one must go beyond pure
politics

for a full understanding and appreciation of the raticnyJe

governing Balfour's Irish policy.

The Chief -Secretary

'

interpretation of Irish History as wjll as his general

philosophic outlook stimulated i-mportantiy his policy of

»
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Hie explanation of
Cro..ell.s failure indi-

conciliation.

cated an early appreciation
of the need to balance
'^-iocs'
With 'icindness. well before
Liberal Unionist support
beca.e
crucial.
That most of Balfour's
r.nedial legislation was
not introduced until 1888
owes perhaps more to the
parliamentary difficulties generated
by the land agitation than
to a desire to capitalize on
the failure of the Round
Table
Conference by responding to Liberal
unionist legislative
suggestions. Certainly Balfour's
parliamentary speeches
fron 1883 as well as his own
correspondence

'

.indicated a

consistent determination to promote
peasant proprietorship,
which was, after ail, one of the
primary goals
of the

National League.

Balfour's persistence in the face of
land-

lord, Radical

ev.n some Cabinet objections, ultimately

Bjid

succeeded in making government subsidir'.ed
land purchase a
major rjlank in the Unionist Irish policy
Land purchase took priority in Balfour's
program for
pragmatic as well as general philoccphical
reasons. As has
been shown, he was convinced that, in
the chort run, a solution to the land question would effectively
eradicate
the

political and parliamentary turmoil which the
Home Hule
movement precipitated
It might also check the spread of
dangerous socialistic doctrines in Jingland. Irj
addition,
however, to these pragmatic considerations, Balfour
o

at this

tine genuineJ.y believed that peasant proprietorship
along

with his other remedial schema! s would lead to a consistent
and permanent improvement in the economic and social condition
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of Ireland.

In his Rector's Addrec^e,
Auaress +^
to Glasgow „
University
in 1891, entitled On
Balfour attributed the
progress and prosperity of
Victorian society to the free
interaction of the forces of
education, individualism and
manufacture. Education and
property-holding he defined as
the most effective stimuli
for promoting individualism,
initiative and resourcefulness.
Indeed^ Balfour claimed
that all the great changes and
discoveries of civilisation
were the product of individual
genius as opposed to state
action. He limited the role of the
state to providing the
opportunity and security in which that
genius might develop
and flourish. Questioning the hereditary
interpretation of
progress and human ability, Balfour asked:
to

.

}^^s.

'

Are

v/e not often attr.U..uting
to heredity what
IS properly due to education, and
crediting
nature with what is really the work of man?

Balfour posited that the economic and social
ills of any
society could be cured by a combination of

education^ indus-

trial development and individual initiative.

Governments

and individuals had a responsibility to create
an environment in which this combination would be valued and
extended.
From the perspective of this address, one may feasibly
argue

that Balfour's commitment to Roman Catholic university
education, railways and technical education, and land
purchase

derived from his general philosophical views on progress.
In short, Balfour believed the Irish would possess the
key
to progress once they emulated the values, ideas and insti-

tutions of the contemporary British estat)lishment

.

As he

68

frankly admitted in state papers
and in his parliamentary
addresses, he designed each component
of his program to
encourage the individualism,
initiative and industrial
organization which he alleged the
British and Ulsterman
already possessed. While one may
justly criticize Balfour
for his failure to appreciate some
genuine nationalist
aspiration in Home Rule, and for his
contempt and condescension toward the native Irish, his
analysis of Ireland's
economic and social needs was not far off
the
raarkc

It has recently become fashionable to
denigrate Bal-

four's remedial programs as 'too little,
too late

/'-^
'

However, just as the New Left critics of Franklin
D. Koosevelt might benefit from reading Studs Terkel's

MxA

liris^,,

conteLiporary Irish historians ought to i-ealize that
Ivlr.

Balfour's embryonic projects of social engineerings

despite their limits and the racism with

administered, saved
1890-1,

mar.y

\.'hich

they were

people from starvation during

The establishment of the CongeBted Districts Board

and tha encouragement given to Plunkett's cooperatives and

Father Denis O'liara's Parish Goimittees helped to lay the
foundations for some significant changes in living standards
in the .Vest,

It cannot be pure coincidence that bet^.voen

1391 and 1901 housing accommodations in the province of

Connaught registered a decline in third and fourth class
69

Joseph Lee,
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2l Ixlnh Society, XSMGill and Llacmillan, 1973;, pp. 122-25.

ilie Mp^ii:riisji.tlQn

(Lubiini

»

69
dwellings, and a rise in first and
second class dwellings. 7°
The steady fall in relief expenditures
after I891 testifies to improving conditions. While
the government spent
^565. Olif on relief works during the t^velve
years before
I89I. they laid out only £100,00^
during the thirty-two
years of the Congested Districts Board's
."^^
existence

Another indication of significant improvement
in the West
after I89I is the nine-fold increase in post

office savings

deposits in the years between 1831 and 1912.*^^

While per-

haps some of the long-term planning of the Board
\ms defi73
cient
in relation to the types of industry set up, the

statistics given indicate a faster and more significant
rate of improvement in the West than existed previously,

and indeed in some decades since.

The Congested Districts

Board was an early experiment in state intervention.

To

suggest that it should have been able to solve completely
the economic difficulties of Western Ireland expects too

much.

.Ml the expertise available to the Irish government

in the 1960's and 1970
70

71
72
'

's

has not produced a complete solution

Third and fourth class dwellings fell from 71,986 to
38(837, and A"', 503 to 1,978 resTsectively. First and
second class dv/ellinrs rose from 4,70^P to 4,95&, and from
52 V 816 to 60,^53 respectively.
Gtaiila Direct pry f 190 5,
Po 729*
.

Micks,

Coni^fisisii DisirixLta

Board, pp. 72-3

Sayliu^. B5>nk (irelanil) iietuoi, pp. 2-27, h. c. 1913 (272).
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Gladstone's determination to
re.^ain faithful to the
Home Rule principle insured
that, despite the split
in
the Irish Party following
the deposition and death
of
Parnell, the Irish Question would
loom large
in the I692

electoral fray,

.-rom the

spring campaign of I892 until

the Lords killed the Second Home
Rule Bill in September
1893, Balfour was one of the most vocal
and active Unionist critics of the Gladstonian
solution. As the minister

responsible for moulding and executing
Irish policy for
four and one-half years, Balfour was
the most informed and
'.veil prepared of Unionists
to defend the Act of Union both
in and out of Parliament.
His notable success as Irish
Chief-Secretary as well as his close family and
poIit.ico.l

relationship with Lord Salisbury insured that
Balfour would
assume a prominent role in the debates en the
Irish Ques-

tion during

tlie

elections and thereafter,

his speeches

during this time are significant not only as
Balfour's

first public explanation of his interpretation of
the
nature of the Irish Question, but also because, as
a man
whose parliamentary reputation derived chiefly from
his

Irish administration, the opinions expressed therein were

boimd to have considerable effect upon his fellow Unionist
parliamentarians as

v/ell as

upon the average voter.

His

speeches reflect and refract many of the ideas and anxieties which promoted Unionists from various classes and

to these prob3.ems.

A final evaluation of Balfour's
role and influence
the shaping of early VA'entieth-century
Ireland must await
an examination of the Irish
administrations
of his two

Unionists successors, Gerald Balfour and
George Wyndham.

CHAPTER
BALFOUR AND THE

HOM

RULfi

III
DEBATE OF I893

geographical a.eas to defend
the Union despite
oontinuinl'
Irish support for Home
Rule.
.Shortly after the
dissolution of the Unionist
Parlia-

ment, Balfour launched
his attac. upon Gladstone's
interpretation Of the Irish Question.
Claiming that his own
policy of vigorous law
enforcement and Treasury
subsidized
land purchase had produced
lower crime rates and
significant
economic im.provement Balfour
predicted that Home Rule
would prove Just as elusive
in finally settling the
Irish
Question as had the previous
Gladstonian measures of Irish
,

Church Disestablishment and the
Land Acts of I870 and I881/
The 1886 opposition of the
English majority whose interests
he considered to be vital,
indeed paramount, was stressed
by the former Chief-Secretary
along with criticisms specific
to Ireland's economic and social
situation. ^ However,
the

Irish Question notwithstanding,
continuing economic difficulties and more militant socialistic
propaganda made the
recently enfranchised voters restive under
Tory rule, and
a Liberal victory was almost a certainty.
The full vigour
of Balfour's rhetoric was wisely reserved
until, subsequent

to the Liberal victory, Gladstone introduced
his Second

Home Rule Bil]. on

IH-

February 1893.

Following the intro-

duction, Balfour embarked upon a series of speeches
•""TiLP.

Times, 30 June I892.

Leiters.

(London:
i^.

il.

V,

jQl QxiQeja

J,

Vlai&xla» 3rd series, ed. George E. Buckle
I920), II, 136.
Hereafter cited

/.mrray,

attacUn, both the general
principles and
the Liberal proposal,

m

the details of

early April when the
second

reading debate was in full
swing he journeyed to
Belfast
and Dublin to deliver the
Key-note addresses at two
massive
I'nionist demonstrations.
An appearance at Li.ehouse
in

London's .^ast Knd on 18 April
I893 followed.
These speeches
in particular display
considerable oratorical and
political
Skill in moulding his arguments
to the prejudices, anxieties and vested interests of
his audiences. Addressing
^^000 people in Belfast's Ulster
Hall where seven years
earlier Lord Randolph Churchill
encouraged Ulstermen to
unconstitutional resistance, the former
Chief -Secretary
forecast that Home Rule would bring
economic disaster to
Ulster in the form of higher taxes,
lower wages and shrinking imperial credit for land purchase
and public works. He
flattered the enthusiastic Belfast
audience by comparing
their 'orderly' and 'prosperous' condition
with the South
and //est whose population was 'inferior'
in political knowledge and experience.
Continued prosperity depended upon
the maintenance of the Union.
The central Gladstonian

concept of a single and historic Irish nationality
was
challenged by the assertion that
...at this moment, the religious differences

v/hich divide different sections of Irish

society are deeper and more impossible and
difficult to heal than such differences in
any other country that I know of in the world.
Under these circumstances, is it not folly,
is it not madness to suppose that in Ireland
you find a single nation with one single set

^

of aspirations, with
one single set of

"^i^^^"'^ - which"S^Ls:\s1iraIn developing the therne
of unbridgeable
historical and
religious sentiments. Balfour
came close to playing
the
'Orange card'.
The famous Miiiite warnings
against the
•tyranny of the majority was
employed to clinch his protest against any attempt
to impose Home Rule upon
Ulster.
Following his tumultous Belfast
reception, Balfour

travelled to the Duke of Leinster's
estate near Dublin for
rest prior to his speech to
the Irish Unionist Alliance.
The Dublin Unionists organized
an evening parade illuminated by torch-bearing Trinity
undergraduates as a prelude
to Balfour's Leinster House
address.
Once again Balfour
raised the spectre of economic collapse
as the necessary
corollary of Home Rule. The small
farmer and landlord
would equally suffer from the
suspension of Treasury loans
since it was doubtful that an Irish
IDxchequer could secure
rates as low as the British Exchequer.
The possibility of
diminishing British demand for agricultural
products from
the South and the West was raised.
Civil servants and
Royal Irish Constabulary men were warned that
their careers
and their pensions might be sacrificed by the Home
Rule

policy.

For those possessing imperialistic sentiment,

Balfour claimed that despite Gladstone's intentions, Home
3

Tb£. TjjDQB,

5

April I893.

Rule would ultimately lead
to separation.^ A
fortnight
later at Limehouse.5 Balfour
predicted that Home Rule would
bring lowered Irish productivity
and shrinking credit, and
as a consequence Irish
immigrants would flood the
:.nglish
labour market. This line of
argument undoubtedly would
have exacerbated the traditional
anxieties that English
workers felt in the face of
Irish competition.
Ealfour then
suggested that Home Rule would bring
additional burdens to
all British taxpayers since land
purchase loans would be
'

difficult to retrieve with a Home Rule
Government. Balfour
claimed that Irish debts were hard to
recover in ordinary
circumstances despite the fact that
official reports
on

land purchase receipts proved the
Irish farmers were punctual in their purchase payments.^
-

Balfour's visit to Belfast is significant
in two
respects.
On the one hand, it gave him concrete
experience
of the intensity of Northern opposition
to Home Rule, and
of the seriousness of the much employed
shibboleth

will Fight '.

'Ulster

The memory of the four hour parade of 80,000

citizens and of throjigs of people clinging to his
carriage
'...with tears in their eyes..c' begging to know if the

Lords would destroy the Bill,'' explain the addition of the
SliMLS,
^Tlia

u»

9

April 1893.

limes, 19 April 1893.

Balfour's

iviemorandura on

I896, CAB 37A1/16.

Irish land purchase, 10

i.iarch

n

Countess of Antrim to Harriet thipps,
in L.
v., 3rd series, II, 2i|-5--6.
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April I893, cited

e

.

Ulster isoue to the catalogue
of objections to Ho.e
Rule
contained i„ Balfour's second
reading speeches. ^ This
i=
especially notable because
Balfour, although always
i.oressed
by the Northeasfs
industrial capacity, previously
had shown
distaste for the Orange.en.9
,vhen the Ulster issue
emerged
again in I9I2-U. the ne.ories
of this visit .ay partially
explain Balfour's acquiescence
to the tactics of Ulster
.militants in the formation
of the illegal Ulster
Volunteer
Force.
Secondly, Balfour's visit
gave to the Northern
Unionists ample '...evidence
that Ulster was not deserted '.1°
Following her nephew's visit. Lady
and ^ord Salisbury also
travelled to Belfast. After the
trij .ady Salisbury told
Queen Victoria that the Northerners
were much soothed by the
feeling that they had powerful
^.nglish friends who would aid
'

them.

"In fact', she wrote,

'it is hardly too much to say

that the two visits of Arthur Balfour
and Salisbury have
probably saved Ireland from a dangerous
riot.'^^ iVenty
years later, the Ulsterraen's obstinacy
and resistance to
the Parliamentary will probably owed
much to their own recol-

lections of Balfour's consistent advocacy of
their case
against Home Rule. However, at that juncture,
the stakes

fens,^, viii,

l/+08j

xi,

987-8.

o

"Curtis, Cosx^doxit p. ^03.

^^Countess of Antrim to Harriet i-hipps, 5 April I893, cited
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Queen Victoria,

3 June 1893,

cited in

were higher, and it was
civil war. not a riot,
that was
narrowly averted.
In the

^

Colons debates Balfour
vigorously attacked

the general principles
and specific details of
the Home
Rule Bill. Challenging
the Government's contention
that
Irish crime and rural unrest
were

caused by frustrated

nationalism. Balfour reiterated
his firm conviction that
the system of dual ownership
in Ireland was the real
catalyst of Irish alienation and
agitation.
The Home Rule
Bill would do nothing to
eradicate the land problem which,
he maintained, was the effective
driving force behind the
country's support for the Nationalists.
land purchase, not
Home Rule, he presented as the
most effective remedy for
disaffection and rural cri.,e.l^ Balfour
labelled as foolish
any hopes, often held in Liberal
and Radical circles, that
Home Rule v.ould alleviate the time
and energy rarliament

expended on Irish debates. 13

i„,perial responsibilities for

defense and foreign policy in addition
to a vague definition
of the Viceroy's position and powers
would insure plenty of
parliamentary attention to Ireland. He opposed
the retention of 80 Irish members as giving the Irish
double repre-

sentation in comparison to the

ivelsh.

Scotch and inclish,

and because it held out the prospect of continual
Irish

disruption of British party politics during periods of
slim
^"^ Hansaril., viii,
1399; xi, 939.
13

78

majorities.

It was intolerable that
English parties shoi,ld
be held hostage by the
Irish.^^ Balfour criticized
the

government's characterization of
the bill as the initial
step in the eventual federation
of the British Isles
'...since the English nation so
enormously exceeds all
other elements of this proposed
system, both in population,
and in wealth and power...'.
Coordinating them as equals
was termed '...an absolute
impossibility whenever
it is

tried.'

In words oozing imperial
self-confidence and

pride, Balfour asserted that to divide
up the United Kingdom
was to defy history's evolutionary
tendency toward large
units and empires.
In both debates, Balfour made full
use
of his ministerial expertise in Irish
agrarian crime, and
its suppression, aiad questioned whether
promises by pro-

fessed boycotters to henceforth respect property
could be
taken seriously. He reminded the Commons that
...the Irish politicians have been occupied
a steady and consistent propa/?anda of
doctrines with regard to property, and doctrines with regard to government which are
absolutely inconsistent .with any government
at al.l
They have preached spoliation 1
admit undefined. 16

m

.

Given recent liistory and Irish doctrines on Icmd, rent,
tenure, eviction and resistance to law officers and court

writs, Balfour predicted that within a year of the
H^aasuia, viii,

U15--16.

^^^ UB-n^rAt XX, 970.
^ £!3nSi\r^t viii,

1^21,

establishment of a Home Rule
parliament, would follow
'...a confiscation more
absolutely monstrous and
unjustifiable than any of the monstrous
and unjustifiable confiscations Which stain the history
of

Ireland.^^7
the 1893-4 debates on Home
Rule, Balfour continually
harped
upon the theme of agrarian
violence and Irish unorthodoxy
on property rights.
In .larch, he introduced a
motion censuring the Government's law
enforcement policy in Ireland.
The Liberals he accused of
trying to pacify Ireland by
dangling Home Rule and amnesty for

convicted agrarian

offenders in front of the Nationalists.

Balfour charged

that the proposed repeal of the change
of venue clause
meant that intimidation would triumph so
completely that
...in every agrarian case whatever you
abandon
all hope, even the remotest, of obtaining
a
conviction, no matter v/hat the evidence may

be.

He predicted rising rural violence and
rent boycotts if

Hone Rule did not pass.

These were controlled, he alleged,

by the dictates of the Irish party rather
than by effective
Castle administration and law enforcement.-'-^ The
chronic

nature of rural violence was cited as procf of the unfitness of Ireland for Home

Rule.,

In these comments cn the

caust-E and nature of rural crime,

}3alfour n-ver cnoc dis-

played the contempt v/hich he had shown occasionally in

private for landlords like Clanricarde, whosre insistence
iiaii^j::^,

18,

xi, 989.

4 Himsaxol, X, 12C7-29.

"
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upon property rights amidst
economic distress aroused
ev.n
the ire of Balfour, let
alone that of
the poverty-stricK-on

peasants.

^

^^^^^^

^^^^

effective
defense of property rights
demanded that Balfour keep
private his impatience and contempt
for the ultra-landlords.
His claim that rent defaults
owed more to the political
need
to pressurize the Liberal
government than to inability to
pay, likewise demonstrated
a convenient absentmindedness
in
the m.an who established the
Congested Districts Board after
personally viewing the hopeless and
dire poverty in Aestern
Connaught during autumn 1890.^°
'

During the second reading debate
Balfour developed at
great length his views on the nature
and consequences of
the Act of Union.
He flatly denied the Nationalist
contention contained in John Redmond's and
Michael Davitfs
speeches that the Union was an economic
failure.

On the

contrary, Balfour asserted that Ireland had
seen more economic progress between H^j^ and I890 than had Jingland.

The

different economic bases from v/hich they started in
however, he ignored.

In answering

17-50,

Davitfs charge that

the

Union had increased the rate of lunacy, Balfour cleverly
turned the argument around.

He attributed the increase to

better British registration and to the fact that
'Curtis, Go^r-Oion, pp« 256-8; Dugdale, BaXJ-gur,
Shannon,
.in IixiliaM, pp. 48-9.

^m.^m^
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licca-i
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ir^^lanii,

Co^jciilgrj,
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369-?Oj Siiannon,

,

century to which the Hon.
Me.ber looks back as the
.olden
ape Of Ireland, lunatics
were tied to posts or were
allowed
to stray unattended
through fields, and nobody
counted the.
because nobody cared for them. -2^
while admitting
that

Kngland bore some responsibility
for Irish economic and
social problems, he castigated
those who from ignorance or
hypocrisy charged her with all or
mere than half the blame
2
2
for Irish ills.
In phrases ringing with
Anglo-^iaxon
patriotism and condescension, Balfour
attributed whatever
Irish progress had been won to the
very fact of the English
connexion, and labelled as absurd the
notion that
Home Rule

would restore any worthy ancient
Celtic institutions.
Thej^act is, that before i^n^lish power
went
to Ireland. Ireland was a
collection of t-ibes
waging? constant and internecine
warfare,
without law, without civilization. Althoucrh
the law :;.s imperfectly obeyed, and
although
civilization may oe ir/iperf ect
ly axjprehended
all the law, and ail the civilization
in
Ireland is the work of .ingland, Ihe unity,
•the imperfect unity which Ireland
enjoys that
also IS the work of iingland, and the Parliament which Ireland desires to have restored
to her, what was thax but the work of England ?23

Balfour next held out the loyalty of the Anglo-Irish
to the Union as an argument against Home Rule.

That the

class constituting Grattan's iarliament now ardently sup-

ported the Union indicated its success.
Hanssxd. xi, 971-2.
^''^^

23
^^1-

Harisg-xa,

xi, 9?1.

Hsiis^d, xi, 972-3,

This suj^port was

-

•
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explained by their higher
wisdom and 'noblesse oblige
rather than by any recognition
of the vested economic.
social or political interests
of the Ascendency and
their
anxiety to preserve their
privileged status. Balfour
invoked the reputations of the
greats of Irish literature
and administration such as
Swift. Goldsmith. Berkeley.
Burke and Wellington, to add
lustre and authority to the
Ascendency's repudiation of Home
Rule.^^ This line of
argument evidences the former
Chief-Secretary's almost
total contempt for the Celtic
elements in Irish

'

society,
and that he measured everything
by an Anglo-oaxon yardstick.
His very infrequent and short
stays in Ireland, as well as
the obscurity of the only recently
established Celtic literary and language laovement, may
partially explain
his

indifference to, or ignorance of, the
recent discoveries
by linguists, archaeologists and
historians of the achievements of the pre-Norman Irish in language
and art. not to
speak of the Irish monastic contributions
to the survival
of learning in the ninth and tenth centuries
in iiingland
and

on the Continent.

In 1913"14. despite the evidence of

24,

^ HaDsar^. xi. 990-1:

25

The trr.e measure of Balfour's contempt for Celtic
elements
in Irish society came two decades later when the full
impact of the Irish Literary movement and the Celtic
revival put the Irish peasant in a new and better perspective even for many educated i:-n£clishmen. including
Balfour's former private secretary and successor as Chief
secretary. George Wyndham.
*vhile aamittedly Wyndham
described the Irish people as 'mongrels', his letters to
Balfour and others indicate that he appreciated some Celtic aspects of Irish life.
Curtis. Coercion p. 40?.
,
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the achievements of the
Celtic past and the
economic and
social progress attained
in the countryside,
Balfour still

disdained any CelUc
manifestations that did not
recognize
an innate superiority of
Anglo-.axon ideas and institutions
I^aturally.

therefore, Balfour gave full
play to the
Ulster opposition during the
second reading debate. While
he did not specifically
state this theory, the
similarity
Of the Northeast's economic,
industrial and religious life
and values to contemporary
England and ocotland undoubtedly
reinforced his conviction of the
seriousness and validity
of the Ulster position.
Balfour denied the Nationalist
Charges that he played the 'orange
card' by making inflamatory speeches on his Belfast visit.
He reiterated his
contencion t>)at because Ireland was
'...divided, fissured,
rent into two sections...',
parliamentary government was
only possible if Ireland was merged
into the ^highor unity
of the United Kingdom'.
Ulster's opposition to Hom(^ Ruie
rested upon the conviction that '...all
that is most educate
all that is most intelligent, and all
that is most enterprising in Ire;uind b-long to a minority, that
would be
oppjressed,..', and upon the knowledge that
'...the -ceachlng
of Irish politicians, patriotism has been
confounded for

years with plunder', principles v.hich would make
'...any

civilized government absolutely impossible'.

By contrast,

he again characterized the citizens of Belfast as

subjects of tne Queen, who

v/are

'loyal

anxious to obey the Imperial

Parliament, and who could see no reason why they should be

handed over to those who
they knew would have
absolute control over their destinies.. 26
Concluding his speech with
predictions of national disaster,
Balfour claimed that
under Home Rule even the Celtic
Irish would suffer by the
compulsion
...forever to drink from th.e bitter,
narrow
and polluted streams of
purely fr'sh hllttrv that unhappy history - and
yo^ will forbid
^^^^-^^^-^y to touch'that

bro^d^stisa^'^

r

^^"^e^^'^'

Partake^SriroSry^u will

The adjectives employed in
this

peroration

suggest that

Balfour equated all past and
future Irish progress with the
preservation of tne Union, and with the
obliteration of any
Celtic elements that had thus far
escaped Anglicization.
Reassured that the house of Lords would
probably kill
the Home Rule Bill despite the
Commons pas^'age, Balfour
participated in the Committee debates in
only a limited
fashion. He did. however, reveal his
continuing conviction
that the Roman Catholic clergy exercised
an undue and corrosive influence over the Romaji Catholic
electorate.
He
protested against the disenf ranchisement of Trinity
College
on the grounds that literate voters

v.'ere

essential to check

unhealthy clerical influence in the polling booths.

The

sweeping defeat of all but nine larnellite supporters in

^
27

^

Mji^Qxa, xi, 987-8.
Himaarfi, xi,

991.

the 1892 elections, as
.ell as Darnell's defeat
in the I891
by-elections following the Irish
bishops'

denunciation of
his continued leadership,
had confirmed many Unionists'
belief in priestly domination
over the Roman Catholic
voters. 23 Balfour, Salisbury. ^9
and other Unionists frequently cited these defeats as
convenient debating points
in their efforts to denigrate
Irish capacity for selfgovernment. Clerical domination as
well as racial and
religious divisions. Balfour concluded,
made minority reprementation in the form of the university
vote essential.
...if you mean to give Home Rule,
you must
safeguard it with provisions and
arrangements
which would be probably unnecessary
and possioly_ even noxious in i^ngland
and .Scotland
Oux YJiiich are absolutely most
necessary in
to give anything ax^Droachy^^J<^'^n
u^V'tT
mg
representation to what are, after all, the
most orderly, the most enterDrising and
most deserving classes in the whole I>-ishthe
coniTnunity ,

j'-)

Balfour thus portrayed the southern Irish
as politically
unreliable, and inferior to the Anglo-Iri^h
and Ulster
minority.
The last two groups alone he rated as equal
in
stature xo the izinglish and Scots.
Bali our 's opposition to Home Rule in I892-3 derived

from a number of sources
26

Curtis

»

GogrcjLfin,

in ItsilsMt
29

p.

0

First, and most obvious, was

pp. 323-2?; iJhanjnon, I^cj^J, Goj^^riuneirt;

95.

See Saiisbvry at the Guildhall, 9 November I891, The
10 Ncvember I89I; Curtis, Coerciori, pp. 323-7.

Himejii
30.

^
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his ovm recent experience
fighting the land agitation
directed by the Land League
climaxing in the lian of
Campaign
That the chosen political
leaders of the Irish
people, despite jail sentences,
in their speeches and
actions repeatedly called into
question- 'sacred property
rights' raised the spectre of
dangerous socialistic doctrines to rich men like Balfour.
After two years as Irish
Secretary Balfour wrote:
"l have long been impressed
by the'
fact that at least half the force
behind Home Rule is :.ocialistic and the more this is unde>-stood
the better for us.-^l
Two years later he wrote to
Professor Henry Calderwood,
.

The Home Rule agitation, properly
understood,
IS a very hollow affair consisting
chiefly.,,
of two elements in conjunction,
neither of
which separately have anyxhing to do
with Home
Rule whatever - the old i-enian element,
namely,
which desires separation, and the old
agrarian
element which desires or did desire spoliation. 32
His defense cf Irish landlords and of
their attachn-.ent to
the Union did not rest upon any recognition
of their innate

worthiness or merit, but rather upon the implications
which
a Home Rule and Nationalist victory would mean
across
the

Irish Sea.

By the late 'eighties and early 'nineties the

infant English socialist organizations such as the Social

Democratic Federation and the Socialist League were begin-

ning to question the property rights of the v/ealthy in
31

Balfour to

£peJ^3lori,

vV,

p.

H.

Hurlbert,

1

April I889, cited in Curtis,

k07,

32
-"Balfour
to rrof. Henry Calderwood, 22 October 18QJ

in Aluil.

,

p.

400.

,

cited

8?

^n.land.

Knowledge of the writings
of .arx and .ore moderate socialists li.e Henry
George was spreading
a.onr the
I^nglish poor.

To allow the Irish,
with their socialistic

doctrines, victory either in
Westminster or in the countryside might set a dangerous
precedent and encourage English
radicals and socialists to
imitate Irish tactics and
methods.
This fear, more than an
affection or respect for Irish
landlords, explains Balfour's
militant stance on their
property rights. Balfour displayed
his contempt for Irish
support Of the Man of Campaign
when he exclaimed to Queen
Victoria that if he were an Irish
landlord, he would rather
beg his bread than give in to it.
While the former ChiefSecretary had criticized in ministerial
circles uncooperative
and vindictive Irish landlords, his
devotion to private
property rights was so firm that he could
never acknowledge
publicly such criticismo Law, decency
and civilization
depended upon the defeat of the separatist
and socialist
elements in the Home Rule agitation.

Balfour shared some of the anxieties" of many
British
politicians and aristocrats thr-t the triui.-iph of Home
Rule

would cause the whole British £;mpirG to lose power
and prestige.

To allow Ireland, the oldert and closest imperial

possession, to fall to the disintegrating forces of nationalism miFht imperil the vast network of colonies, dominions
33 Balfour

to J, Robert, 6 February 1888, cited jn
Cu'^tis
"
QQ£LCillcj}, p. -'iOB; L. Qt, V., 3rd series, 11^ 12.

'
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and protectorates that
reinforced British economic,
naval
and strategic power.
While Balfour, at this
juncture, did
not invoke the strategic
arguments, twenty years later
when
Germany manifestly challenged
British economic and military
strength, he directed considerable
attention to this argument.
Undoubtedly his anxiety over the
menacing international situation prompted Balfour's
comment to Horace
Plunkett in early 19lk that he loathed
nationality
as a

sentiment which could lead to the
destruction of empires. 3^
Balfour's perception of the history
and character of
Catholicism and Protestantism is a third
important factor
in explaining his opposition to
Home Rule.
The combined
effects of the secret ballot and the IdQk
franchise reform
ensured that any Dublin parliament would
be predominantly
I^oman Catholic in its

composition and sympathy.

Balfour

was raised among men and institutions that
had traditionally

equated Catholicism with intellectual backv/ardness

antism and authoritarianism.

»

obscur-

He and his generation were

part of a national and intellectual tradition that
traced
the progress of modern f^ociety to the religious
upheavals

against the Papacy and Catholic orthodoxy during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Mot only did they view

the Protestant revolts as the well-spring of intellectual

and religious liberation, but they also heralded these
rtorace Plunkett Diaries, 20 warch 191^, i-lunkett House,
London, iwicrofilm couy, .'/estfield c--tate College.
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revolts as the effective moulders
of a parliamentary tradition Which defied and finally
destroyed Stuart absolutism
in 1688-9.

All progress and enlightenment
in modern
history, whether political, economic,
intellectual or
social, they associated with the
triumph of Protestantism
and its values.
Indeed, in I90I Balfour reassured
a correspondent Of the continuing strength of
Protestantism owing
•to

its possession of the

'weapons' of 'enlightenment',

•toleration', and 'education'.

In fact, he equated the

cause of Protestantism with Enlightenment
and humanity.
The tendency ever since the Reformation of
England's

Catholic continental rivals, France and Spain, to
view
Ireland as a bridgehead for attacking the iinglish
Protestant state added strategic justification to anti-Catholic
and anti-Irish prejudice.

To Balfour, therefore, so long

as the Irish remained unquestioning and devoted believers
in Catholicism, they did not possess enough independence
of

thought or action to insure British security or to participate in the most elementary of political functions.

Balfour

and his peers interpreted Parnell's defeat as a capitulation to priestly domination rather than an indication that
the majority of the Irish Parliamentary Party and Irish

people were politically mature enough to put the higher
Home Rule principle above personal loyalty to Parnell.-^^^

^^Balfour to Colonel Sandys, I6 April 190I,
MS '49.85^1-, ff, 72-76.
Lyons, l)2&lm4 since

£&l(}2ns.t

201.

B.

M. Add.
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Perhaps Balfour's concern to
minimize clerical influence
and to establish minority
representation for Protestants
in any Home Rule Bill assumes
understandable, if mistaken
proportions, when one remembers
the reaction
to the I870

pronouncement of Papal Infallibility
even among Irish
sympathizers like Gladstone. Balfour's
fears of Catholic
domination may have been exacerbated
by the contemporary
Irish willingness to support
generously the construction of
massive new churches and cathedrals,
and to supply numerous
recruits to the growing ranks of Irish
priests, nuns and
brothers.
Balfour and his contemporaries apparently
failed to appreciate the penitential or
identity-crisis

part of the Irish devotional revolution.

They tended to

view the increase in the Catholic Church's
woal-^h and personnel simply as another manifestation of
Catholic attempts
to reverse the verdict of the Reformation.
The very fact
that Balfour spent only six months in Ireland
during his

four and one-half year term would have made it difficult
for him to gather enough experience and evidence to question this anti -Catholic tradition or the anti-Catholic
opinions ne heard from his colleagues, family and friends.
His most trusted Irish advisor, Sir

ivlathew .vest

Ridgeway

on

^mmet Larkin, "The Devotional Revolution in Ireland,
1875/' ^jnorJsL^^-n hisJ:^rj^l RqxJj^w. 77 (June 1972), 625-52.
In this essay, Larkin points to the probable impact of
widespread church construction and succossiul clerical
recruitment in the late nineteenth century upon those who
later invoked the Orange cry 'Home Rule means Rome Rule'.
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told his chief:
came to this country absolutely
devoid of
prejudices, but I have been
forced
th^
fi''''?
the conclusion that it is not
^'r^^^^ to
Irish Ro.an Catholicin"
posiUoS whe^e'he' will
^^^^^^
perform? His connecI

^ton.''''^^'^'^^'

U

"^'^^^'^

^c^^^^^^^^^
^equiredTve^v'.'?

influence brought to bea?:3i

at'hil^'and

Z

wit^siI!5^?H
'^^^^s.and the

Lord Salisbury^^ held similar
views about the power and
influence of the Irish clergy over
their flocks, as did
Balfour's aunt Lady Salisbury.'^O
Balfour demonstrated
analogous views when he advocated a
limited form of minority representation through a cumulative
vote in the abortive
local government bill of I892, and
when he told Salisbury
in 1892!

have never quite ma.de up my mind
the Extreme
the political disputers, or the R.
most.
On the whole, the last, but
all odious, ^1
I

disliice the Orangemen,

whether

I

RituaUsts.
C. 's

the

they are

In his anxieties over Catholic power
in Ireland, Bal-

four failed to appreciate the many Irish political
leaders
such as John Dillon, John Redmond and Iviichael
Davitt who
wanted to keep the clergy out of Irish politics. At
this

38Ridg^eway to Balfour, 5
39 IMd.,

Ivlay

1888, cited in Curtis, Coercion,

pp. 325-26.

Frances Balfour, Ne PbllYiSiL?ir.ls (.London:
Stoughton, 1930), II, 54.
^1

Hodder and

Balfour to Salisbury, 2^ December I892, cited in Curtis,
Ci>.Q.rc

laQ>

p.

^i-Q'u

^

Juncture. Balfour's recognition
of the anti-clericalis.
Within the Fenian tradition
was offset by his abhorrence
of
separatist republican elements
in Fenian ideology.
Balfour's
attitude toward the political
involvement of the Irish
clergy, indeed, evidenced
a degree of 'double
think'.
Back
in 1887 in his war against
the Land League's Plan of
Campaign, he was not reluctant
to make overtures to the
Vatican
to obtain a papal order
that Irish priests ought to
direct
their energies to the restoration
of law and order in the
countryside. The Papal Rescript
of I887 was the product
of
these negotiations with Rome as
well as of Mon. Persico's
observations on Ireland.
Obviously. Balfour permitted,
even
welcomed, involvement by the Roman
Catholic clergy
'

if it

facilitated the government, but he
condemned such involvement if it furthered the Nationalists'
goals of rent reductions or Home Rule.
Balfour, on the other hand, did not see
the Catholicism of the Irish as a permanent
disqualification for full
political participation on a democratic basis.
He had groat
faith that 'sound education' free of 'the
bonds of Catholic
orthodoxy' might develop ultimately those
habits of independent thought which he equated with the English
educations

and university system.

Much of his support for educational

reform in Ireland, and in particular for expanded
university
opportunities for Roman Catholics, was predicated upon
the

belief that a gradual enlightenment and appreciation of

Anglo-Saxon values and institutions would thereby develop

among Irish Catholics to
.ake the. content with
the Union.
In speaking of his
continuing support for improving
higher
education in Ireland in I901.
Balfour said.
"it is in^possible but that the illegitimate
power of the priesthood
Should be diminished by the
spread of culture "'^^
.

^imilarly. Irish exposure to the
rationalist scientific tradition. Balfour believed, would
correct the allegedly mythical,
sentimental and green-coloured view
of the past which

prompted the majority of the Nationalists
and their supporters to seek Home Rule or separation.
The fourth and most significant
factor in Balfour's

attack upon the principles of Gladstone's
Home Rule policy
in 1893 was his perception of the
exact nature of the Irish
question.
In surveying the history of Irish
nationalist
agitation. Balfour concluded that the bread
and butter
issues of land tenure and poverty rather
than frustrated
nationalism caused the disaffection of the majority
of the

Irish with the Union.

movements ever

;^ince

He observed that the nationalist

O'Connell's day equated the solution

of the land question with the achievement of
their political

objective.

He believed Parnell's popularity and success

derived precisely from the linking of the consxitut j.onp.l
movement, with its goa]. of legislative independence, to the

solution of the land question.

In 1893, just as in Fintan

Balfour to Colonel Sandys, 16 April lyOl, B.
MS 49»85^, f. 76

1.;.

Add.

9^

I^lor's day, the heat and
steam of the land agitation
fired the Home Rule engine.
Balfour believed that once
the Irish peasants were
blessed with the benefits of

peasant proprietorship the whole
nationalist agitation,
with its threatening socialistic
and separatist doctrines,
would evaporate. The Irish farmer
would then espouse
those values of orderliness,
self-help, and initiative
that many prosperous Victorians
associated with property
holding. Land ownership and education
would guide the
now gullible Irish to a sense of
responsibility and a
respect for the law. Balfour's sister,
Edith Balfour
Lyttelton, who accompanied him on his
Gonnaught trip, apparently entertained analagous views when
she observed that
the Irish peasants

v.'ere

...little children still listening' to old
fairy stories while their bread has to be
earned, they are like cnildren who are afraid
to walk alone, who play with fire, who are
helpless; like children who will not grew
up...,.vhat would I not give... to help^thoinv
But the task is very difficult, and if you
give children complete freedom thev will
certainly stray. ^3
The tremendous energy with which Balfour threw himsej.f

into dravving up land purchase legislation during

liis

own tenure as Chief-Secretary and later rested upon these

convictions.

He was revolutionary in the tactics he

^3l. p. Curtis, Jr., ^aol^^Jizsim S-M Ggji-i, A otucly Au
Anii-Irijih i^iimdicja In }Lli:j:mLmn J^n,^;land (Br-idgeport«
Conference on British Studies, I968;, p. 53. Hereafter
cited Curtis, ADGilfirSaxms aasl C^^ils.

employed to teach the Irish
conservative values in order^
to save society fro.
the threat of socialism
and disruption.
His use of wide state
credit to finance peasant
purchase, and the establishment
of the Congested Districts
Board, are striking examples
of Balfour's willingness
to

suspend still highly valued
laissez-faire principles. Like
the aristocratic American
progressive, Teddy Roosevelt.
Balfour would tolerate extensive
state intervention if \he
values of individualism and
property rights could thereby
be protected.
He told a Mnchester audience
in I895 that
"...if those Who wield the
collective force of
the com-

munity show themselves desirous.
.to ameliorate every
legitimate grievance and to put society
upon a proper and
more solid bo.sis," the threat of
socialism would evaporate.
He further told the Duke of
Devonshire in I903,
.

The movement of thought and the
pressure
events have compelled us (in mv opinion of
rightly coiT^oelled us) to abandon these
(laissezlaire; principles in the extreme form,
but
this does not mean that either you or I are
socialists.
It does mean that we now feel
bound to consider many proposals on their
merits which the Manchester School of 60
years
since would summarily have dismissed on what
they called principle .^^^

Balfour believed that the acquisition of a solid
basis for
Irish society depended upon the adoption of practices
of

state subsidization, which flouted rigid laissez-faire

Sydney Zebel, Balioui:, A miiicrU Bip^caphy (Cambridge!
Gamoridge University Press, 1973J. p. 1^^2, lialfour to'
Devonshire, 2? August I903, D, M. Add. MS -^19,770,
^fff
ff. 115-16.
*
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doctrine.

In pursuit of this end.
Balfour was not reluctant to chastize the Irish
landlords for their unwillingness to ,„ake some sacrifices,
shortly after taking office
1887. he defended his land purchase
proposals against
landlord objections
A few years later, while still
struggling to expand the state
supported purchase program.
Balfour complained somewhat bitterly
to Sir Stafford Northcote,

m

.

'"^^ 'English garrison'
bu?
^S^Hn^^"^'
""^'^l-^
but while
dual ownership
exists, th^y no more
add strength to England than the
ol
buikata and Tokar add strength to garrisons
Egypt.
On
the contrary, the whole of our Home
Rule
troversy has been hampered and embarrassedconby
having to defend not only the Union but
the
lanaloras. Abolish dual ownershio and
the
influence of the landlords will./.be
greatJv
augmented.
There will be no cause of friction
Det^veen them and their neignbcurs;
they
be made the theme for Platform oratory; cannot
they wixl then for the first time really and
become
an ciicient support of the English connexion. ^f-^

When the Second Home Rule Bill was introduced
in
1893

I

Balfour maintained that the land purchase
program

had not been given adequate opportunity to cure
Ireland of
its chronic 3,and and social problems.

He strongly criti-

dized the Liberal preoccupation with political solutions

rather than with diagnosis and treatment of the land problem.

More time was necessary, he argued, to complete land

-^Balfour's Cabinet Memorandum on Land Policy, 8 April
188?, B. M. Add. iviS ^9,822, ff. ^1-9-50.

46 „

Balfour to Morthcote, 1

£asX£lPl]» p. 3^4.

Fiay

I890, cited in Curtis,
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purchase and other aineliorative
n^easures in order to get
the Irish people to repudiate
Home Rule and become loyal
'
supporters of the British connexion.
A firm believer in
the Burkean tradition of slow
and gradual reform. Balfour
proclaimed in August, I89O1

"

It does not rest with one
individual, with

generation com^?etP?^^^^"^••^^^^
pletely
to solve so ancient a
controversv
historic difficulty as... the Irish
OnP^itr
^^^^ Unionists) can claim
?o
h^ir^o
to hci^e
Qone..,!.;
-2 jn the
solving It, and that claim, we process of
may
ward with something like moderation put forand
justice
As Balfour's letter to Professor
Calderwood suggests,
he did recognize some Fenian
separatist elements within
the Home Rule agitation, and certainly
the intelligence
reports on the activities of the Irish
Republican Brotherhood that circulated in the Irish Office
and in .Dublin

Castle must have emphasized the irreconcilable
nature of
Fenian opposition to the Union. While acknowledging
that
this Fenian element could never be completely
annihilated,^^

Balfour believed that the majority of the Irish people
would repudiate Fenian tactics and goals once the beneficial effects of the Union were made manifest to them
through a vigorous policy of law enforcement tempered with
conciliation.

The former Chief-Secretary maintained that

Curtis, Coercion, p. ^03; Balfour at Belfast,
5 April 1893*
^ Hsa£axii, viii, 1^19.

i'h.o

T imes

,

ion. period of
constructive unioni.™ woul.
Ceci.ate tho
ranks of the Penian
sympathisers, leaving only
a few
fanatics oiin.ing to
separatist republicanism.
Only a
few v.-ee.s before leaving
the Irish Office in
I89I, Balfour
outlined this theory sucrin-fi.r
^^y i=uccin..tly to Prancis ^
Baxter.
With re,-ard to the native
'hatred of
•

v,'

^^^^^

tSnffi^

?

-

.

-o s^'Paral..LoiTi xn cerf'lpc'c-.r.
tain c.-^'.-sea
01 j^u
the communitv ris--nr out of
ancient historical causes
and which ran onL
'

|ee^r;::>^^i?.i^,^^^^^?^^-t%what I ,noan is the

Prot.stants against Popery

"

^^^^Jr^'''^'

-rely'r^Kus'"

a

f^el?L fg'in

01.1 loncos but having its roots
gious and political controversies ir the r^-liof
the;n
lon^ forgotten past. .^enti..ents^
and
^^i? kind can only be erase? by
^'^^"S impatient about

\y

it%

5

During the deoarts of Unionist
rule from 1895 to I905,
Balfour encouraged Gerald Balfour,
George Wyndham and Sir
Horace Plunkett in forwarding
policies of economic and
social amelioration. This support
bore witness
to his per-

ception of the
public

aiid

debates.

lri^}>

Question, which he presented to the

the House of Commons during the I893
Home Rule

Until such time as the majority of the
Irish

clearly demonstrated that they favored
separation on its
ovm merits, Balfour had faith in the ultimate
triumph of
the Unionist cause,

Balfour to Francis Baxter. 23 January I89I. B. M. Add.
R'io

49 829, ff. 631-32.
»
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The decade beginning in I895
brought perhaps more

Significant and fundamental
economic, social and political
Changes to Ireland than had
the dramatic and exciting
years of the land war and
the Gladstonian conversion.
Any
definition of the nature and extent
of these changes is
determined inevitably by the
perspective of the historian
documenting them, as well as by the
particular institutions
and values that are being described
and analyzed. While
the historians of modern Irish
nationalism find in
the

Gaelic Loague, the Gaelic Athletic
Association and the
Irish Literary movement some of
the seeds of republican
separatism that culminated in the rising
of I916, the historians of Unionism can look with some
justification upon
this era as the zenith of Unionism and
its values.
The
ambiguity of the period is challenging, and
one is hard
put to employ a term or set of terms that
accurately

describe the character of the decade.

'Modernization' is

the term that perhaps best encompasses the
contradictions

and dichotomies of Irish life in the late
'nineties, and
the early t-.v'entieth century.

Jf , in addition to the rise

of democratic nationalism, modernization means the
growth
of economic, social and political opportunity based
on

merit rather than upon birthp and a consequent decline in
the deference paid to the establishment, then the decade

Of Unionist rule from I895
to I905 was truly vibrant.
While the Gaelic oriented
n^ovements contributed

significantly to this vibrancy,
the consistent and often
successful application of
'progressive unionism' produced
much
Of the dynamism of the
period.
This chapter will be
concerned mainly with describing
the implementation of
this progressive imionism and
how it contributed to this
process of modernization.-^

A number of factors account
for the recrudescence of
•conciliation' during the third
Salisbury administration.
Firstly, Arthur Balfour remained
convinced that the Irish
support for Home Hule would diminish
in direct proportion
to the degree of social and economic
improvement achieved.
Speaking at Alynwick in July 1895,^
Balfour acknowledged
the cruelty and stupidity of the
land confiscations,
the

penal laws and the suppression of Irish
industries prior
to the Union.

At the same time, he called upon his
fellow

Unionists to support the government's efforts
to upgrade
the material condition of Ireland during
the Salisbury

administration.

Undoubtedly,

t]ie

appointment of Gerald

Balfour in 1895» and of Geoi-ge Wyndham in I900, were

motivated by a desire to continue the conciliatory policies evolved by Arthur Balfour in the late 1880
•^The

The

definition of modernization comes from Joseph Lee,
£i irisJi oociety.

iJis. Mcn3,.erni:iaiij2a

2

IM

's.

liiaos,

'^5

July I695.

101

legislative priorities and
accomplishments of these chiefsecretaries were defined and
facilitated by the inspiration,
encouragement, and often direct
advice which Arthur Balfour
rendered from his position as
Tory leader of the House
of
Commons and subsequently as
Prime Minister.
Secondly, a growth in the
number of Irish unionists
who favored progressive
policies materially assisted
the
Irish administration in its
program of social and economic
amelioration. Lords Monteagle,
Castletown, and Waterford
along with Hugh de F. Montgomery,
the O'Conor Don and
Horace Plunkett, though not typical
of Irish landlords,

rendered valuable advice and support
to both Gerald Balfour
and George .Vyndham during their tenures
in the Irish Office.
A sense of 'noblesse oblige' along
with astute political
pragmatism seems to have stimulated these
individuals to
abandon negative unionism for a more
positive approach.Thirdly p Chamberlain's presence in the
Cabinet as
Colonial Secretary provided the Liberal
Unionists with auseiul channel and leverage to press for a
progressive
L,

P. Curtis, Jr., "The Anglo-Irish
Predicament," 20th
S^^linry pildiiL^, November, 1970.
This essay is a itimulaoing discussion of the Anr,-lo-Irish prior to world .var
I
Horace Plunkett once reminded Arthur Balfour that a more

productive and prosperous Ireland would facilitate
"...an
increased consumption of manufactured articles im-oorted
from Ji.ngland, and therefore apart from all political
considerations, domestic and imperial, it is a clear advantage
to Great Britain to develop quickly its nearest market."
Plunkett to Balfour, 9 February 1900. B, JVi. Add hlS
49.792,
f. 51.
See also Monteagle, "A Unionist Policy for Ireland," NaiimaJ. Royj^i:.:, 28 (1895). pp. 306-28.

"

policy.

Indeed, the pressure of
fighting the second Home
Rule Bill had given the
Liberal Unionists, and
especially
Chamberlain, greater clout than
they had exercised in the

previous Salisbury ministry.

'

The Ulster Liberal Unionists

continued to forward resolutions
outlining their priorities
Of land purchase, economic
development and local government
reform. Balfour acknowledged
the necessity of catering
to the Liberal Unionists as early
as I892 when he wrote.

...it must be recollected that the
party which
has with such unswerving loyalty
supported
the Government through five stormy
sessions
Conservative Party but a Unionist
*
jFdrty; A Unionist Party in
which no doubt
Conservative element greatly predominates, the
out one nevertheless of which the
Liberal
element forms an essential and most
important

parti

•

y

The political apathy hovering over Ireland
subsequent

to the Parnell divorce

scandal and the continuation of

the split in the Ir-ish party up to 1900
greatly facilitated
the implementation of a conciliatory policy.

The defeat

of the Liberals dashed for at least rive yoa-s
any hopes

of Home Rule, and the

.Tri.<=jh

people began to focus

th.5 3.;?

attention upon practical economic and social issues rather
than politics.

The spectacular grovrth in the Irish

Joseph Chamberlair. to Balfour, 25 May I896, B, M. Add,
49,773? f. 63j Salisbury to Balfour, 26 July 1892,
B. M. Add. LIS 49,690, ff, 66-7.

lis

Balfour to Colonel Milvmish, February or March I892, cited
in S. Zebel, BalfpilTs p. 79.
In fact, Balfour got a local
Conservative to withdraw from the I892 East Worcestershire
election so that Austen Chamberlain could run as the
Liberal Unionist candidate.

.
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Agricultural Organization Society
and the requests for
programs of technical education
are suggestive of thi.IS
inclination to put economic and
social improvement ab.)ove
the din of contemporary
politics.
The shaky financial
condition of the Irish Parliamentary
Party is yet another
indication of this political apathy.
Good political
and

parliamentary tactics compelled the
Irish members to direct
their parliamentary energies to
securing some concrete
economic and social benefits. Freedom
from active coercion
from 1895 to I900 enabled the Irish
members to render
some

limited cooperation in passing remedial
legislation. They
were not constrained, as in former
days, to use every Irish
debate to condemn the law enforcement
policies of Dublin
Castle and the Royal Irish Constabulary.
While tlie Nationalists in the ivIcCarthite camp were somewhat
sensative to
the dangers which a policy of conciliation
might bode for

Home Rule enthusiasm, the large Unionist
majority enabled
the government to pass beneficial measures
without relying

heavily upon Irish cooperation.

In fact, both Gerald

Balfour and George Wyndham had their most trying battles
with the ul-craconservative and reactionary landlords like
Aberconi, Ardiluan, Clonbrock and westmeath, who viev/ed

any concession to the Irish as traitorous to the 'loyal
minority*
Owing to the

intirr.ato

relationship betwee

1

.

^.hur

Balfour and the next two Unionist Irish secretaries, a
great deal of Balfour's recommendations for, and

encouragement of. conciliation
see.s to have teen accomplished through casual
meetings rather than by
the usual
procedures of Cabinet memorandums
and meetings. This
reticence i„ Balfour's
correspondence on Irish affairs
is
duplicated by a similar
parliamentary reticence. However,
the priorities and
legislative programs pursued by
the

Irish government from 1895
to I903

almost identical
to the broad plans Arthur
Balfour had developed when he
was Chief-Secretary. ,Vhile
thin chapter focuses on the
Irish careers of Gerald Balfour
and George Wyndham. the
Shadow of Arthur Balfour clearly
hovers over the whole
period.
v,ere

The most obvious indication of
Balfour's influence
on Irish policy after 1895 is the
immediate steps which
the Salisbury adminintration took
to revive land purchase
from stagnation. Considering the
importance

which the

establishment of peasant proprietorship
commanded in the
previous Tory ministry, the incoming
government was

naturally aiixious over the fall in land purchase
applications from 4526 in 18Q1 to a mere 1300 in I895.
The
declining value of government stocks, by which
the landlords were paid under the I89I legislation, had
made many
landlords unwilling to sell.

The tenants wore equally

reluctant to initiate purchase, hoping that a further

reduction in judicial rents might be forthcoming at the end
of the second term.

the peasants

'

Moreover, the yearly fluctuations in

security fund payments discouraged many from

3

availing themselves of the
purchase facilities of the
I891
act. Although Arthur
Balfour thought that the
difricultios
Of purchase were often
exaggerated by landlords who
did not
want to sell and by tenants
who did not want to buy,
he
considered the decadal reductions
as essential
to long term

purchase and to the avoidance
of 'more or less legal
warfare in Ireland '.^ Only a few
days after the Alynwick
speech. Balfour advised his
brother to rescue the purchase
program by remedying the defects
in the I89I legislation.^
By early I896 Gerald Balfour
submitted his recommendations to the Cabinet and the
Treasury. Besides
increasing land purchase funds by
^36. 000, 000 the ChiefSecretary advised amending the stringent
security arrangements of the 1891 act by extending
the repayment period
from if9 to 70 years. In addition he
contemplated
a

2i-fo

interest rate and decadal reductions in
annuity payments
based on the balance rather than on the
principal.
Those
peasants who had already initiated purchase
under the I885
and I89I legislation v/ere to be allowed
renegotiation of

their loans under the more liberal regulations
which Balfour formulated. This relaxation in security
and credit

arrangements apparently did not sit well with Treasury
officials, for on 27 January I896. E.

.V.

Hamilton submitted

^Balfour to Chamberlain, 15 March 1895, B. M. Add M3
ff. 72-3?
Hansard, xxxvii, 25^^-56.

77
^fff^^

^1-9.

^l-

7

^I'^^Jj^^gBalfour^to Gerald Balfour, 27 July I895, B.

Add.

Q

i
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a Cabinet memorandum
expressing considerable anxiety
over
the wiEdom Of the Irish
government's proposals.
The

lengthened repayment period ho
criticized as possibly oreating a precedent '...fraught
with danger as well as
inconvenience'. The Treasury did
not have 70 years to pay
its debts.

Although acknowledging a 'remarkable
regularity' of present annuity
payments and the absence of default
by the Irish purchasers, Hamilton
attacked Balfour's scheme
as a violation of the general
economic maxim that high risk
loans necessitated short terms and
high interest rates.
The

interest he attacked as being lower
than that contemplated for English landlords or any
public body.

Hamilton also objected to the provision
allowing for
renegotiation of past purchase agreements because
...if there is one thing more than another
which ought to be brought horr.zi to Irish\r-np
xt is that contracts are sacred and cannot
be set aside for the mere asking.
The priority v/hich jand purchase held in the
new

Chief-Secretary's policy was evidenced by the comments
he
appended to the Hamilton memorandum. The extended
payment
period and the lower interest rates he upheld as crucial,

owing to the special economic conditions of Ireland.

Default was more likely if the buyers were burdened with

higher rates for a short time.

Gerald Balfour thought it

rather 'late in the day' to teach
g

t)ie

Irish the

'sacredness

W, Hamilton memorandum cn Irish land purchase proposals,
2? January I896, CAB37AiA.
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Of contracts', but insisted
that the bill was designed
to
avoid the necessity of reopening
the. in the future. These

Changes, and most especially
the decadal reductions
and
the renegotiation clause, he
deemed absolutely essential
to prevent agitation by
previous buyers and to encourage
prospective buyers from postponing
purchase until the next
rent revisions. In early Ivlarch.
Gerald Balfour submitted
a detailed memorandum vigorously
defending his recommendatioHB against Treasury objections,
and he reassured his
colleagues that there was little
chance of serious loss,;es
to the Exchequer, in as much as
the relaxed terms would
help the state recoup its money. To
further buttress hiiLS
position, he reminded his colleagues that
time after time
the Conservatives had defined land
purchase as the keystone
of the party's Irish policy and an
object of the highest
public importance.^
The Land Purchase Bill which Gerald Ealf
ou

intro-

duced into the Commons on I3 April 1896 followed
the

general pattern of the Jajiuary cabinet memorandum.

In

addition to the provisions describ.id above. Balfour's bill
hoped to expand the

po'A'ers

by enabling ic to borrov/

of the Congested Districts Board

-:^500,000

from the Treasury for

its reconstructive efforts in the V/est of Ireland
v

After

outlining to the Commons the proposed financial adjustments.
9

Balfour memorandum on Irish land purchase proposals.
10 fuarch I896, CAB37AI/I6.

G.

lOS

the Chief-Secretary
asserted that land purchase
had
already produced some of
the beneficial social
effects
which Arthur Balfour had
envisaged earlier.

f=^™?rs have purchased their
holdLJ^r""!?* t-sjiraony
is invariably that
it
ha^tfifL^"?
^i^^-i^i^ a^d better
ciUzoSIt^^
^''^^ '"''^^ "i^^" ^^^y «ere
^.ere
^enantstio''^"

Despite some strenuous objections
by landlord advocates
such as Colonel Saunderson
and Mr. Smith-Barry in the
Commons, and by Lords Londonderry.
Templetown. Belmore and
Clonbrock in the Upper House.
Gerald Balfour safely

piloted his land purchase bill
through its parliamentary
journey.
The combination of decreasing
annuities and the

extended term were sufficiently
attractive to stimulate
tenant purchas^e applications from
?.500,0C0 in I895 to

in 1897 and to

-^2,

000, 000 in lOoS.-^^

Perhaps

another measure of the success of the I896
act is the odium
in which the reactionary landlord
clique in the Kildare
Street Club held Gerald Balfour. Its
leader, Lord

Ardiluan.

refused to meet the Chief -Secretary on
the grounds that he
would not receive a thief, and in J900
Ardiluan refused the
Lord-Lieutenancy of County Dublin as a protest
against the
10

^ ilsmsardt xy.xix, 781.

^^The cojrrpulsory sale of bankrupt estates and some
minor
changes
tenure clauses were the principal sources of
landlord opposition.

m

^^pomfret, Sho, ^trvgglQ

£si£

L^Dd In Irsland, p. 274.

,
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damages which had been done to
the 'loyal minority' since
1895.^^ On 23 August I896,
Horace Plunkett reported to
the Chief-Secretary's wife that
the Kildare Street Club
was full of sultry and grumbling
landlords and their
Ik

agents

While Balfour's bill did not
constitute a final solution to the Irish land question, it
did relieve the buyers
of the pressing disadvantages .of the
I89I act, and it
helped to relieve the country from agrarian
agitation
until 1900, when the falling prices of
government stock
consequent to the Boer War and tenant opposition
to the

grazier interests, pushed the land question back
into predominance. This peaceful interim stimulated
government
officials and individuals within Ireland to investi^rate
other facets of the Irish Question,

For instance, in late

I898, Gerald Balfour requested additional funding
to expand

further the already successful work of the Congested Districts Board,

He wanted i.30,000 per arxnum of its capital

endovmient for purchases conducive to amalgamation.

He

requested an additional ^.^0,000 to increase the regular
Board functions in the field of technical education and
,

If

agricultural instruction,
Countess of Fingal, Scvea^y Years Xs^-^mrCollins, 1937), p. 232. Ardiluan's bitter
letter attacking the Salisbury administration's Irish
policy was published in T]tg Tiines on 2? July I896,
l^Plunkst to Lady Betty Balfour, 23 August I896, Plunkett
Papers, Plunkett House, London.
^•5g, Balfour ir.emorandum on Congested Districts, 8 December
1898, CAB37A'.8/92,
•^^21i'?;abeth,

dondoni
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Me,anwhile, in Ireland the
hiatus in political and

agrarian agitation inspired some
novel cooperation between
unionist interests and nationalists
regarding the financial
relations between Ireland and
Great Britain. The general
lack Of facilities for
agricultural improvement
and occupa-

tional training were another area
of mutual concern and
cooperation.
The report of the Royal Commission
on the
Financial Relations between Great
Britain and Ireland was
published in 1896 shortly after the
land bill's passage.
iViinority reports notwithstanding,
the majority report
seemed to substantiate the widely held
nationalist contention that Ireland had been seriously
overtaxed since
the

Union.

Landlord and Unionist pique over the recent
land
legislation as well as over the abolition of
four judgeships on the Irish Supreme Court for i7,500
per annum
savings was sufficient to drive a number of leading
Unionists, including Colonel Saunderson, A, W. Samuels,
W. E. H.
Lecky, V. F. Knox :-.nd Horace Plunkett, to
join the Nation-

alists in establishing the All-Ireland Committee
in February
189?.

While this bipartisan committee

v/as

unable to agree

on the best means of redress, the Unionists reirjained
very
sore over Whitehall's general fiscal policy for Ireland

right through 1898."^^

The Treasury responded to the alle-

gations of overtaxation and to the subsequent Irish protest
W, Samuels to W. E. H. Lecky, 4 July 1897. Lecky MSS.
159^^ Trinity College, Dublin.

^•^A.

Ill

by questioning the objectivity
of a comnussion that
included eight Irishnien of varying
political allegiances,
but only one English Unionist.
Although admitting
the

greater burden which indirect taxes
placed upon Ireland,
and that equity might demand that
Ireland's contribution
to each L210 of duty be reduced
from il6 3s to iio and a
consequent increase in the English chare
from t. 3 17s to
;

i200p the Treasury believed Ireland's
lower cont.

bution

to the national debt, defense and Irish
expenses more than
offset the discrepancies described above, -^"^
while the

Chancellor of the Exchequer. Sir Michael Hicks
Beach,
appreciated the sense of grievance felt in Ireland,
he

attributed the difficulty to the inevitable effects
which

agricultural districts suffered from half a century of
free
trade,-^^

Arthur Balfour's response to the whole controversy
illustrates how stereotyped views of the Irish often militated against equality and equity of treatment even in the

leading spokesman of progressive unionism.

Although Balfour

admitted that the different history, geography and economic
structure of Ireland and Scotland might justify some excep-

tional treatment in taxation policy, practical politics
17

Treasury memorandum on Financial Relations between Great
Britain and Ireland (L, W. Hamilton), 30 September I896,

CAB37A2/37.
18

Hicks Beach to Arthur Balfour, 28 December I896, B. M.
Add, MS 49,695* f. 60.
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demanded that the three kingdoms
be treated as a financial
entity.
Balfour apparently shared Hicks
Beach's contention
that Hamilton's recommendations
for a separate Irish
exchequer smacked of financial Home
Rule, and he vetoed
any such method of redressing
the alleged grievance.
Having insisted upon financial unity,
Balfour charged that
the alleged overpayment of
^,2, 500,000 per annum by Ireland
was net the fault of the Imperial
Government, but of the
Irish themselves. The Commission's
case was based mainly
on indirect taxes on luxury goods
rather than on life necessities. Balfour suggested that since
it was notorious
that these indirect taxes derived mainly
from spirit duties,
the government was perhaps performing a
'philanthropic'
service in levelling high duties on liquor.

He admitted

that the simplest and most logical method of
redressing
the alleged injustice was to lower these duties,
but asked

Does any Irish patriot think it would be to
the advantage of the country materially to
lov'cr the spirit duty?
If not he can only
ask for an exemption and enactment under some
other head of revenue on the grounds that
England ought to pay to keep Ireland sober.

Balfour argued further that Ireland was treated no differently than England since there too 'the man who consumes
pays', and 'the man who does not consume gets off '4
The province which contains many of the first
class and few of the f^ocond will be at a
financial disadvantage compared vd.th one which
19

Balfour was similarly critical of the plan for a separate
Irish financial authority contained in the 190^-f Devolution proposals.
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He agreed with the Treasury
that British expenditure
in
Ireland «ore than made up for
the difference

between what

Ireland paid and her taxable
capacity. Balfour concluded
that Ireland's financial
grievance was r„ainly self-induced,
and that on balance, it was
not essentially different from
one which agricultural Scotland
or even Lancashire might
put forward. 2.0 Balfour's facile
dismissal of the Coinrais-

sion's findings on the grounds
of Irish drinking habits
probably reinforced Hamilton's and
Hicks Beach's positions,
and thus partially explains the
ministry's attempt to bury
the whole controversy by appointing
a nev; commission.
The
ministry virtually ignored the question
until Irish Unionist discontent reached such a pitch
that all the Irish
Unionist members joined with the Nationalists
in support
of V. F. Knox's 6 May 1897 budget
motion demanding a full

agricultural equivalent grant of B700,000 for
the relief
of Irish rates.
On the other hand, bipartisan support for
the
20

A. J„ Balfour memorandum on Financial
Relations betv/e^'n
-"^^ Scotland, 1896. E. M. Add. L^.S 49,'823,
11, 2J7"-51.
H. 0. Arnold Foster, the Belfast Liberal
unionist, termed the commission report "rubbish",
and

like Balfour thought that Ireland's preference for
whiskey
over beer was the root of the alleged overtaxation.
H. 0.
Arnold Foster to Joseph Chamberlain, 10 Decembe-^
1896.
B. M. Add. Ll^ ^9,773, ff. m-15.

Ilk

establishment of

Department of Agriculture and
for a
system of technical education was
received more sympaa.

thetically by the Irish government
and by the Ministry than
the joint protests over the
financial relations issue.
Since the early 'nineties Horace
Plunkett and his growing
Irish Agricultural Organization
Society had been attempting
to publicize their conviction
that no permanent or meaningful improvement in Irish agricultural
production and

marketing could be accomplished without
the coordination
and education which a properly funded
Department of Agriculture could provide. Shortly after the
return
of the

Unionist ministry in 1895. Plunkett i^^sued
an invitation
to those concerned with the material
prosperity of Ireland
to join in a nonpartisan study of Ireland's
agricultural
needs. He hoped that this study would elicit
a government

commitment to establish the necessary agricultural
department. Although the McCarthite faction of the
Irish Party
and some of the ultra- Unionists did not
participate, the

respect which Plunkett and his cooperative movement
commanded among the Farnellites, the Northern Liberal

Union-

ists, and in the agricultural midlands resulted in
the

convening of the Recess Committee in early 1396.
Plunkett and his followers

v;ere

That

champions of the doctrines

of self-help and personal initiative ma.de Gerald Balfour

very responsive to the Recess Committee's recommendations
for state supported technical education and for some popular elements to be introduced into the operations of the
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future Board of Agriculture,

m

fact, the Chief -Secretary

apparently altered the draft bill
he was preparing to
embody the suggestions of the
Recess Committee,

so that
the Agricultural Bill laid before
the Commons on 12 April
1897 was substantially the product of
Plunketfs Recess
Committee, Although the principle of
the measure commanded
wide support within the house,
Nationalists and Unionists

criticized the financial provisions of
the bill which
established an annual income of only i.150,000.^^
The

recent Financial Relations report and the
discontent it
provoked in Ireland was bound to make the
Irish very sensitive to the financial allocations of the
proposed depart-

ment.

Moreover, the government's intention to take
this

income cut of the

^-.700,

000 reserved for an Irish agricul-

tural rating equivalent grant, rather than from the
Imperial

Exchequer as with the English Agricultural Board, added
insult to injurj%

When V, F. Knox's ^notion commanding widespread Unionist support, including that of Gerald Balfour and George

Wyndham, was only narrowly defeated by 28 votes, it was

clear that the government was in serious disrepute with the
21

22

Plunkett DiariePp 13 August I696, 12 September I896,
Plunkett House, London,

15 April I897; i.rish Indj^pi^niifiM*
17 ^iay 1897; Ullblia l^lly ^Jg^uss^, 21 May 1897; Th^ Irish
HfiDS^eM. 17 April 1897; see also A. W. Samuels to
Lecky, 7 l^iay 1897, Lecky KIS 153^; same to same, ^ July
1897 » Lecky IvlS 159^, Trinity College, Dublin.
Frsfjiiaala Jimrinl,
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•loyal minority.

Writing to w. E. H. Lecky.
the Liberal
Unionist member for Trinity College,
A. W. Samuels,

a judge
in the Irish High Court of
Justice painted the following
picture of unionist disillusion:

an intense feeling of indignation
h^i^r.^^
l^nionists with regard to Hicks
R!r>,^''°S^
Beach
s fiiiancial policy to
Ireland. He will
neither treat the tariff in England
or in
way to destroy
^
i^o^'oflv^'''^
^
the faith we have had in English
honesty.
^ ''^''^ unhealthy feeling
E'^T^i^
that the country is being cheated growing up
Ind thi
Goyernraent is blundering very badly
in its
Irish policy. Hicks Be^ich was a
desiDerate
1 allure as Irish secretary
with
'pressure
withm tne law' policy but he is his
going it one
worse for the country as Chancellor
of the

£<xchequer,

I have never seen such universal
discontent
among loyalists - landlords believe they are
robbed, and commercial men that they are
being cheated by the go'/^rnmcnt that they
did anything in their power to put into

office,--'

A few weeks later Samuels reported that the
Nationalists
were openly taunting the Irish Unionists with
'stewing in

Unionist grease', and that not a single one of the loyalists had a good word for the government.

General government fiscal policy toward Ireland and
the small income contemplated for the Agricultural
Depart-

ment did not exhaust the list of complaints against the
Unionist government.

Immediately after the passage of the

23
^^arauels to Lecky, 7 May 1897, Lecky MS 153^, Trinity

College, Dublin.

2/k

Samuels to Lecky, k July I897, Lecky
College, Dublin.

m

159^4-,

Trinity
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1896 Land Act, the Ulster Liberal
Unionists renewed their
campaign to secure democratic local
government reform.
Which had been one of the main
conditions of their alliance
with the Tories ever since 1886.
At their annual meeting
in 1897 they passed a resolution
suggesting that, although
there might be some just apprehensions
of mismanagement

and abuse in the beginning in some
sections of the country,
the reform would ultimately engage the
best energies
of

the people in public affairs, and would
provide wholesome

education and experience of public duties and
responsibilities. The resolution suggested further

that this con-

cession would remove all reasonable complaints
of Irishmen
about lack of political power,
The presence of Chamberlain and Devonshire in
the

Cabinet facilitated the publication of these views among
the Ministers.,

In addition to the purely political motiva-

tions for instituting local government reform, there was

an urgent adininistrative need to overhaul the Irish work-

house system.

In the absence of any other democratically

constituted bodies, the local Boards of Guardians took on

many duties in the areas of health and sanitation which
had little to do with poor relief.

Moreover, there was a

pressing need to amalgamate and improve conditions in
existing workhouses.

Once the political and theoretical

need to abolish the grand jury system was accepted by the

Cabinet and the party rank and file, it was logical and
more efficient to rationalize the Poor Law Guardian

^^uist?r Liberal Unionist A^.s9ciatigD»

p.

85.
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functions within the general
local government measure.
Therefore, the limited poor
law bill which the Irish
Office
was preparing in 1896-7 was
dropped by the government.
Thus by

Rlp^y

1897 the Unionist government
had a variety

Of disgruntled constituents
and groups to appease.

Many
landlords were incensed over the
land act. the moderate
Unionists over the agricultural
bill, the Irish liberal
unionists over the delays in local
government reform, while
virtually all Irishmen were embittered
by the government's
general fiscal policy. Only five
days after the Knox
motion, Arthur Balfour submitted a
proposal to his colleagues which would liberate the Ministry
from its Irish
dilemmas by simultaneous treatment of
the local government
question, the financial grievances of the
landlords, and
the need for imperial aid to agricultural
rates.
In fact.

Balfour m.aintained that by combining local
government
reform with a large finc'.ncial grant in aid of
agricultural
rates, the governmsnt had a unique opportunity
simultaneously
to give the Ir.lGh landlords some

'pecuniary solatium', quash

Irish financial discontent, and satisfy the legitimate

demand to reform the antiquated and politically
indefensible system of Irish local administration.

In order to

accomplish all these objects, the government would drop the

agricultural bill and the proposed poor law reform.

Ireland

would receive ^700,000 in aid of agricultural rates rather
than the i500,000 which, in 'strict equity*

v/as

the maximum

She could claim based on
the -,,,^3, Agricultural
Ratin.
Act.
The extra ^200,000 was
included because
.generally
speaking the circumstances
of Ireland justify
generous
financial treatment', and because
the settlement of all
these issues would be well
worth some financial sacrifice.
The ministry's policy was
clever and unique in offering benefits to every segment
of the Irish

political

spectrum.

The Nationalists were offered
an opportunity of
more power to weaken the
political base of the aristocracy.
The Liberal Unionists would
have their old local government

grievance redressed, while the
landlords would receive a
great financial boon from the rating
relief and from the
conversion of the incidence of taxation
from the owner to
the occupier.
The landlords were also scheduled
for relief
from their former share of the poor
rate.
These financial
provisions were crucial to prevent the
landlord class from
opposing their inevitable exclusion from
local affairs.
The major Ascendency objection to
Balfour's I892 bill had
been that, as the rate-payers for both
their occupied and
tenanted land, they would have been taxed
out of existence
by nationalist dominated councils
In effect, the agricultural equivalent grant enabled the ministry
to allow
„

democratic local government reform by buying off
landlord
?6

'A'
11

^* Balfour's Heads of statement policy on Ireland,'

Ilay

I89?, C;aJ337AV20,

opposi-tion.^7

practically

ad.itter

this v/hen he said:

After the class war of which v/e
hpvp
-.n been
nave all
^
the
+ TTYic! +ui„
xne vir
victims
this Bill - without the
finanoiTi
clauses... would have been the
most
uiiu^^
measure iinaginable.
It would
weapon ready made in the hands have been^
oFthe maiorltv
extinction of whatever property
fr^^L^^
n
^''^
Irish^IandJo^ci^
With rTJ.T'i
^he landed M.^r^^S'^'^^^"'" ^^^^^ conferred on
^^^"^ revision of
rents wn?
I
'^'^^^^ of the
L'nantstie

^

'

Horace Plunkett attributed the loss
of his agricultural bill
to '750,000 golden reasons '.^^

Balfour informed the House of Commons
of the new
Irish policy on 21 May 1897. The Irish
Nationalists were
naturally pleased by the prospect of
increasing their
political power, while the Unionist leader,
Edward Carson,
echoed landlord opinion when he said that
as long as the
minority were protected, it would be narrow
for his party
to be antagonistic.
Six months elapsed before the pariiajnentary draftsmen completed their work.
The local government bill which Gerald
Balfour intro-

duced on 21 February 1898 eventually established
county
and district councils, elected triennually
on a parliamentary

Ridgeway to Balfour, 19 November I891, 13. M.
ff. 206-7.
Absentee landlords who let
their entire estates received double benefits berause
their non-occupying status cancelled all poor relief
and
local rates.
There probably were not too many in this
category, hov/ever.
i^ir V;est

Add.

28

29

I^'b

i|9,8l2,

^ Himjifird,

ixii, 577.

Plunkett to I^ady Betty Balfour, 29 October I897, X'lunkett
Papers, Plunkett House, London.
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franchise.

Those women and peers, who
but for their sex
and title would have qualified
for the parliamentary
register, were also given the
local government franchise.
The application of the one-man
one-vote principle to every
occupier abolished the plural
voting privileges formerly
enjoyed by the Ascendency class.
Because the only qualification for eligibility for office
was possession of a

parliamentary franchise, local politics
were open to all
Irishmen, irrespective of wealth,
religion, or politics.
The franchise and eligibility
clauses were perhaps the most

revolutionary aspects of the bill, for as
the first elections indicated, they enabled the
native Irish to sweep
the Ascendency completely out of local
affairs.
The parliamentary reception accoru^d to
Balfour's

bill did not give the government any grounds
for complaint.
The very minute objections brought forth by
the Nationalists
aiid Unionist members were solely for
appearance's sake.
Unionists did not want to jeopardize the prospective
financial aid. while the Nationalists looked forward
to having
new machinery to further the Home Rule agitation.
John

Dillon spoke of the

absolute necessity of a limited

movement to secur- popular control of the county councils...'

when William O'Brien was planning; the September Convention
of the United Irish League.
30

Dillon to O'Brien, 8 July I898, O'Brien Papers. National
Library of Ireland, MS 885/I3.
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There were many Irish
Unionists who felt the major
safeguards against financial
abuse, i.e.. the incidence
of
taxation on the occupier, were
inadequate, and shortly

after the introduction they
mounted demands for minority
representation or for a system of
cumulative
voting.

The

Chief-Secretary apparently shared
his elder brother's view
that such mechanisms were useless,
and were opposed to
democratic principle:
no longer to keep up. so far as
Lri!^'
government is concerned, anything that local
emphasizes the distinction between
ana tenants, bet^/;een large and smalllandlords
cesspayers. Iviy own belief is that if
you
by a system of minority representation succeed
in
getting a larger proportion of landed
gentry
on uhese councils you would do so with
the
accompanying disadvantages that those who
Dy this means secure seats on the
council^,
'^'^ influence on the councils
I?
i
Si'^
that they would otherwise poscess.31

Colonel Saunderson lod these ri-ht wing
Unionist
forces in the Commons while the Belfast
Newslcttor was
their mouthpiece in Ireland. W. E, H. Lecky
received

petitions for minority representation from the
Derry Unionist Association, the Irish Unionist Alliance,
and a Committee of Kerry Landowners, as well as from the
Mid-Arm.agh

Constitutional Association,^^

Despite Lecky 's advice that

the best course was to accept the inevitable

^ Hxmaarii, iv. ^59,

ajid

to involve

516-7.

32Lecky MS I687, I692, 1700a. Trinity College, Dublin.
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themselves in the new system, 33
.any of these Unionists
remained embittered by the
government's refusal to countenance any form of minority
representation. 3^ An indication
Of the bitterness which
the government's conciliation

caused among the ultra-Unionists
is reflected in the following editorial from the
^qlf^ NewslAtt^r'
The Bill is a notable
instance in which the
Government have deserted their
going out of their way to pleas supporters
eT?ac?ioA
that never will be pleased
with anvthing
independence, and for that
t^^.f politicalinto
a revolutionary measure,
f ^V^Bf?i^^r^'-'^?
altogether
experimental as
h:t juccess
^'^h.^^i
of local government in England
an.J^ Scotland cannot be
taken as a criterion
asure of this nature will work in
lini"''''"/^
irelj^nd,
the social and political conditions
Ox Inis country being so
different from
those prevailing in Great Britain. 35

f

It would be incorreot to assume
that Gerald and

Arthur

Balfocir.'

had complete confidence that the local

government machinery would be run in a totally
nonpartisan
and efficient manner, Vor instance, the
clergy were disqualified from off j.ce ovdng to what Gerald
described as
'the tame submission'

priestly

v- tPx-e^

councilG

v^ere

33 le-cky
lo'-j-',

of the Roman Catholic population to

rcnco and do/nination.

(Moreover,

the county

not given the powers of compulsory land

to Lud-Armagn Constitutional Assooicticn,
5 April
Lecky
I704, Trinity College, Dublin,

Botlon J. v.'aller to Lecky, 26 knrch 1893, Inckv MS £601same to same, 16 April I893, Lecky ivii 26n2, 'iv-^nity
y
College, Dublin.

—

35
•^-^Ih^

Bfiiila^ Newsli^tjir, 16 Way I898,

12^

seizure which the gx-and juries
had possessed.
The Local
Government Board exercised
stronger powers of supervision
over capital expenditure
than existed under the English
and Scottish systems. 36 Nor
were police powers extended
to the Irish as had been the
case under the English and
Scottish Acts. There were
differences in the application
Of the agricultural rating
which suggested a desire to
confer more benefits on the landlords
than on the ordinary
ratepayers. For instance, unlike
in England, agricultural
holdings within towns were exempt
from relief, while woodlands, parks and pleasure grounds
outside of towns were
accorded relief. Landlords, the only
possessors of such
recreational property, were the obvious
beneficiaries of
the latter provision.

Nevertheless, the Irish Local Government Act
was

second only to the land purchase acts in
providing Irishmen with the opportunity to control their own
immediate
affairs.

An Irishman's Catholicity or his class origins
no

longer prevented his participation in local
affairs or
denied him the opportunity for public employment.
The

first elections in I699 virtually ousted the
Ascendency
classes from their former control of county affairs.

Nationalists secured 551 places on the new county
councils,
while the Unionists could claim only 125, 86 of them
in
3^G. Balfour memorandum on Irish Local Government
Bill.
29 Novem.ber 1897, CAB37A5/5i.

,

Ulster.

Inevitably, the first
elections «ere fought
upon political lines. To
have expected the Irish
in the
f^rst flush Of their newly
won electoral powers
to ignore
the predominant political
issues of the d.y,
whether Ho.e
Rule versus the Union or
landlordism versus tenant
demands,
was asking too ™uch.
On the other hand, the
extension of
democratic local government
helped to develop an awareness
that Home Rule could not
solve all Ireland's problems.
Most Of the county councils
proved themselves cognisant
Of the basic economic
requirements of the country, as
they
demonstrated in their cooperation
with the Department of
Agriculture in their initiation
of technical and agricultural courses. The democratization
of the franchise helped
to focus attention on the
horrendous grievances
of the

town and agricultural labourers.
the land question from the 1670

The preoccupation with,

's i,ad

obscured the claims

of this large class of impoverished
Irishmen.

The election

of labourers and their
representatives facilitated the

expansion of publicly supported labourers'
cottages all
over the country in the decade after
1898,

The Irish

agricultural labourer, who suffered the
nost fror,, depression and unemployment, was equally
influential in pressing
the local organs for technical instruction
schemes.
37c
•

Shannon, I-2£aI

.Go ve raumJl jji

ICEland, Chap, Four.

38
^!!2""""' if^ai Ssym:mpnt jjy teiand. Chap, Five, pp. 29630^. 319-3^7! also 1-/9905/12825/1902,
i^iji, ladijjiji^aal
-^,_>jjtf-.-u^
O, 30 August 1902.

Indeed, by I905 the majority
of
ratepayers showed
the most concern for these
pragmatic considerations and
efficient administration, and
considered Home Rule sentiments and declarations
increasingly irrelevant to the

M^h

proper administration of local
affairs.
The passage of the Local
Government Act did not
terminate the reconstructive
efforts of Gerald and Arthur
Balfour.
In 1899 the government
established the long-

awaited Department of Agriculture
and Technical Instructi
along the lines recommended earlier
by the. Recess Committ
The appointment of Horace
Plunkett as Vice-President of
the department and the subsequent
acquiescence of the

Chief-Secretary in the appointment of

T.

P.

Gill, a Roman

Catholic nationalist and an ex-participant
in the Plan of
Campaign, indicated a greater responsiveness
to Irish
wishes and ideas than had existed previously.

Undoubtedly,

while ties of friendship partially explain
these appointments, Gerald. and Arthur Balfour saw in
Plunkett the very
model of the Irishman that 'progressive
unionism' v/as
expected to develop.

Despite growing ultra-Unionist suspi

cions of the genuineness of Plunkett' s
unionisi

subsequent outcry over the Gill appointment by

a
.e

Ardilua

clique, Arthur Balfour and his brother remained
steadfast
in their support of this dynamic AngloIrishman and his
39
Plunkett 's nonpartisanship led the Irish
39 3.ady
-

Betty Balfour to Arthur Balfour, 28 August 1900.
:ViJ
^9,831, fe

B. M. Add.
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.

unionists to ^ry
try TO
to oust
ow^ii- him
hir^ from
his South Dublin seat,
Arthur Balfour encouraged
urdgea iiunkett
Pi„ni-«+-4- ,
to run so that his
constituents would bear full
responsibility for the loss
Of his talents to
the Co.n.ons.
Writing to the Du.e of
Devonshire, Balfour severely
^y ^rixici..ed
critici-od the
-t-ho
v
diehards
who
remained blind to Plunketf«?
-LunKett s onr>+>,.'>
contributions to the cause
of
the Union:
Mr, Plunkett's position io ^„

iiciano.

land's

He has devoted himself,
for n^nv

srefest'^SLt'ryia°'ioS^^

puipose, with an absence of
any -seJ f-sp^ki v^/r
motive and with an unwearied
zeaJ which o^^ht
to earn the gratitude of
Irislmen of all
classes, and not least I
think o? ?hose Unionists who hold that poverty
is one of ?he
'^"^^'^^
the ancient
'""^^
L'rP%'"of'li'Lnf
prevented them from
hrn?L5 M Plimkett
O? ^I"^
has now
J'^""'
in which he can still furth6:r got a position
develop the
Ideas Which as a private
individual/ he has
done so much to foater; and
it is
melancholy reflection that a man sire
of whom all
this may be said cannot find
a seat in the
country of his birth, and whoso
best interest
^^^^ ^^^^^^-^^ and\^^elf.

^

V

"evS^I^;^!^r^^

Balfour greatly regretted that the
Gill appointment and
Plunkett's one vote in support of
the release of Irish
agitators was allowed to outweigh his
services to the country.
If Sir Horace was forced to retreat
to a safe English
or Scottish seat, Balfour suggested
that this event would
emphasize the accusations that party
divisions ran so deep
that Irish administrators could only be
effective when
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holding English and Scottish
seats.^^

Despite Balfour's

admonitions to the Irish Unionists,
the reacxionary
Ardiluan clique put up their own
candidate against Plunkett
with the result that the spJit
in Unionist votes gave the
South Dublin seat to the Nationalist
contender.
Mooncy.
Balfour's admiration for Plunkett
and his conviction that
Sir Horace's work was strengthening
the Union led to
Plunkett 's retention of the Vice-Presidency
of the Departinent of Agriculture.
Indications of Unionist backlash notwithstanding,

Arthur Balfour remained convinced that
'...Ireland should
receive exceptional treatment of a generous
character to
mitigate or remove the social and economic
difficulties
under v;hich she had so long laboured'. Although
there

were no English parallels, Balfour defended
the land purchase program, the Congested Districts Board,
the Light
Railways and the Agricultural and Industries Act
as justified by an anxiety to give exceptional aid to a sister
kingdom.

Indeed, Balfour maintained that such policies

strengthened rather than weakened the Union.
In the autuiTin of 1893 Balfour hoped to follow local

government reform with legislation to provide university

education for Irish Roman Catholics.
Balfour to the Duke of Devonshire,
Add. I/iS 49 769, ff. 179-183.

As has been shown,

?

June I900, B. M.

»

41

Balfour to
IvlS

1^9,853,

Jackson, 20 March I900, B.

V/.

p.

f.

199.

Add.

129

on principle Balfour had been
sympathetic to this Irish
grievance back in the late 1880 's.
In February I897 he

told an Irish bishop that the
government would welcome

receiving confidentially the views
of the Irish hierarchy
on the university question/^^ 3.^^^
^^.^ question had
generated so much religious passion
and bigotry
in the

past, Balfour took no immediate
steps to frame legislation

for publicly endowing a Roman Catholic
university.
explained to a correspondent in July 1898j

As he

It would break the party to endeavor
to
force them against their will or against
the
will of their constituents, to vote for
a
measure to which many of them have an
ineradicable objection. ^3

A further obstacle was undoubtedly the absence
of any consensus among the Irish bishops, Presbyterians and
laity as
to the ideal solution.

However, by late I898 the Irish bishops as well as

John Dillon had expressed renewed interest in rapidly settling the higher education issue on non-denominational
lines if financial support comparable to that of Trinity

College could be secured.
R»

B. Haldanes, ^^ho had

Ec;lfour drafted into service

written the London University Charte]

only a few years previously.

In October I898, Haldane

secretly journeyed to Ireland and interviewed Archbishops
42

Balfour to Bishop O'Dwyer (?}, 19 February 1897„ B. U,
Add, MS 49,852. f« 42.

-Balfour to Mr. Samson,
f.

303.

8

July I898, B. hU Add.

M'S

49,852,

Aalsh and Logue as we.Xl
as Christopher Reddington.
T. ,i
Healy and John Dillon of
the Irish Parliamentary
Party.
He also tall:ed to various
business and educational
officials in Dublin and Belfast
in his efforts to build
up an
Irish consensus.^^ He
envisaged setting up two
constituent universities in Dublin
and Belfast.
One supreme
governing body would be established
which could grant
internal and external degrees.
Haldane believed this
measure would satisfy the
northern Presbyterians as well
as the southern bishops,
whom he described as more interested in having 'a non-atheist
atmosphere than a specifically Catholic curriculum. In
view of his pre^ car
'

sentiments, Balfour must have been
relieved
.v.ane's
report that the hierarchy did not
particularly v,ant to
dominate the governing bodies and would
be satisfied if
they were consulted in the nomination
process of the university governors, Haldane encouraged
Balfour to press
the Cabinet to deal quickly with the
matter to substantiate
the government's good will.^*^^

Three weelcs later, despite the inevitable
diehard
objections, Balfour submitted Haldane 's report,
sketch
bill and sketch charter to the Cabinet, He
told his
The political delicacy of the mission is
illustrated by
Haldane s request that the Foreign Office print
only 20
copies of his report, 6 for Balfour, 6 for himself
and
the others to be locked up,
,

Haldane memorandum on Irish Mission, prepared for A
Balfour, 20 October I898, CAB37/W?'?.

j
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colleagues that in the interests
of Ireland, of the Union.
and Of higher education in
general, he felt obligated
earnestly to press the
recommendations,

From the point of view of

Tt'pT'-.v,/!

^U^^^l^T

••

•

-•

^s'i^ prop?
"

the Union/' the
re?usaf t^'^'
reiusal
"i""
CO pass such
a measure would be a
plain admission that on some
least, a Unionist Parliament subiects
coSld

4

not

Wis'

S^n^^ally, it is manifest,
as^a master
politics, that, so
^hf Irish grievance
Ion? as
a? the
long
remains unredressed. It will be imT30ssible
to r-ntr^brte
anything from public sources towards
V^Tver"
sity requirements in Great Britain,
Ax^least.
Irish member, I should take care
in
Lrf"^-^"^
oo make
ix impossible ^•''6
I

Over the next four months, Balfour
and lialdane met frequently in an effort to get an Irish
University Bill laid

before Parliament

.

^'^

Hicks Beach enthusiastically sup-

ported the cause and promised ^50,000 from
the Church
^'^
Surplus funds.
However, despite his desire

'...to get

the Roman Catholic population of Ireland
educated...,''''^
i' ^^^^-'-^our memorandum on Irish Unive>-s-:tv Question
12 November I898, CAB37A8/82.
Balfours^rLsed
that the support of the Ulster Liberal Unioni^:t3 alsS'
and
some bcotch and Welsh dissenters gave a
unique opDortunity to proceed with the reform.

^"A

if?

'R,

B. Haldans, ^in Ajiln]^^api}y (Garden
City; Doubledav
and Doran, I929), pp. 138-144.

48

^^'thur^Balfou^^^ to^Gerald Balfour, n.

d., B.

yi.

Add.

49.

Balfour to Professor Park, I5 February I898,
49,853, f, i\o.

Mi)

B.

M. Add.

Balfour's efforts in I898-9
proved as abortive as those
Of 1889.
While the Irish bishops'
den^ands for an endowment equal xo Trinity's and
for more control over the
governing body caused some
difficulties for the leader of
the House, the death blow to
Haldane's proposals came from
opposition within the Cabinet, and
especially from the
Duke Of Devonshire. 50

The appointment of a new
commission

to investigate higher education
in Ireland buried the ques-

tion until 1903.

It is perhaps more convenient
to turn

to that year to conclude this
discussion on Balfour and
the Irish university question,

Encouraged by the conciliatory atmosphere
generated
by the Land Conference of I902 and
the passage

of the Land

/ct in 1903, George Wyndham urged Arthur
Balfcur, now the
Prime Minister, that the time was propitious
for reopening
the university question.

Wyndham maintained that the

multiplication of public universities in England at
Liverpool, Leeds, Manchester, Birmingham and Sheffield
rightly

exacerbated the Irish sense of grievance.

Since the report

of the second royal commission indicated
that Catholic,

Anglican and Presbyterian interests all agreed on t]ie obsolescence of the present examining university, Wyndham
advocated converting the Royal University into a teaching
university.
50

The Queen's Colleges at Cork, Galway and

Balfour to General V/anchope, 8 June I899, B. M. Add.
MS ^^9,853, ff, 95-7; also W. Long to Balfour,
2? November
1898, B. M. Add. MS 49.?76, f. 10.
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Belfast he thought shoula
oe converted into
technological
institutes. According to
Wyndhan., £50,000 to fc6o.OCO
per annum drawn from the
Irish Development Grant
of
^185,000 per annum would finance
the bill adequately, and
would thereby eliminate
possible parliamentary difficult
ties that might arise if
funds were drawn directly
from
imperial revenues. Wyndham
believed there was enough

support among all the religious
factions as well as from
moderate Unionists such as Dunraven
and Monteagle to
guarantee success. His anxiety
for proceeding at this
juncture was not entirely altruistic.
The I903 I^nd Act
had operated only a short time
when it became apparent
that landlords had received very
generous prices. Wyndham
hoped that university ix^form would
help to divert Irish
attention from the great boon conferred
upon the Ascendency e-^

Wyndham 's proposals were publicly floated
in Lord
Dunraven 's letter to the press on 4 January
190^K

However,

the Chief-Secretary's optimism was
quickly dampened when
three weeks later Lord Londonderry told
Belfast Orangemen

that the Cabinet had no intention of establishing
a Roman
Catholic University in Ireland.
Besides the opposition

September I903. B. M. Add. MS
lol; same to same, 4 November I903. B. M„
^^''^
18 January J
p^^r^
B„
M. Add. iijS L^o^sok, ff. 207-8.

^"^Kn^
^^,604,

3*"

f.

'^IhaMin Daily E^garfiss, 23 January 190^1,

9(V4,'

Of this influential
peer other factors also
explain
Balfour's failure to
support vigorously the
Chief .Secre-

tary's proposed university
scheme. Firstly, the
Prime
Minister could not risk
rekindling, by an Irish bill,
the
religious dissensions which
had accompanied the passage
Of the English Education
Act of 1902.53 F,,,,ermore,
there
was widespread feeling
in Whitehall that Ireland
had

received extremely generous
treatment in recent years with
the monies expended on
the agricultural grant,
the Devel-

o-m

Grant, the Department of
Agriculture and the more
recent land act. Austen
Chamberlain and Edward Hamilton

reported that the required
borrowing to finance the latter
measure was causing considerable
anxiety in The City, and
that resistance to Irish
expenditures was growing.
j.
Sandars, Balfour's secretary,
warned his chief that the
majority of his colleagues believed
that '...George and
his clients had a very fine
exhibition last session, and
that the Party want no more Irish
measures for the
'^^
present.
53
ilJliaand,

l8Z0rm.4 (Oxford:

Oxford
These
pages
dLcuss
the ^o!t^T.;f
'J^^^^'the Education
T'Tohler^s
Act causid for the
Ministry!
u:.Ur:J:'^

l""^'

^55-8.

.

^alfour, 13 November IQ03. B. M.
to same, 6 January 1904, B.
f]?*
Vr^'lM' i'
^^^'^^
-''"^^^ 24 August 1904
^'
t
1^
"t/t^"'-^^;
B« M,
Add, IVxS 49,735,
f. 49.

'

ti^'''v^^i^^7?^^^^^''

55

U

ino

^'

to Balfour, 29 October I903, B. M. Add.
io
^9,761, f, 190.

ivj,

'

Once again the claims
of Irish Roman Catholics
were^
set aside in deference
to English financial
and religious
sensibilities. This grievance
was finally settled
in I908
When the .ain elements of
Haldane's recommendations
for a

'

nondenominational university were
introduced into Augustine
Birreirs University Act.
Although Balfour was opposed
to
the academic recognition
which Birrell's bill accorded
Maynooth Seminary, and to the
role of the Irish county
councils in choosing the
governing body, he welcomed the
measure as a sincere effort
to establish sound academic
institutions and traditions
'...unpolluted and unperverted
by religious prejudices or
bigotry on either side.... '56
In as much as the present
university system of Ireland is
based upon Haldane's plan, Balfour
nust be given some
credit for providing higher
educational opportunity for
Irish Catholics,
As has been shown. Arthur
Balfour's support of land

purchase and local government reform
began to open novel
economic, social and political
opportunities for the majority of Irish people.

However, conciliation proved expensive

in terms of Irish unionist support
because the Ascendency

classes attributed the erosion of their
social and political influence directly to these measures.
Irish unionist
discontent began smouldering at least eight
years before
the Devolution Crisis burst upon the
parliamentary scene in
56

^ H£m^:j:d» clxxxviii, 35^-56? cxcii, 631-ifO.
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Much Of the furor over the
Gill appointment and
Horace Plunicett's nonpartisanship
was B,.apto.atic
of the

anxiety which conciliation
generated in the great Irish
houses. By 1900 many unionists
found further cause for
complaint in Gerald Balfour's
failure to initiate coercion
against William O'Brien's United
Irish League.
The Chief-

Secretary's position was further
complicated by the reunification of the Irish party in
February I900 following
almost a decade of internecine
squabbling.
Gerald Balfour's
oft used parliamentary tactics
of divide and conquer were
losing their utility in the face
of a united Irish party
at Westminster. As the man responsible
for Irish affairs.

Gerald Balfour had to bear the brunt
of both Irish unionist discontent and the renewed vigor
of the Irish Ilationalist benches.
Caught between the cross fires of Nationalist
hostility and Unionist anger, the Chief-Secretary
suffered
a loss in healtii and political influence
by mid-1900, and
his resignation from the Irish Office in
November 01 that
year was virtuaJly a foregone conclusion. -^^
The chcl(;e of George Wyndham as Gerald Balfour's

successor in the Irish Office indicated that Salisbury
and
Arthur Balfour wore not disposed to capitulate to
the first
signs of Unionist backlash.

The Ardiluanite clique had

hoped to terminate conciliation by getting v»alter Long
57J^lunkext to Lady Betty I^alfour^

19 June I9OO, Plunkett
Papers, Plunkett House, London; W. Long to Arthur Balfour,
2 November 1906, B.
Add. I-ii 49,776, f. I85-6,
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appointed as Chief -Secretary. 58

Wyndharn's appointment was

undoubtedly prompted by motives
similar to those which
led to Gerald Balfour's
appointment as Chief -Secretary
five years earlier, wyndham
had served an Irish
apprentice
Ship When he was Arthur
Balfour's private secretary
from
1887 to 1891.
Moreover, ties of mutual
intellectual
out-

look and friendship insured
that there would be constant
communication and empathy between the
leader of the House
and the Chief-Secretary. Wyndham
was in office only a
short time when their substantial
agreement on the causes
and solution of the Irish Question
became apparent. As the
new Chief-Secretary explained to
Lord Cadogen, the Viceroy,
Ireland would suffer from chronic
agitation so long as the
system of dual ownership and periodic
rent revisions
existed
s

Under the existing system the value of
Irish
land must be continually depreciated;
the
landlord cannot be expected to improve tne
lai\d; the tenant may be expected
to deteriorate It, and even in the best estates, certain
occupancies will be perpetuated which are
centers of lawlessness an.d rallying grounds
for fresh attacks on the capital value of
Ireland \s chief asset, I therefore wholly
concur
thinking that purchase must be
accGleratcd and cheauened and released fi-om
impediments to all parties concerned. 59

m

Easier said

th.-.m

donel

A number of factors were

bringing purchases under the existing legislation to a
5St.

LrQemnllz

ilouriiS.l,

2 iNove:nber 1900,

"^Vndham to Cadop:en, n. d., B. M, Add. Mo ^49,830,

f.

I6I.

standstill.

Firstly, Wyndharn discovered
that all the
landlords who could afford
to sell as a result
of other
income, had already done
so.
The legal costs, often
as
high as 33f^, were preventing
the rest from putting
their
land up.
Landlords were reluctant to
accept the declining
government land stock as payment.
On the other hand, .any
tenants were slow to buy what
were basically uneconomic

holdings.

In addition, expectations
of a third rent revision and Of the United Irish
League's

agitation forcing

sale prices down were postponing
many peasant purchase
applications.^^
The urgent need to revive
the flagging purchase program was pressed upon Wyndharn and
the Irish administration

by the rapid growth of Wiiiiain
O'Brien's United Irish
League, originally conceived as a
weapon for poor tenants
in their fight against the grazier
interests in Connaught.
0.\ W.
Russell, the Ulster champion of tenant
right, persuaded O'Brien to use the League to
forward compulsory
purchase.
The popularity of the League's
platform was
measured by the rise in the number of
branches from 386 in
•

1699 to 865 by late I900, while membership rose
from i^if,225
c^-^
to 86, 119
In fact, many Irish landlords, anxious
over
6o„.

.^ynaham to Cadogen, n, d., B, M. Add.
190 s

61

m

49,830, ff. 166-

Wyndharn memo?.-£indum on the origins of the United
Irish
League, 23 July I901, i3. M. Add. IViS /^9,802,
f. 172.'

:
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declining land values and falling
land stocks, were beginning to agitate for increased
government s^.bsidization^
for land purchase as protection
against bankruptcy .^^
Wyndham proved to be as
sensitive as Balfour to the
especially serious conditions
in the far west, and wrote
that the present funding and
powers conferred
on the Con-

gested Districts Board were
inadequate to the task of
bringing permanent improvement
through amalgamation and
resale. ^3 i,,ereased financial
support and '...two or three
years of paternal administration...'
between the landlords'
sale and tenant purchase was the
Chief-Secretary 's pre-

scription for the economic ills of the
west«^^
The complexity of the legal and
financial problems

of land purchase as well as the political
and parliar.entary

difficulties generated by the United Irish
League's agitation prevented Wyndham from producing a
land purchase bill
until the spring of 1902. Nevertheless,
the general lines
of a land policy and the best means to
defeat the renewed

agitation began to emerge in a series of
memorandums which
Wyndham sent to Balfour and to the Cabinet starting
in

November 1900.

Although he was as firmly committed to

peasant proprietorship as Balfour, wyndham opposed
bee in particular Montgcmery Papers, P. R, O.N.
I., Montgomery to G, de L, Willis, Secretary to Trustees of
Irish Land Trust, 26 April I889, Dod/627A28/98
4 iio-marii, ci, 751.
-^Wyndham to Balfour, 26 November I9OO, B. M. Add. ¥^
49,803, ff. 139-43.

^^IMii., ff. 143-7.
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compelling landlords to sell
on the .rounds that
compulsion
would^stereotype the existence
of small uneconomic holdings.

Until a comprehensive land
purchase bill could
be formulated, he preferred
to expand the powers of
the
Congested Districts Board to
supervise amalgamation, and
to instruct the Land Commission
to approve only those sales
Where the size and quality of
the holding gave promise
of
successful farming, Balfour agreed
with the Chief ^Secretary
that steps ought to be taken as
quickly as possible to
remove the barriers hindering
purchase. He was also opposed
to compulsion because of the
enormous expense such a scheme
would necessitate,^"^

By early January I90I Wyndham
had concluded that
substantial amounts of imperial monies would
have to be
expended to secure a fair price for the
landlords and annuities attractive to the prospective buyers.
He strongly

recommended the 'in globo' purchase of whole
estates by the
Land Commission when 3A of the tenants agreed,
lie hoped
thereby to facilitate the eradication of rundale
and the

prevention of subdivision,^''^

Wyndham was not able to trans-

late these general ideas into legislative form
until the

fall of 1901, and the actual introduction was
delayed
65
66

67

.

rtyncham to Balfour,
49fo03, f. 143.

26 November I900, B. M. Add. MS

Balfour to ^Vyndham, 18 January I90I,

'^'Vyndham to

Cadogen, n.

0.,,

B.

B.

M. Add.

:/].

Add.

Iv]S

49,803,

WS 49,803, ff. l6l-4.

1^1

until March. I902.

One of the principal obstacles
was

Cadogen's opposition to the 'in
globo' principle/^
Cadogen feared that making the
state a landlord would precipitate perpetual difficulties.
Secondly, the continued
growth of the United Irish League, which
was up to
989

branches of 98,/fOO members by the summer
of 190I, and the
support which John Dillon, John Redmond and
the Irish Parlaimentary Party gave to the agitation, increased
Wyndham's
difficulties in persuading the Cabinet and the
Treasury to
embark upon any fresh ventures in land purchase.
Moreover, Hicks Beach warned Salisbury in September
that since

normal expenses had risen W'o in the previous six
years,
and heavier direct taxes would not bo tolerated in

times

of peace, the estimates for 1902 would have to be pared to

bone/7 0

the

Wyndham was sorely tried by all these diffi-

culties, but Balfour counselled patience and encouraged

him to keep plugging

away.''-^

The Chief -Secretary did plug

away, but chiefly by sending more and more pleading memos
^^vvyndham to Balfour, I3 January I90I, B. M. Add. MS
'>9fB03, f, 15I; same to same, 20 January I90I, B, M.
Add, MS if-9,803>, .f. 19-!+.
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^V/yndham to his brother, 19 November 1901, cited in J. V/,
Mac kail and G. vVyndham, Lif^ ^6. Letters o£ George
Viyililh-^ja (London?
Hutchinson, I925), II. ^31. Hereafter
cited kackail and Wyndham, Gae^^'^^ wyndham.
70

71
'
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Hicks Beach to Salisbury, I3 September I90I, B. M, Add.
MS ^-9,695, fr. 127-8.

Wyndham to Balfour, 29 September I90I,
'V9,803.

f.

220.

B»

M.

Add.

MiS

3

that introduction of a land
purchase bill was the only
effective means to check the
rising agitation:
landlords except a
^^^1 facilities for
lllnlt^tK.^
purchase
at some expense to the state
b; dependent upon that
reducing the state
simplincation'o/p
^'^f ^o If I rents/by
cation of appeals
only can

bnater.^^hnr^-^^'"

e:et

Of renl!?2'^''

"

the

no^hird^revision

A few weeks later Balfour received
another plea:
I cannot say too earnestly
how necessary I
feel It to be that the Cabinet
should decide
on a comprehensive land policy
and place me
a position to speak early in the
session
or sooner,
iiiveryday that I give to studyinthe question convinces me that we
must accept
principle
and
announce
it soon.
tT^ would
^^.^i^^^
It
be a great calamity not to come out
with our policy until the agitation has
gone
lurther.
I am keeping the lawless
parts
wedged off from the rest of Ireland, but
the
strain is increasing. V

m

He emphasized to Balfour again his conviction
that the

combination of ordinary law plus a constructive policy
was
the most effective weapon against the rural
agitators;
. .nine-tenths
of the people are holding back
from the agitation. The graziers have had a
very bad year and prices for stock are very
low.
If we can get in with a reasonable
constructive policy beforf: the agitation
develops further, and v/hilst the 'grass' interest is still suffering from past inflation
and Present low prices, I believe we sliall
c

win.

^

f^-^

Wyndham to Balfour, 18 October 1901,
^i-9,803,
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'•^vvyndham to Balfour,
^9,803, f. 233.

''^lidii.,

B.

M, Add.

IViS

B.

l/i.

Add,

I/iS

ff. 228-29»

ff.

235-36.
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November 1901,

•

1^3
w'yndharn's plans

for ordinary law plus
purchase were
thwarted by growing Irish
Unionist frenzy over the
United
Irish League and Cadogen's
conversion to the necessity of
coercion.75 Although Balfour
put pressure on Hicks 13each
to accept a L5 iOs rather
than
annuity in Wyndham's
proposed bill, the Leader of the
House was not able, and
perhaps not willing, to prevent
the Cabinet from making the
introduction of the land bill
conditional to the renewal
of the Crimes Act.^^ A vigorous
Tory press campaign in
conjunction with the pressure that
the Irish Unionist
Alliance applied by deputations to Lord
Salisbury and by
resolutions in April led to the proclamation
under the
Crimes Act of Cavan. Cork, Leitrim,
Roscommon and Sligo on
16 April 1902.
The revival of coercion along with
unsatisfactory financial pr-ovisions virtually
precluded any
possibility of Vvyndham's I902 Land Bill being passed,
and

Parliament dropped it on 10 June I902.

'

Almost immediately

Cadogen Memorandum on Ireland, 8 March I902, CAci37/6l/'58
vVyndhara to Balfour, 2 Karch 1902, B. M. Add.
/f9,804.
f. bj J. J, Sandars to Balfour, n. d., B, M. Add IviS
49 761, f. 9-12,
Balfour acknowledged in his repoi-t to
the King the growing pressure for coercion from Cadoron
and the Irich unionists, but he apparently appreciated
vvyndham's reluctance to prosecute or to introduce the
Crimes Act until he had sufficient evidence to almost
guarantee conviction. From his experience as Irish i^ecretary Balfour appreciated the difficulties which innocent
verdicts caused to Dublin Castle and Royal Irish Cons tabul^r^r^morale
Balfour to the King, 11 March 1902,
'

J

.

76

V/ilfred S, Blunt, J^iy Diaries (New York:
Hereafter cited Blunt, Liy
p. ^^5,

Knopf, 1921),

vVillia. O.Brlen and
John Red.ond .ade plans
to revive .ho
rural agitation so as to
bring Dublin Castle and
tne L.ndlords to heel.7^ By the
end of su..er the
government had

Placed two-thirds of the
country under the Cri.es Act,
and
had gaoled a total of
.embers of Parliament as well
as
two former members.
The government faced the
real possibility of an agitation of the
proportions of the Flan of
Campaign. However, wyndham,
as Chief -Secretary and
Balfour,
now the Prime Minister following
Salisbury's July retirement, were sav^d from that
by Captain Shaw Taylor's

n

suggestion Of

September I902 that representatives
of
Irish tenants and owners search
for a solution at a round
table conference.
Wyndham heartily endorsed this Anglo3

Irishman's proposal in a public
letter two days later, as
did William O'Brien and John
Kedmond. Although the ^ndowners Convention refused to
participate, the J^nd Conference convened on 20 December I902.
By early January its
Nationalist and moderate Unionist representatives
had
worked out general terms attractive to
landlords and
tenants alike.
The Land Conference Report called for
the
direct payment of state cash to the landlord
and extended
payment periods for tenants. The details of price
and

financing were left up xo the Chief -Secretary and the

Ministry to work out.
77

Because ./yndham believed that

Redmond to O'Brien, July or Au^^ust 1902, O'Brien MSS
National x^ibrary of Ireland. 10^^96; Tho. Fr^^oniiuil^
'IsmumL.
June 1902; ..'illiam O'Brien, An OlivQ Bxoncil In

Irsl3,nsi &nsl lis. hlslj^i:^

pp. 136-37.

(London:

iv'ac:viillian,

1910).
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purchase woul. .ene.it
the .o.e.n.ent
Charges and law enforcement
expenses,

.e.ucin. .udiciai

he urged Balfour to
get the Cabinet and the
Treasury to accept the
Report as
the basis Of his next
purchase biU.78
^^^^^^^^
Wyndham eventually laid
before the Cabinet called
for
^12 million in direct cash
payments to the Irish landlords.
Prices were determined at
to 2,^ years rental
value on
first term rents, and 21-^
to 27* on second term
rental
values, with an annual
interest rate of 3t percent.
Some
government members opposed this
extensive use of state
funds to rescue the Irish
landlords. For instance. Hicks
Beach wrote the Prime Minister
from Palermo. Italy, that
although he realized the government
had little choice but
to accept the unanimous
convention report, he was loathe
to expend ^12 million without
the introduction of compulsory purchase. Ha held that many
Irish landlords would be
foolish and obstinate enough to wreck
the scheme by holding
out for better terms later, and he
suggested that plenty
Of precedents for compulsion could
be found on the basis
Of public interest, or oven on the
basis of the past adjudi-cation of Irish rents. "^^ Chamberlain also
seemed to oppose
the bill vigorously. According to his
cousin, wilfred ,S,

m

Blunt. vVyndham
78

liad

such a desperate fight to secure Cabinet

wynrtham to Balfour,

11 January I903, B.

i^i.

79
•Hicks Beach to Balfour. 22 At^ril 1903; B.
*+9*695» ff. 1^7-8.

Add. MS k9,8oh,

Ivi.

Add. MS

^

approval that the fate of the
bill was uncertain just
forty-eight hours before introduction,
wyndham later told
his cousin that Arthur Balfour's
support was crucial in
securing ultimately Cabinet
assent.
In reporting the
Cabinet proceedings to the Kir.g,
Balfour acknowledged the
objections cut supportod the bill
enthusiastically
This is a very far reaching measure;
and the
-urish government are sauf?;uine
that it w^il
^^''^
^^^^^ 1^^^ difficulty!
t-'^'''':'^^'^
The objections
to it - and there are objections^ to all things - arise from
the fact that
It maKes a heavy call on British
c^-^e^it
already handicapped by the past war loaAs
and
the Iransvaai borrowings? and that it
will be
represented as a great gift to the Irish
tenants and landlords at the cost of the
Brit;;.sh taxpayer.
The Cabinet did not underrate the force either of the fijiancial or
the political argueraent, but they were
clearly
of the opinion that in the interests of a
greax policy ruinor difficulties must be ignored.
The bill will be introduced as soon
as the financial work of the House of Commons
will allow. ol

m

While opposition to Wyndham's bill in the Comraons

was

limii.'.--d

Balfour

rof-e

to a few Engliah Unionists and some Radicals,
xo defend the purchase idea^

He maintained

that anxieties a.bout security were groundless as install-

ments under the 1691 and I896 legislation had been paid

vdth absolute regularity.
from charging defaults to

Additional security derived
tiie

local rates, as well as from

the fact t)iat public sentiment in Ireland did not favor
80

Pi

Blunt, My Diari££, p.

-'+59.

Balfour to the King, 10

ivlarch

I903, CAB41/28/5.

repudiating debts.

The Pri.e Minister
asserted that owner-

ship was already stimulating
Irish farmers into a
greater
amount of work and energy
than was ever prompted by
the
1881 legislation. While denying
any intention to convert
Home Rulers into Unionists
by the bill, he forecast
that
the bill would take away
the sores which '...aggravate
every political movement which
might otherwise be innocuous
The Prime Minister's
commitment to Wyndham's
measure was so firm that during
the critical committee
stage, he told the Duke of
Devonshire that a ministerial
crisis over Chamberlain's colonial
preference must be
avoided at all costs.
•

.

..at would destroy the chances of the I^nd
^ill.
Chamberlain, I am aware, does not like
thac measure, and I am not s-ore
that it movps
your enthusiasm.
Yet it seems to me to rive
us a unique chance - I do not
put it hi^^her of really settling the Irish land
controversy,
and I should regard it as the greatest
of
national misfortunes if that chance was
thrown
away over differences which do not as
yet
relate to any question of practical Dolitics.C3
After congratulating wyndham on his success
in

tlie

third reading debate, Balfour proclaimed his
support of
the measure, not as a politician fighting Home
Rule, but
82
Hsusxild,

cx::i,

12^1 -56.

Co

Balfour to the Duke of Devonshire, k June I903, B. M.
Aad. MS il9,770, f. 9, At this juncture, Joseph Chamberj.ain had begun his campaign for imperial preference.
There v/ere still many proponents of free trade principles in the party, and Balfour was anxious that a
vigorous Chamberlain campaign vj-ould endanger party unity
and thereby endanger the successful passage of the land
Dill.
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as a social reformer.

Although admitting that the
great
Irish controversy would
remain, he asserted that,

at least,
the social wrongs of the
Irish land system would
not
intrude on the political debate
between Home Rule and

British public opinion.
Despite his denials of political
motivation, it would
be naive, in view of Balfour's
earl.ior explanations of the
origins and nature of the Irish
^uefi-^:icn, to believe that
the Prime Minister did not hope
this measure would deliver
a decisive blow to Home Rule.
Balfour's belief
in the

•elevating' effects of land ownership
carried with it the
firm expectation that eventually most
Irishmen would recognize and admire British institutions
and values and cherish
the British connection.
Meanwhile he did not venture
...to prophesy when or how soon there wilT
be
any wide spread revulsion of Irish nstionaU'-^t'^.
in favour of this country.
Emotions which
are the result of long generations of enmity
and bitter traditions are not easy to blot
out.
They die hard. They leave tones of bitterness
long after the causes which have first produced
them .aavG become only matters of histor-ical
and speculative interest. ^5

Obviously Balfour still believed that social and
economic grievances, rather than genuine politica]. griovances, were the source of Home Kule enthusiasm.

He was,

however, confident that the conciliation ho helped initiate
in the late 1880

iianj>5J3i,

8

5

's

and encouraged from 1895

cxxv, 1333-39.

^vas

helping to

"
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make Irish disaffection a
matter of 'historical and
speculative interest'.
Meanwhile, he could take
satisfaction
from various reports that land
purchase and local government were developing in the
Irish citizens a sense of
fiscal and proprietory responsibility
which would buttress
the institutions of private
property throughout the United
Kingdom.
This sense of responsibility
had been achieved
without subjecting the Imperial
Exchequer to undue risk, and
without despoiling the Irish landlord.
Indeed, six weeksafter the Land Act received the royal
assent, George /.yndham reported to the Prime Minister what
"a good deal" purchase was for the Duke of Leinster, whose
selling arrangements were netting him h98 on i-100 rentals.
Balfour was
unwilling to admit any genuine political
nationalism within
the Irish Fax-1 iamentary Party or among its
supporters.
There is no indication that he

v/as

aware of, or gave recog-

nition to, the growing manifestations of cultural
nationalism tiiat wex-e being nourished by the Gaelic League,
the

Irish Literary Movement and the Gaelic Athletic Association.

George Wyndham's enthusiasm
86

v.'yndham to
49,804, f.

for'

conciliation was not

Balfour, 9 Seotember I903, B. M. Add. MS
18''-;,
L. P. Curtis, Jr. suggests in his essay,
"The Anglo-Irish Predicament," 20th Oen'^^vry Studios,
November, 19?0» that the Land Act of 1903 actually buttressed the positions of the landlords by making them
more financially secure, enabling them to pay off debts
and generally to lower their expenses. He believes the
land acts v;ere more destructive of their sense of identity than of their financial pov/er.
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exhausted by the Land Act of
1903.
In late Soptenbor he
submitted to Balfour a general
sketch of future Irish
prooects.87 wyndham pressed for
an expansion of labourers'
cottage schemes by pooling all
the cottage funds allocated
under the I89I Labourers Act
and the Local Government Act
of 1902, and from Board of
.vorks sources.
As he explained
to his chief:

Dilapidation in the small tov/ns,
squalor in
the labourers cottage are a
social evil in
Ireland, maintaining fevers (even
typhus pracextirpated from England), depressing
viUlity and lowering self-esteem. If the
Irish nation is to be healthy,
energetic,
hopeful ana independent, one fourth,
perhaps
one third of their population must
be better
housed.
The Chief-Secretary showed special
concern to help urban

districts which could not easily assume the
cost of constructing decent labourers' cottages. In the
category of
trade and industry, Wyndham suggested an
industrial exhibi-

tion near Phoenix ^ark in I906.

The success of the Cork

Exhibition had impressed him the previous year, and he
apparently thought another like it would stimulate more
enterprise.

Other projects he suggested included the

building of a naval base at Galway. the subsidization of
an ocean line from Galv/ay to Canada, and continued Treasury

support for drainage schemes.

V/yndham strongly rGcommended

that Ireland be allowed to transfer any savings on her
87

'Wyndham to Balfour, 28 September I903, B. M. Add. MS
^9.80^-1, ff. 186-9^.

estimates to the Irish
Development Grant Tor
application
to the particular objects
which commanded wide
enthusiasm
among the Irish. He asserted
that this measure would
free
the Treasury from requests
for doles, and at the same
time

teach the Irish the benefits
of social peace and
economical
administration. As shown previously,
the university
reform v/as also a major
priority for Wyndham in 1903-^.
Unfortunately, the Chief-Secretary
's desire to proceed with conciliation was
thwarted by a number of factors,
and most of his recommendations
were Jettisoned. Firstly,
Nationalist criticism of the generous
financial arrangements accorded to the landlords,
combined with Dillon's
and Redmond's insistence that Home
Rule was still the
prime objective of the party, made
many English Unionists
as well as the more conservative
Irish Unionists unwilling
to concede additional imperial
funds and more power in tlie
name of conciliation. Secondly, as
the era of I895 to
1903 proved, conciliation required some cooperation
from
the Nationalist ranJvis. After the Land
Act, John Dillon was
especially worried that Irish attention to Home
Rule would
be diverged if Wyndham kept appearing bearing
gifts.
Therefore ho refused to endorse any further
experiments in
»

cooperation with the Unionists or the Chief-Secretary,
which crippled Wyndham 's hand when going to Whitehall.
Thirdly

»

as has already been suggested in reference to the

University Question, the Treasury was especially hardpressed

m

1903-4,

''^^

88

owing to the Boer War
expenses and overall
inflation. Money was difficult
to raise in the City, and
Wyndham's suggestions for new
Irish expenditures therefore
did not command ministerial
enthusiasm.
In fact, wyndham
and Austen Chamberlain in I904
disputed the amount of cash
to be made available for
purchase.
Wyndham insisted that
5 million pounds was the figure agreed upon
by Charles T.
Ritchie, Chamberlain's predecessor
as Chancellor
of

Exchequer.
pounds. 89

t},e

Chamberlain maintained it was 4 million

,

writing to teeton Frewen in November,
I903.

Wyndham acknowledged the financial obstacles
hindering his
program:
The English are very jealous of the Land
Act.
ihey want credit on easy terms for many
purposes - for their own labourers, for art^san^ dwellings for equalizing rates, for
municipal schemes
.There is no scope for
heroic finances just now. 90

As Prime Minister, Balfour could hardly be
indiffer-

ent to the strong sentiments of the Chancellor
of the

Exchequer, and the. growing feelings among.rank and file
Unionists that Ireland had received more than her fair
share.
68

89

The unity of the party had already been severely

Sandars to Balfour, 16 October 1903, B.
KS 49,761, f. 132.

J. J,

Add.

Chamberlain to Wyndham, 21 December 1904, B.

w. Add.
49,805, ff. 3-/|r vVyndham to Chamberlain, 27 December
1904, B, ivi. Add,
49,805, ff. 5-6? same to same,
1 January I905, B. M. Add. iMo 49,805, ff. 7-8.
Iv'iS

90

•Vyndham to More ton Frewen, 14 November I903, cited in
Mac kail and wyndham, Geor.,-j;e i/ya^iam, 11, 472.
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strained by the education
controversy, and was beginning
to
be tested by Joseph
Chamberlain's ventures into the
field'
Of colonial preference.
Pragmatic financial considerations

and the dictates of practical
politics explain Wyndham's
inability to enlist the enthusiastic
support of the Prime
Minister for his future Irish
proposals.
That does not
mean Balfour opposed the Chief-Secretary
's policy on principle. He later told Wilfred Ward
that George Wyndham.
...had a great and a most legitimate
ambition
economic and social conditions
vv^-h^r^
i''^''^
vvith British
money and he was keenly alive
to all the misfortunes which the bitter
divisions between different sections of
the population had brought upon the country. He
may"
have overrated (he probably did) the
power of
the individual to heal these ancient
sores by
personal influence and sympathetic treatment,
out for all this who shall blame him?91
•

I

The most decisive blow to the policy of
economic and

.

social amelioration was delivered by the
Devolution Crisis
of 190^-5, and the Unionist backlash that
it generated.

The association of Sir Antony MacDonnell,
Wyndham's Roman

Catholic Undersecretary, with Lord Dunraven and the
moderate

Unionists of the Irish Reform Association caused a furor
of suspicion and indignation amongst the Ulstermen,
the

English Unionists, and the ultras in the South.

When

McDonnell's participation in the preliminary discussions

leading to the associations' Devolution scheme was
91

Balfour to Wilfred V/ard, 2 October 1913, B, hi. Add.
MS 49,863, ff. 12-13,
V-ard was preparing an article on
Wyndham, who had passed away recently.

:

discovered, these Unionists were
sure they had cau,ht a
Home Ruler in Dublin Castle.
The Devolution scheme, which
called for a partially elected
financial advisory council
to supervise the cooperative
development of Irish resources
and to control purely Irish
affairs, smelled of Home Rule
to these loyalists.
The publication of the proposals
on
26 September 1904 led to immediate
denunciation of Dunraven
and his associates by Attorney-General
Atkinson and other
prominent Unionists. ^2 Although wyndham
repudiated the
devolution proposals on 2? .ieptember in
O^lg Time_s
and
McDonnell severed his connection with the
Irish Reform
,

Association, the ultra-Unionists kept insisting
upon McDonnell's dismissal. The Chief -Secretary s refusal
to accede
finally led to suspicions that he himself had
been involved
'

in the form.ation of the proposals, and
that McDonnell was

being made a scape goat for the Irish government's
tampering with the legislative union. As Sir Henry Lucy
explained
...Ulster is a sleuth-hound which, having once
got its nose on the trail, does not uplift
it except to spring on the fugitives. 93

And spring she did upon McDonnell, and especially wyndiian,
once the I903 parliamentary session opened.

Lords *Vest-

meath and Rathmore led the attack in the Lords, while

i^&£hS&
93

P.n

U^ollxlXQUt Irish Unionist Alliance Pamphlet.

Henry Lucy, Tlj.£. BalfjOiaiiiiii L2,]ZlJLDMLml, l£LQihil20i (London:
Hodder and Stoughton, I906), p. 36^. Hereafter cited
^ucy, S3l£s>Mrli^n Pa rlianignt.

William Koore,
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A. Sloan. J. B.
Lonsdale and T. .

Corbett reflected the intensity
of Ulster suspicions
and
anger.
Typical of the attacks upon
.vyndha™ and his policy
v;as William Moore's:

After twenty years of Unionist
Government
^^i^ n.inu?e! such
mistrust; such disSf^cSon n^^^H"^^^P^""^
^^i"
mmr?pi^^
quarter of people who certain million and a
Majesty's Government thought, members of Kis
might be li^^tlv
''^^^""'''^ regret.f..Up
to ^
'
Aul74 llll'^it''^
°f
^riJ.
Unionists
toward the G^vP '^'''"^''^ ^as one of
dislike
dfJ?!^!.
distrust, K
but? since the introduction of and
the
^''^^''^
'^^^^ '^^^^"^^
five times
live
time? as intense, and the
was, '.Vho was responsible for real Question
this s2heme7?9^

unive^^;^'''"^'^

Attack followed attack until it was
clear that Wyndham's continuance in office was
impossible. According to
Viscount Ssher, Londonderry and Carson
v/ere prepared to
resign if Wyndham was retained, and only
personal loyalty
to Arthur Balfour kept the whole
Unionist party from going
against the government.
By early Llarch the political and
physical strc.ins

-of

defending himself and Sir Anthony from the
Ulster sleuthhounds convinced Wyndham that he must offer
his resignation
oil,

Hans^LTd,

95 Viscount

lixci,

6-^1.

Esher, Joiiriia:Lfl .and LetJ;£rs oX YlD!iQml
>''-iier
ea.
V. Brett (London:
Nicholson and Watson, 193'4j /
±}f 76; i,ucy, tt^Tfjiu^rLan It^tlls^mnl, p. 362.
-Vyndham's
discovery of documents and letters sent to him by
McDonnell
Ultimately proved both men innocent of the charges
levelled against them during this crisis.
iv]

to the Prime i.in.sxer.
iMinister

-^^

Roi-p«
Balfour

sincerely believed

Wyndhan, innocent of any
wrongdoing, but he acknowledged
the seriousness of the
situation in his reply to the
res

nation offer:
TVio

lobby is full of the wildest
and

moc^t

only a fraction
o^^^^ J'^i^f ^^^^^^"^'^^n
°r ^^.^^---is
circumstances, wiu come
ir. ^'ul
.0 ^ight; tnat McDonnell and
Dunraven have
^^^'^
^ut
if dr?;en to
'"l^T ^^^""^ materials
for making
^^i^
'H-^""^
is exceedingly
du.-i?.icult to know how to
neutralize this
poison, which eats into the larty,
and r-roO.UCCS such depression and
discontent -'n :he
house of CoKimons out of all
proportion, X
tnirui-, to the effect which
is being produced
in tha country.
But there it is and we have
to reckon with it. 97

^

"^J^^

The personal p?,in and anguish which
the whole episode cai
the Prime Minister ho revealed in his
closing words to t>
e mb a 1 1 1 e d G h i e f 3 e ore t a r y
t

It is utterly repulsive to raa to ai:uyA'
a
colieugue to go under- anything in the nature
Ox pressure from outside.
We all have our
Ups and downs', we are the greatest of vion
one week: the most inconipetent of politiciars
the next; and if the Irinie r;;inister is to'
permit these gusts of feelin^^; to modify the
constitution of his Cabinet, it appears to me
that all Cabinet solidarity is in cJanprer of
dissolution^
I should feel just the same
about
the iviember of the Government to whom I was
least attac/ied sis I feel toward you who y.re
amongst my closest and dearest friends. S-o^

96
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"

v.yndham to Balfourr. 2 Karch I905, B. M, Add.
'^9,805,
ff. 22-23; same to same, 3 iV;arch 190 5, B. :/u Add. :ViS
^+9.805, ff, 25-26.

Balfour to Wyndhain, 3 March 1905,
ff. 33-3^.
T ^

.

35-6.

13.

M.

Add.

JiS

^19,805,
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Balfour's responsibility as
party leader, one which
he toolc most seriously,
eventually outweighed these
strong
feelings of personal affection
and trust, and he accepted
Wyndham's resignation. As
early as 21 January, j.
j.
Sandars had warned his chief
that the Devolution Crisis
was creating pressure for
an early dissolution and
severely
straining party loyalty;
Carson, whom

met yesterday speaks in the
-hoLsSe damage
Zll
that has
ha?'^pjn
been J"^"'
done...'I
to our Party's int-rpst^
in Ulster and so does Atkinson.
You may
^^^1^
oppose
us on
tnis h^f
but we could suffer almost as
much
from
the disinclination of our
friends. 99
I

Sif

The appointment of Walter Long,
the darling of the
militant Unionists, as Irish Secretary
was the natural

consequence of the im.broglio, and of the
urgent need to
quiet the suspicions of the Ulster
Unionists. Balfour

acknowledged as early as January that Long's
appointment
would "give great satisfaction to the

Orangemen", and even

though he was somevvhat anxious about Walter's
"fiery
disposition", and rigidity of mind.^-^°

The Devolution

Crisis hung like a black cloud over the remaining
months
of Balfour's administration, and even into
1907.

AJ.beit

personally disgusted by the persistent and disloyal
90
''oandars to Balfour, 21 January 1905, B, ivi. Add. IvlS
also same to same 23 January I905, B. M.
a.m"''
AQd.
^9ti^3t f. 85.

L

^^[^Balfour to Sandars, k January I905, Be
^9,763, f* 7^.

P.,

Add,

I»iS

suspicions Of the Irish Unionists

,

and while ho refused

Long's request to publish the
correspondence relating to
McDonnell's appointment,
Balfour was forced in the
interests of the party to acquiesce
in Long's policy of
firm application of the law.
When the Chief -Secretary 's
repudiation of conciliation and of
all Lord Dudley's advice
led the Viceroy to consider
resignation.
^^^^^^^ refrained
from criticizing Long, and
diplomatically suggested to
Dudley that since Long was Chief
^Secretary his policy would
have to be accepted as official ."^^^

By 1905 Balfour had disassociated
himself from active
conciliation. The combination of fiscal
strains,
the

political ramifications of the Devolution
Crisis, and
Unionist backlash made it impossible for the
Prime Minister
to do otherwise.
The seriousness of the Unionist backlash
is reflected in Balfour's explanation
to Joseph Chamberlain
in November I905 that the need to convince
the Ulster
Unionists that they were not being 'gratuitously
abandoned'
was one of

tliO

factors which prevented a mid-summer

•^^^Balfour to Austen Chamberlain, 8 October I905, B, hi.
Add.
A''9,?35, ff. 232-33; Balfour memorandum on Devolution, October I906, B, M, Add. IvIS ^f9,859, ff, 53-79.

m

102

Dugdale, Balfo.ur^ II, ^^21-23.
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-'Dudley to Balfour, 7 March I905, B.

f,

ivi.

Add. MS

^1-9,802.

206.

"""^Salfour to Dudley, I5 August 190*5, B. M, Add.
f. 223,

m

^9,802.

.

dissolution.

Moreover. Balfour considered
the land
purchase scheme as the keystone
of constructive unionise.
Once the I903 act had been
passed, he undoubtedly
felt
that, with the exception of
the University Question,
there
was little else to be done
in the na^e of constructive
unionism.
Unionists would now have to
rest their case
until the effects of past
amelioration led the
roajority of

Irishmen to realize the benefits
of Union.
The Devolution Crisis had
other casualties besides

Balfourian anieli oration.

For instance, Lord Dunraven
and
Horace Plunkett found their continued
efforts for eoonomio
and social improveiiient continually
discredited by ultraUnionists.
Very few southern Unionists cared
^
to risk
the odium which further explorations
in conciliation
or

class cooperation would have precipitated.

Retreat into

the ti-aditional patterns of resistance
to Home Rule and

exclusively Anglo-Irish social circles was
much easier
politically, socially and emotionally. ^-^"^ Even
more .sig-

nificant was the impact of the Devolution' Crisis
on Ulster
Unionism,
The Ulster Liberal Unionists, previously
105

A?5'^^--^V^° Jp^^eph Chamberlain, November I905, B. M.
Add,
49
f„ 95; i-ong rnemorajidum against dissolutionj .iO oepteraber 190;5, CAB37/79/158
106
Plunkett to Lady Betty Bal-rour, I5 Kecember 1905,
Plunkett Papers, Plunkett House, London.
ivx-.
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consistent advocates of
conciliation, severed their
connections with the moderates
of the South, and

joined ranks

with the Tories of the North.

The distinctions between

these Ulster Liberals and the
hardliners were lost when
the Ulster Liberal Unionists
affiliated with the Ulster

Unionist Council in July I905.

Ulster Liberal Unionism

was submerged henceforth in
pure Ulster resistance.
The
way was thus prepared for the Home
Rule Crisis of 1913-lif,
and ultimately for the abandonment
of the Southern Unionists for the salce of Ulster's
survival in the Union. The
partition of Irish unionism precipitated by
the McDonnell
affair in a sense foreshadowed the
partition of the nation
15 years later.
Pragmatic politics prevented Arthur Balfour
as Unionist leader from publicly
critioizin.- or preventing
this ominous development in Irish Unionism.
Perhaps that
partially explains why iie eventually advocated
partition
as the best solution to the Irish question.
'

V/hile Balfour's

participation in Irish affairs during

the crucial decade of 1895 to I905 had been
peripheral,

this survey of the administrations of Gerald Balfour
and

George Wyndhara evidences the former Chief-Secretary's per-

sistent inspiration and encouragement of economic and
soc5.al amelioration down to late I903.

His support helped

to mould early twentieth-century Ireland into a more modern

society where political, economic and social opportunities
were based on merit rather than upon class or religious
identities, as in the past.

Land purchase gave the people

161
a positive interest in the
improvement of their land, while
the extension of local governnent
stimulated an awareness
and concern for the quality of
the economic and social
environment. A desire to improve
farming standards led
the first county councils to
participate in the instructional programs which the Department
of Agriculture sponsored after IS99
By 190/f the Department of
Agriculture
had 121 itinerant instructors teaching
551 courses to
.

39,398 students.

The only counties which by look
did not

have some schemes of technical instruction
in which local
authorities participated were Antrim, Armagh
and Down.--^^

Moreover, the county and district councils
provided a

forum for the Irish laborers to air their previously
ignored grievances, and the multiplication of laborers'
cottages after I9OO indicates an important expansion
of

political and social opportunity for this neglected segment of the communitye-^^^

The democratization of the

local franchise helped to complete the Catholic Emancipation of 1829, while it also led to the ostracization of
the Anglo-Irish gentry and their ultimate withdrawal into

despondency or pure resistance.
108.
"

kSLiiona.

Moreover, v/hile the land

Anmial .Ssjigri dI. 1\x2. P-j^arim^at nL Agjz^jinilliir^
InaixuallQn, p. 22 (Cd. 1314) h. c. 1902

anii ^'iuaoiii^

XX; Wo He i'isher rr.emorandum on grants in aid of Irish

technical education, TV9905/12825/1902,
3

OQ

Shannon, laoiQ, IisaLsmmeni in Irelanii, pp. 330-39.
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purchase acts saved the Ascendency
fro^ financial ruin,
they also contributed to
terminating the relationships
(admittedly bad ones in most
cases) between the native
Irish and the gentry, thereby
exacerbating the gentry -s
identity-crisis and sense of
besiegement. Th.se developments made it much easier for
the Celtic and 'Irishing
Of Ireland- forces to influence
the countryside prior to
World War I.
Finally, the extension of local
government gave the
Irish the opportunity to prove
to themselves, to England
and the world that thoy were indeed
capable of effectively
administering democratic institutions.
Reports of the
Local Government Board and contemporary
authorities gave
ample testimony of the success of local
government in the
years before the war.
The experience gained in the county
councils ma.y have been a significant factor
in the success
of the Sinn Fein government and later of
the Irish Free
State

While Arthur Salfour took great pride in the expansion of economic and social opportunity which
progressive

unionism helped initiate, he was undoubtedly chagrined
that Irish interpretations of political opportunity neces-

sitated not only democratic local government but also a

national legislature.
chagrin

v/as

As the next chapter will show, his

transformed into a more violent if not almost

treasonable position by 191k,
^lOile rbert
8

Gladstone to Sir Henry Campbell Banncrman,
December l899» B.
Add, r-iS ^1,215, f. 162.

CHAPTER

V

ARTHUR BALFOUR AND THE IRISH
CRISIS, I9IO-I91/1
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In his lively and entertaining

^

ThSi Si^mga
I^i^ml England. George Dangerf ield portrayed
the atmos-

phere of crisis Which gradually
developed in England during
the four years prior to the
outbreak of the First World
V/ar.-^

The Home Rule issue was a
prominent factor in

contributing to this environment of
instability and anxietyo Arthur Balfour's response to
the deepening
Irish

crisis substantiates DangerfieM's
thesis that the leaders
of society lost their sense of proportion
and reality in

attempting to come to

terras

with the complicated issues

of the day, v/hethsr they be parliar.i9ntary
reform, suf-

fragette demand, or, indeed, the persistent
Irish deLuind
for a Dublin parliai-ent« Balfour's attitude
to and role
in the unfolding Irish crisis between IQIO
and 191if, will
demonstrate that even ono of the most intelligent,
erudite
and experienced of politicians ultimat^ily advocated
policies that were diametrically opposed to the traditions
of

parliamentary government that had been evolving since the
late seventeenth century.

In his recent study, Sydney

2ebel argues that Balfour showed an uncanny ability to
adapt to the forces of the modern world. ^

However, his

^George Dangerfield, Th2. Strang tolh £(£ Llbnmi
I21XI:dit <1935j rpt. New York:
Capricorn, 1961),
^Zebel,
vi-vii.

Jin^-UDii,

.

response to the approaching
enactment of Home Rule illustrates a glaring exception to
Zebel's contention. The
following description of Balfour's
response to the Parliament Bill and the third Home
Rule Bill will demonstrate
his inflexibility in the face
of the democratic implications of parliamentary reform
and of twentieth-century
Irish nationalism.

Despite the personal and political
humiliation of
the massive Unionist defeat of
I906, Balfour probably
derived some solace from the fact that
the huge Liberal
majority^ freed the Campbell-Bannerman
ministry from any
obligation to introduce Home Rule immediately.
While
the LiboralG did not repudiate Home Rule
altogether, the

majority of

tlie

party, anxious lest the defeats of 1886

and 189^ be repeated, favor-fd a gradualist
approach toward
a Dublin legislature. The Liberal reluctance
to face

squarely the Irish issue and its implied recognition
of
Irish nationalism was reflected in the innocuous Irish
Council Bill v/hich AL^jstina Birrell,

the^

Irish Chief-

Secretary, introduced to the Commons on 7
proposal, which

v/as

Devolution Scheme of

r-Iay

1907.

The

a recasting of the controversial
I90/+,

called for a partially elective

and partiaJ.ly appointed council to coordinate and supervise the administration and finances of eight Irish
3

the 1906 election the Liberals won 377 seats, the
Unionists I57, the Irish 83 end Labor 53, H, G. K. linsor,
England, ld7Qzl9Vl ( Oxford
Oxford University Press,
1936), p. 386. Hereafter cited linsor, England

•'In
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departments, including education,
local government, and
the Department of
Agriculture and Technical
Instruction.
The Lord-Lieutenant would
exercise wide veto powers,
and
the ultiinate authority of
the Cabinet and
the Iraperiai

Parliament remained intact.^
As party chief Arthur
Balfour led the attack on
this
Liberal proposal. He warned
the Liberals that the Bin
would do nothing to satisfy Irish
nationalist aspirations.
>ie forecast, however,
that the council would be used
to
fonvard the political aspirations
of the Nationalist party

rather than as an agency for efficeint
and economical
administration. The former Prime Minister
asserted xhat
the Liberals were deluded to anticipate
that the
Irish

would r^^duce the time and ener-y which
the Commons;
had to devote to Irish affairs. On
the contrary, Balfour
argued, the proposed council would
provide fresh opporGourde 11

tunities for jurisdictional collisions hetvc^on
itself and
its subordinate departiaents as well as
between Dublin and
Westminster. The Unionist lea.d8r suggested that
•

.

.

^weariness of dealing with this perpetual and
perennial

Irish problem..

rathar than a sincere commitment to

Irish mtionalism was the real impetus driving some
British
politicitnrs an'i citi2.ens to advocate abandoning the Union.
Th.e

rapidity with which the Nationalists and the ministry

Lyons, imiMisl Slnon lim Emim., p. 265.
It

-^5

Hans^'J, cixxiv, iii-xs.
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Oettisonod the Irish Council
Bill suggests that Balfour
astutely assessed the attitudes
of the Irish members
and
the Liberal party toward
the proposal and toward
the whole
question of Irish nationalism.

By 1909. however, the
Liberals developed a fresh
appreciation for the Irish members
and their Home Rule
policy. Recent government losses
in bye-elections, as
well as the recognition that Lloyd
George's plans for
heavy taxation on land and liquor
interests in the

I909

budget would incur bitter Conservative
resistance, prompted
this change of heart in the Liberal
ranlcs.
The miniotry's
program of social reform, along with
their plans
to

strengthen the British navy in the face
of the German
challenge depended upon securing new
parliamentary allies
to pass unprecedented taxes upon the
wealthy land and
liquor interests. Since it was almost certain
that the
House of Lords would veto a budget which
they alleged to
be 'Gocialistic*, and which attacked their
financial interests, a showdown over the Lord's veto powers was
the

expected sequel to the introduction of Lloyd George's
1909 budget e

In those circumstances, the Liberals quickly

recognised the value of the Irish-Liberal alliance that
they had taken gratuitously in the previous three years.

Although the Irish liquor and publican interests

from v/hich the Irish Parliamentary Party dervicd much support

v/ere

bitterly opposed to the heavy spirit taxes, the

16?

Irish members recognised that,
in the long run, their
Gupport for the budget provided
the necessary leverage to
secure abolition of the Lords'
veto and consequently, the
realization of Home Rule,^
The Unionist forces also recognized
that the Liberal

electoral losses in conjunction with
the budget and House
of Lords issues would cause Home
Rule to rise as the
proverbial phoenix. As early as January
I908 Walter Long
warned Balfour of an inclination toward
Honie Rule in
Birrell'o Irish administration. Long, who
was now leader
of the Irish Unionist M. P.'s, told
Ealfour in July that
the government was using the education bill
merely

•

to

obscure tiieir intentions of introducing Home Rule."^
Although
alive to the probable consequences of a Lords veto,
Balfour,
as was natural to a man of his v/ealth and status,
refused
to support a budget v/hich seemed to represent
the thin

sdge of Gccialism, 8

He considered tariff reform the best

mechanise for raising the required monies to finance the
navy and social programs, but his view did not

comir<and

^The Irish abstained from the third reading vote on
4 November I909 but voted for the budget in 1910. Ensor.
SnslsM, p. ^M9«
o

^Long to Balfour

21 January 19 08, B. LU Adda
r
same to same, 17 July I908, B, M, Add,
ff. 7-9«
f.

hiS

49,777,
'^9,777,
^'ff(p

Q

A

kSJiflX

m a Qrs^

(London*
Oxford University
Hereafter cited, Gollin,

^-^ditorr^hlp

Press, i960), p, 112-22»
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majority support within the
j^rty.
addition to hi.
personal antipathy to the
Lloyd George proposal.,
Balfour
was vmder considerable
pressure fro. Conservative
landed
and liquor interests to
advise a rejection.^

m

Moreover,
the propriety of rejection
had been recommended,
although
um.isely. by two leading
constitutional experts. A. V.
Dicey and Sir W. H. Anson.
Despite the fact that the^
Upper House had successfully
challenged the Commons financial parogatives only once in
250 years,
November
1909 the Lordn rejected by 350 to
75 the budget which the
Commons had approvea by 379 to
1^9 on 4 November 1910. An
election v/ar? now inrrritable.

While

Liberal campaign oratory concentrated
on

tliG

the peersMnvasion of the Commons

•

financial rights. Bal-

four and most of his Tory collcaguen
oonsiderGd Home Rule
the principle election issue.
Balfour'b cousLn, Hugh
Cecil, urged the Tory leader to question
publicly
in a

letter to

51he.

ilmaa the miniotry's Home Rule intentions

A week later in
accused

tiie

hi.-!?

.-'"'-^

opening election address Balfour

Liberals^ of conspiring to set the people

^Roy Jenkins, Mr.. S^JJLQiir!^. 2siQdl& (London*
Hereafter cited Jenkins, B2.1^g^JXiL^l
p. 96.

Collins. I968).
2n^.2si,

^^Snsor, .SiiSlsna. p. inc.
In I860 the Lords rejected
Gladstone -s pmporial to repeal the iD-r»er duty. However,
the repeal was carried in the foliowinn: year.
Dorek
^asllfir^. IfiJ^ (New York:
Norton!

l%9)f^f^ ^

"Hugh Cecil to Balfoar.
^^9»?59t f. 220,

3 Ceceraber 1909,

3. M. Add. MS

16s

against the peers in order to
obtain a .ingle chamber
legislature which would pass
revolutionary projects. The
allegedly revolutionary projects
were Home Rule. Welsh
Disestablishment, payment of
parliamentary members and
Lloyd George's social legislation.
^^^^

^^^^ .^^^^
was most central to Balfour's
concerns as his speeches and
correspondence indicate. In early
January the Unionist
Chief sent to the Ulster Unionist
Council his assurances
that '...they (the Ulatermen) have
behind them the same
resolute party whose determined resistance
to the dismemberment of the United Kingdom has twice
defeated the policy
of Home Rule.'^^ It was another
matter to impress upon
the British electorate Balfour's
interpretation of the real
issue of the campaign^
In his election addresses, Balfour

repeatedly charged the Liberals with using the Lords'
veto
as a red herring so as to stay in office by
suffrance of

the Irish and Laborites who expected Honio Rule and
Welsh

Disestablishment in return.

Balfour labelled the Liberal

tactics as a reincarnation of Gladstone
conversjion to Home Rule in 1885~6.^^^

's

opportunistic

In addition to ques-

tioning Liberal motivationc, Balfour delved into numerous
12

Jenkins,

Ismlm*

lan Colvin. C'xr^,
p. 109
York!
Macraillan, 19
p. 171.
Hereafter cited Colvin, Caxiiiaa.

at^

.SalijaurJLs.
^talfijSiJlim (Wew

j

^ ThQ. liiofia,

Walter Long read Balfour's
5 January I910.
message to the Ulster Unionist Council.

Balfour at York, .Hia lims., 13 January 1910; Balfour at
Haddington, liia Xmiia* ^ January I910.
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financial, strategic and historical
arguments against Home
Rule.
He predicted that the vast
amount of imperial monies
on loan in Ireland under Land
purchase legislation and
economic development would be
jeopardized under a Dublin
parliament. This was a rather
disingenious objection considering that, when speaking in support
of Wyndham's land
l5ill in 1903, Balfour assured
the Commons that land purchase installments had been paid with
absolute regularity
and tliat Irish public sentiment did not
favor repudiating
debts,
The former Prime Minister stressed
especially
the strategic dangers which Home Rule
allegedly would bring.
•

Emphasising that Britain's position was much less
secure
in relation to increasing European tensions
than in the
1880

's

or even I90C, Balfour quostioned the wisdom of
sepa-

rating England from an island which he maintained was

predestined by geographical necessity to be part of the
United Kingdom.
we prepared to make Ireland, at our very
gates, independent of all efficient, practical
and real control » when v/e are well aware that
the defensibility of the United Kingdom icj a
problem v/hich is not merely occupying the attention of the British Admiralty and' the British
Army Council, but is being anxiously considered
by foreign powers, friendly a.nd neutral? To Tne
it is incredible, absolutely incredible, that
the community, v.'hich in 1806 and in I893 rejected
Home Rule for Ireland, before these new aspects
of the question had arisen, - financial, military and naval aspects - it is incredible to me

^ ilansanij cxxi, 12^1-5.
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that the coiTimunity which so
acted vdthin
the lifetime of all I address
now are changed
icixai

vo xno

country, lo

Balfour's use of the strategic
argument was interesting,
considering that the government
leaders had insisted that
naval defense requirements were a
large factor necessitating the unprecedented budget.
Balfour's participation
on the Committee of Imperial Defense
made him privy to the
amiieties which the German naval policy
was causing the
Asquith ministry.

At Aberdeen, the former Chief-Secretary
presented
historical arguments against Home Rule. The
prevailing
tendency of modern history, he asserted, was
for empires
and political units to draw together toward
integration
and union.
The I3 colonies and Germany he cited as examples.

;Slnce the

unity of the three kingdoms was already

established, Balfour criticized Home Rule as a stupid and
unv/ise challenge to great historical forces.

He used this

line of argument both publicly and pv-ivately frequently

over the next four years.

At the same time, he maintained

that because Engiimdj Scotland

aj^.d

Ire Land had been invaded

by the same peoples, there was no justification for the

theory of racial separation:
W^hile I admit differerices of aegree, I will
never admit that the Irishman is one race of

inhabitants and England or Scoiiajjd or wales
is another rade.
16

Balfour at Ipswich, ^0.
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7
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»
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To admit absolute equality
or racial unity would
have been
strange for the man who tv.enty
years earlier had advocated

a complete remoulding of Irish
character through his progressive unionism, so he stressed
that the

'progressive
and vigorous' northeast corner
of Ireland had a closer
affinity through religion and blood
to the Scotch. -^"^
The results of the January
elections were extremely
disappointing to Balfour and the Unionists.
Firstly, theirposture on the budget had cost them
the 100 seats which a
January I909 poll predicted would bo
theirs.
Secondly,
the most serious consequence was
that the Liberal majority
of 12^4- now depended upon the
consistent support
of the 82

Irish Nationalists and the kO laborites.^^

This meant

that John Redmond, the leader of the Irish
party, was in a
positicn to fsxtract guarantees from Aoquith*
Redmond
pro7D.ised

Irish support lor the budget only if the Liberals

limited the Lords' veto powers

aiid

ultimately introduced a

Home Rule Bill, and Asquith had little choice
but to agree.
Jack Sandars' prediction to his chief that Asquith
would

deal with the Irish ^ materialized on 21 March I910
when
^"''Balfour at Aberdeen,

.q^ Xims., 10 Jajnuary 1910.

^^Ens or f l^^mlzL^lB p» ^18.
19
'The final results gave the Liberals 275. the Unionists
273» Irish nationalists 82, Laborites ^fO, iinaor, ^dijilciiirl
P • ^18 0
20

m

Sandars to Balfour ^ 29 January 1910, B, M, Add.
^9»7?o» f, 177, Jack Sandars was Lalfourjs secretary
and personal friend.
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the Prime Minister announced his
intention to introduce

legislation to end the peers' veto
over money bills, to
limit their delay on other bills,
and to shorten the life
of Parliament from seven to five
years,

Balfour's imiuediate response was to
suggest again
that the British people were being robbed
of their constitutional checks against 'temporary gusts
of the moment' by
a corrupt bargain between the Liberals
and the Irish.
He

•

warned that revolutionary legislation could be
easily disguised in financial bills,
While still opposed to the budget which ultimately
passed on 2? April 1911,^^ Balfour's parliamentary
energies
during the spring of that year were chiefly directed
to

insuring that Acquith's resolutions would not totally
destroy the Upper House, and thus sweep away the last

barrier to

Horns

projects.

This was no easy task, as the history of the

Rule and other allegedly revolutionary

period bet^veen April 1910 and August 1911 indicates.

Bal-

four *s aristocratic background instilled in him a genuine
dread

oi^

any parliamentary reform which effectively invested

full legislative pov/ers in a democratically constituted
'^^Ensor,

p. ^120? Harold Nicolson, S^DJZgfi 1, iij^
(Londonj
Constable, 1952), p, 103, Hereafter cited ^'icolson, George Xa.

Mis

Bklglri^J-i,

and. EsdJ'ji
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"5

ffiad.?:ir.dg xc, 1186-90
5 Hansard, xvi, 1768-7^? Arthur J.
Balfour, Oj^ilalsairi
Doubleday
Ar^iUElsnia (Garden Cityj
and Doran, 1928), p. 87. Hereafter cited Balfour, Opinion'.5.
^Balfour's nenorandum to King Edward, cited in Lord Newton,
lilin^iJism^ (Londom
ivlacnillan, 1929 )» p. 390,
;

17^
He was, therefore, willing
to consider some elective
peerages
the powers of the Upper
House could be left
intact.2^ Lord Salisbury,
Balfour's cousin, ultimtely

body.

U

pushed for an elective element
to solve the House cf Lords
issue on the grounds thati
We are fighting not for our
hereditary
privileges, but for the Union, and
we rre
preparea to make even the greatest
sacri^

The King's death on 6

^lay

1910 put an end to any more dis-

cussions Of elective schemes among
the Shadow Cabinet and
paved the way for the Constitutional
Conference
of 1910.

Other Unionists, however, shared
Balfour's democratic
anxieties and desired to save the House
of Lords.
They
were prepared to accept a limited
sacrifice of their Unionist principles by proposing federalism
as an alternative
to continuation of the Union.

federalism was

L.

The chief advocate of

Garvin, who edited

Observer -

From M3.rch until November I9IO, Garvin and his
associates
pushed pri-vately and finally publicly the federal
compromise
as the best means cf saving the Lords and the
country from

the dangers which an Irish-Socialist-Liberal
coalition

allegedly entailed.

Moreover, Garvin's anjciefcies over the

German challenge convinced

which

i.iight

]iim

that doiiiestic controversy

inhibit a campaign of national efficiency had

24

'Jenkins, B^ai^mLLn £aQdl£. pp. 143-4.

Salisbury to Lord lansdowne, 6 September I9IO, B. M.
Add.

49,730. f. 10?j Jenkins, ^alXfiurla

]^iiQSlls,,

p. 144.

to be avoided at all costs,

a^herefore federalism was
very

attractive.

Immediately after the January
election had
virtually guaranteed Liberal
action on the Lords and Home
Rule. Garvin suggested to
Jack Sandars. Balfour's secretary/, that something on
the Canadian model might
satisfy
the Irish. 26

The

0^^^

editor believed the continua-

tion of old age pensions and the
British government's help
in fighting the socialist trend
so feared by the Irish
clergy would be sufficiently
attractive to erode much Home
Rule support in Ireland. Garvin
approached Balfour

directly on the Riveria in March, and
argued that in view
of socialist and internationalist
dangers, the Unionists
ought to consider dealing with the Irish
on a federal
basis..

Balfour summarily rejected this as 'eating
dirt.'"''

He could hardly deal with the Irish when
for the previous
six months he had been attacking the Liberals
for their

deals, but he had deeper considerations as well.

Appar-

ently worried that a federalist approach was
gaining some
sympathy, Balfour explained his general objections
to

federal devolution to Grey, who passed them on to More
ton
Frewen, another sympathizer of federalism.

have heard privately from Arthur Balfour
begging me not to make up ray mind on the
subject of federation until I have had an
opportunity of discussing the whole subject
v/ith him.
He regards federation as a means
I

^^Gollin, .Qaixln, p. 172.
27

Gollin, Can-La. p. 18V.
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of organizing separate communities
organic Whole, and is inclined to into one
proposal to federate the U. K. as regard the
tending in
^he direction of disorganization as a
"^"^
teaching
of history.
irlLr^^''^^''^^^
^'O.^^PPreciate
-Che contention tL?''L''^S^'F
triat the Federation of the U„ K.
is an
essential condition precedent to the federation of the Empire. 2b

The federal idea did not die easily.

During the summer

Frev/en arranged a luncheon for Balfour,

lansdcwne and

Bourke Cochrane, the wealthy Irish American
subscriber to
the Irish Parliamentary Party, in order to
push federalism. 29

P. S.

Oliver, an ardent disciple of Joseph Chamber-

lain and a veteran of Alfred Milner's kindergarten,
published under the pseudonion 'Pacificus' a aeries of
articles
in Th^

5!iDias.

touting the federalist approach in late May

and early June.-^^

When in late July the Constitutional

Conference appeared to be breaking down over whether

Korae

Rule would be included in a body of legislation exempt

from the Lords' veto, A. C. Murray, the Master of Elibank,

initially consulted with Harold Harmsworth of
about the possibility of a federal solution.

worth referred Murray to Garvin,

'Sh^

When Harms-

Observer editor and

Grey to More ton Frewen, 2 April I9IC, Fr^wen Collection,
Box 30, Library of Congress,
29

luncheon was described in Frewen to Umsdowne,
30 January 1913 t Frewen Collection, Box 35, Library of
Congress. For Frewen 's involvement in the federalist
campaign in 1910, see Alan J. Ward, "Frewen 's An^loAmerican Campaign for Federalism." Irlnh iUsJiQrii^i
Siiillas., 15, No. 59 (March, 196? ), pp. 256-75.

-^This

Gollin, Garvin, pp. 193'^.

hxs associates seized
the opportu..ity to
renew the federalist issue in editorials
and articles.
In fact. Uoyd
George -e anxiety over the
whole Lords-Irish
controversy
lod him in August to
press upon his colleagues
that the
best way of brealcing the
constitutional deadlock was a
coalition government in
conjunction with a federal
settle...nt Of the Irish Question. 31
Exactly when Balfour first
knew Of these proposals is
not certain. 3^ but by .,idOctober When the final breakdown
of the Constitutional
Conference was i^inent. he was
under considerable pressure
from the indefatigable Garvin
as well as from party
friends
and associates to reconsider
the federal idea.
Garvin sent

Ealfour a long letter on 17
October justifying federalism,
as the best method to save the
Lords, to oemont AngloAmerican relations against rising
Jap^ese
power, to pre-

serve imperial good will, and
to gain moderate support in
the fight against sooialisra.33
Garvin sent a similar

letter to Austen Chamberlain, and
Oliver visited Balfour
at Whittingehame.3^ Articles favoring
federalism appeared

i'L^fi^f'"'^'^

on 22 and JO October as well as
in

'-Chcunberlain suggests that Balfour knew
of the coalition
proposal early, but Urs. Dugdale thinks it
v/as nid-

r^r^r^r "^.^^a^^
kSISllL.,
p» 219, He
33 Garvin
3^

Gollin,

""^^ ^^^^"^

approached,

Gollin,

1,

to Balfour, 1? October I910, cited in Gollin.
Gi^r.Yin,

p.

211, pp, 220-2.

nm^
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and the Pail^

E,^^.

Sandars was apparently con-

verted to the Garvin scheme,
for on 18 October he asked
his Chief, if in the li^ht
of greatly improved Irish
conditions and the need to save
the Lords as well as imperial
good will, a federal solution
might be possible. 35 Sandars'
contention that '...we shall hug
a delusion if we imagine
that Home Rule will alarm the
Orange Order of 1911 as it
did in 1886 and I895 (sic)...'
was overly optimistic.
Alfred Lyttelton echoed Sandars' report
that federal devolution commanded the swathies of
yoimger party men such
as Philip Kerr, Alfred Miiner. F. S.
Oliver, and Robert H.
Brand . ^7
Despite this impressive campaign Balfour
remained
obdurate in his refusal to com-ider a federalist
scheme
for Ireland. Ke replied at length to Garvin

on 22 October.

By posing a series of qi>estions, he
repeated nis earlier
contentions that federation of the United Kingdom
would

be

a retrograde step tending towards disunity and
ultimate
separation,

Ke suggested that Redmond was inconsistent
in

simultaneously maintaining loyalty to Pax^nell's position
and accepting the idea of devolution.

While he admittrid

th? great improvement in Ireli^.nd's economic and social
condi-

tions, Balfour suggested that it was only fear of material

-

bandars' arguraentr, suggest he had been coached by Garvin,
Sandars to Balfour, 18 October I910, B, M. Add. MS -^9,767,
ff, 7"*8,

37

Alfred Lyttelton to Balfour, 16 October 1910. B. M, Add.

m

t^9,775, f. 66.
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disaster and loss of Briti.h
credit that leapt the Home
Rule appeal fro. going
the full length of
independence or
practical separation. The Irish
were not content with the
parliament established in 1782
so that there was no
guarantee that federalism would
dimnish Irish agitation
in the future.
No form of devolution,
he argued, would be
effective in preventing Redmond
and his followers from
making hard cash the condition of
their imperial loyalty.
The question of Ulster's position
he
posed as another
almost insurmountable obstacle. In
conclusion, while
Balfour acknowledged that the Liberals
were moving in the
federalist direction, he emphasized
his doubts that the
Unionist party was ready to accept this
new departure
without a long lapse of time,-^^

While Balfour did not initially reject the
Lloyd
George coalition offer, his letter to Garvin
indicates

that he never considered the federal solution
very practical or appropriate. There were other factors
besides
those he mentioned to Garvin which determined
him against
federalism as well as against the Lloyd George
offer.

Firstly^ Balfour's position as a former Unionist
Prime

Minister and as the party leader made it impossible
for
him to sacrifice the principle upon which the party
had

been based.
38

During his political apprenticeship under

Balfour to Garvin, 22 October 1910. cited in Gollin,

.QarylUt pp. ^16-18.

•

Salisbury, the importance
of party unity and
loyalty to
party principles had always
stood foremost.
In 1885-6
Balfour had witnessed at
first hand Salisbury's
rejection
Of Carnarvon's attempts
to satisfy the Home Rule
sentiment
through federalism. Balfour
had served as an enthusiastic
intermediary in Salisbury's
rejection of Gladstone's suggestions for a bipartisan effort
to solve the Irish Question,
The influence of his uncle's
views on party u^ity
and his disparaging remarks about
Peel bore their fruit
when Balfour told Uoyd George
that he could not be another
Peel. A strong sense of loyalty
to Cecilian family tradition and the party reinforced his
philosophical doubts
about federalism and the extent to
which it would eradicate
Irish separatist tendencies. As he
explained to his niece
t^rventy years later
t

My own remark about Peel, that was
the poir^t,
^"^ ^^^"^
^-ay well have said
It then.
Peel twice committed what seems to
me the unf orgiveable sin.
He gave away a
principle on which he had come into pov/Pr and mind you, neither time had an unfore^^e^^n
factor come into the case. He simply
betrayed
his
party,

Secondly, recent political developments had
driven
home to Balfour the possible repercussions
which any sacrifice of Unionist principles might entail,
The passions
and suspicions generated by the Devolution Crisis
were

indelibly imprinted upon Balfour's mind.
39

In I909,

just

Dusdale» Baii:^, II, 555 Jenkins, Balfour's Poodle,
p • lo /
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prior to the January election.
Lord Londonderry told
Balfour of Tho.as Sinclair's
warning that .onories of

the

Wyndham-McDonnell affair led the
Belfast Unionists to be
anxious that a small Conservative
.majority would deal with
Redmond and Dillon just as
readily as Asquith and the
Liberals had done.^^ Moreover,
any new federalist departure was virtually im.possible
following the January elections.
The Irish Unionist Alliance
had worked very
diligently in collecting money and
giving publicity to
the Unionist cciuse in the course
of the campaign, and they
had recovered some of the losses
of the I906
election.

In

September I9IO Walter Long reminded
Balfour of the great
debt which the British Unionists owed
to their Irish col41
leagues.
When expressing his anxieties about
Garvin's
scheme to Austen Chamberlain, the Unionise
leader enclosed
two letters from Irish Unionists which
he described as
'e.cthe first drops in the storm which will
assuredly break
over us if any new departure will be uuiidtted.*^^

Another important factor which explains Balfour's
Londonderry. 2k December 1909. B. w
?i?"^\^^^f"^i^^^'
Add.
y^Ji9.802, f. 119, Sinclair was a prominent Liberal
Unionist until the Devolution Crisis caused him
to submerge his liberalism in Ulster Tory Unionism.
41

Long to Balfour, 3 September I9IO. B. Ivi. Add. MS
49,777.
Pc?.trick J. Buckland, "The Southern Irish Unionists, the Irish Question, and British Politics,"
Ir'Jlh.
Hl.g tor i fial Sj;ij^l2£, 15, No,
59 (March, 1967), PP. 228-255.
ff. 65-67?
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Gollin, Gsxzin, p. 225,

unwillingness to consider any
new departure w.s F. E.
Smith's report that Carson
was not free to entert.^n
a
federalist solution at that
juncture. Carson had succeeded
Walter Long as leader of the
Irish Unionists in Parliament
only a few months earlier,
and he could hardly
reco..,:.ond

such a change in policy so
quickly. '^3

j^^,,^^

^^^^
Carson got wind of the coalition
rumours on the hasis of
Irish devolution, he circulated
among the Unionists a protest petition Which was ultimately
published in Iha
on 11 Kove,r,ber 193.0.
Included in the list of prominent
IJnionist signers were Walter Long.
Lord Hugh Cecil. Lord

V/illoughby de Broke, and Mr. J. H.
M. Campbell.

Carson
condemned any 'Home Rule all aroundschemes when addressair.3 the Irish Unionists on
5 Movember, and exhortoU those
Unionists who attended the party conference
at Nottingham
on 17 Kovemb-r to maintain their
uxialterable support :ro:.'
the Union/

'

Lord lansdowne, Balfour's old friend

.fror>>.

school days, was not enthusiastic about
devolution either.
With Carson representing the more
conunei-clal and professional elGVT.entrs of Irish Unionism, and
Lansdowne representing the landed classas of the South and West
opposed
to any new departures, Balfour undoubtedly
saw little chance
for devolution to succeed. An additional
factor in

fo"n2P
•Clia

51.

'^^
'I'

^^^^'^t»>

31 October I9IO, B. M. Add,

T iffi.sa » 11, 18 November 19I0r Colvin,

QajinsiXit

N;S

pp.

^^9~
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Balfour*^ rejection of coalition
was undoubtedly his pe^sonal distrust of Lloyd George's
apparent willingness to
set aside principles for
expediency.
On 4 November Sandars
reported to Garvin Balfour's
firm and final decision that
he could not consider new
initiatives on Ireland which
sacrificed the Union.^5
Constitutional Conference
broke down only a few days after
Lloyd George received
Balfour's rejection of the coalition
offer.
On 18 NovemberAsquith announced a dissolution and
said that the Government would take steps to implerf.ent
the resolutions
'

on the

Lords reform if successful at the
polls.

Although the

ministry never formally aclmowledged it.
the Irish Question
was the chief barrier that destroyed the
Conference.

The

fact that the leading politicians, the press
and interested
citizens commonly assumed the Irish Question was
the root
of the conference failure added to the
bitterness which

attended the passage of the Parliament Act and
the introduction of the third Home Rule Bill,''^^
During the December 1910 election campaign the
Liberals concentrated upon the obstacles which the
peers
had thrown up against almost every piece of Liberal
legis-

lation since 1906e

Balfour reiterated his accusations of

a corrupt and opportunistic alliance betv/een the Irish
and
h f

^Gollin, C^HYin, 228-9.
Asquith to the King, 10 November 1910, CAB^a/32/70 cited
in Colvin,

CiuzSiiH,

p. 4?.
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the Liberals, and warned the
electorate of the imminent
destruction of their only
constitutional safeguard against
rash and revolutionary changes.
He pointed to Redmond's

fund raising activities in the
United States and Canada as
an indication of the Liberals'
willingness to destroy the

constitution at the behest of American
subscribers.
centrating upon the Lords ajid the Home

Con-

Rule issue, Balfour

gave scant attention to the tariff
issue and the need for
social reform.
More pragmatic considerations than

loyalty to the Union explain this tactic.

Balfour knew

that his party was sharply divided over
both the tariff
and social issues, and it was much easier
to preserve party
unity by attacking the Irish-Liberal alliance
than by working out a Unionist concensus on these difficult
queGtions
Despite their vigorous campaigning, the election
returns did not give Balfour and the Unionists any
cause
for jubilationc

The Liberals, in combination with the Irish

and Laborite allies, actually increased their overall

majority by 4 to

126,^'"^

Irish votes notwithstanding, it

was clear that the majority of English and Scotch voters

provided Asqulth with a mandate to introduce legislation
^''TJia

Golj.in,

IB,

23,

28,

30 November 1910,

Gaixui* p. 326.

The Liberals and Unionists each had 272 seats, while the
Irish held 84 and Labor 42 seats. Ensor, Kn^-Oaaa, p. 427.
The Liberals had actually lost three seats in Decornbar,
but the Irioh and the Laborites gained two seats each.
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curbing the powers of the Lords.
The Parliament Bill which
Asquith introauced on

21 February I9XI raised unprecedented
passions in and out
of Parliament for the next
five months.
Despite his frank

acknowledgement on the eve of the
Constitutional Conference
of the real difficulties the
peers caused the Liberal
governments, 50 Balfour made light of the
peers' consistent
opposition and suggested it ought to be
accepted
as

sporting polities'.

'good

He returned to the twin themes of

corrupt bargains and the danger of revolutionary
proposals
t}iat would inevitably follow the
Parliament Act
at the

behest of the Irish and Labor! tes

He attacked the idea

that the December election constituted a referendum
for
the constitutional change proposed under the
Parliament

Billj
I think it is utterly absurd to say
that the
transfer of th-ise few votes at a General
Election under the violent impulse of some
hope, fear or passion of the moment is to
give a universal power of attorney to any
government to do exactlv what it likes with
the British constitution.
That seems to me
to be altogether an absurd proposal.
I am
violently opposed, and always have been to
this delegate theory of representation. 53

•^^Balfour's memorandum on the Constitutional Question.
22 June I9IO CAB37/102/23,

51
5

52

Han;aJ2a:£t»

xxii, 567-70.

5 iknsjSLEd* xxip 565-81,

1710.
53

5 hm^£ix<l,

xxvi, 576.

I753-6/-1,

XXV, 226, i^6l-j, 1700-
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This statement illustrates
succinctly Balfour's unwillingness to accept a majority
composed of Irishmen and
labor^
ites Who. he considered
to he second-class if
not dangerous
citizens. He had been
perfectly willing to support
the
delegate theory of representation
in 1886 when the Cominons

rejected Gladstone's First Ho..
Rule Eill.
insistence on keeping the Irish

Of course, this

in the Union,

and

simul-

taneously denying them full
political rights, was common
to the majority of Tory Unionists.
Roy Jenkins has called
this attitude the ultimate of
Anglo-Saxon hypocrisy. -5^
Balfour's subsequent parliamentary
attempt to censure
Asquith for seeking and obtaining
prior to the election
King George's promise to create
sufficient peers to carry
the Parliament Bill smacks of the
same hypocritical

stance.

Early in January I9II. Ealfour admitted
to Viscount Esher
and Lord Knollys that in view of the
election the King
could not really refuse to comply with
a request to

croatc

additional peers.

In fact. Balfour's ultimate refusal

to support the diehards on the
Parliament Bill following

Asquith's communication of the King's promise, -^^
while
statesmanlike in some regards, was predicated on
the

54

Jenkins. MUmLXLLr^ Ej^^I^, p. 133-4.

^Jenkins,

BalfiaiiiLLa

Pood;e. p. 194.

-^'Balfour was informed by Lord Knollys of the Kin.T's
promise
on 7 July 1910.
This information was officially confirmed for him by Lloyd George on 18 July I9IO. Jenkins,
MXt9urls. ZaaOIa, pp. 216-19.
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assumption that this would
provide at least tv,o years
to
raise the country against
Home Rule and Welsh
Disestablishment. A peer creation
would have brought the
immediate
introduction of these measures.
Balfour explained
in a

memorandum designed to overcome
the diehard opposition
that a flooded house would only
diminish the dignity of
the Lords and make it less
effective in resisting revolutionary measures!

The attention of the country
should be
^''-^^ -^P^y manoeuvres but
to'"??f
t° necessity
to
the absolute
of stemming the
revolutionary tide, by mkins such
abuse
of ministerial power impossible
in the
iuture.->r
The passage of the Parliament Act
increased rather

than diminished the bitternesB and anger
which had characterized British political debate since
the beginning of
the Budget Crisis in 1909.

Although he had resign.ed the

party leadership in early November, Balfour
played a major
role over the next three years in perpetuating
the atmoGphere of intense hostility and suGpicion. In
_

his efforts

to prevent the prospective Home Rule Bill
from winning a

Commons majority^ Balfour continued to cast
aspersions on
the political and constitutional integrity
of the Liberal

Dugdale, Balfimr., II, 70.
This r.iGmorandum was never
cxrcu-lated for fear of causing further resentment against
balfour amongst the diehards and backwoodsniene Hu'^h
Cecil advised his cousin that the technical fl^tws in
the Parliament Act might enable them to prevent Home
Rule and V/elsh Disestablishment from receiving the royal
assent. Hugh Cecil to Balfour, 18 August 1911, B. M.
Add. IviS 49,759. 1. 225.
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ministry.

.

Insatiable office hunger, he
charged, had caused
the Liberals to trample
on the constitution and
was
responsible for their current
commitment to Home Rule.
The government's methods
were sacrificing the interests
of
England. Scotland, and Wales,
and represented a plot
'...as
nefarious as are to be found
in the political

intrigued If

Which parlaimentary history
gives a record '.^^ Asserting
that the Parliament Act had put
the country under a provisional or interim constitution
which prevented the electorate from expressing their views
on Home Rule, Balfour
speculated in private that the King
could justifiably
pressure the government for an election.
These attacks
upon the Liberals' integrity did little
to impede

•

the minis-

try,

for Asquith introduced the third Home
Rule Bill on
11 April 1912.
Balfour spoke at length on the first and
second readings, and gave numerous public
addresses attacking the principle and details of the
measure. For instance,
he questioned the ministry's federalist
characterization
of the bill by pointing out that the
provisions granting
control of customs and postal services to
the Dublin parliament was contrary to arrangements in other
federations.
Th&.

59

SJjusjj.,

7

November 1911,

Balfour's iie.-crandum on the King's Position. March,
1912,
ijl.
Add. iv^3 49.869, ff. 119-22. After the Home Rule
2J111 pacGGd Its second reading, Balfour
made extensive
use oi this argument in hopes of getting the King
to dismiss Asquith and call an election.
On this memorandum
IS a notation that the King was to present those
arguments to the government.
B.
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He poeited that the need
to supply the Nationalists
with

sufficient patronage was the
reason for this difference/^
The 10% customs le^/ying
authority extended to the Irish
was contrary to other federal
systems and threatened
England with a customs barrier,
Balfour attacked the contention that the Home Rule Bill was
an initial step in
the eventual federation of the
United Kingdom on the grounds
that there was no desire for
federation in Scotland and
Wales. Any such federation, he
asserted, set
up in a

piece-meal fashion was bound to increase
rather than
decrease the work of the House of Commons.
Returning to
the historical argument that federation
was attempting to
reverse the course of history and national
progress. Balfour pointed to the struggles waged :.n Germany
and
the

United Statea to achieve and mintain unity.

He raised

the spectre of increasing international tensions
as a

further argument against division of the United
Kingdorai

Every great country in the world has been
trying to draw closer the units of v.hich
it is composed, and when they have failed
their position excites the profoundecn
misgivings of their best friends ,61
Balfour criticized the financial arrangements of the
Home Rule Bill on a number of points.

He suggested that

the Liberals were attempting to escape the cost and respon-

sibility of Irish social reform, thereby throwing an
u

.

...

5 iianaariit

xxxvii, ^o-i.

5

xxxvii, 53.

6l
iiaiifiariit
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i^possiMe burden upon the
Irish taxpayer.

The provision
calling for six years of
imperial financing he
considered
unfair, because the British
taxpayer

had no voice in controlling the expenditure
of that money.
Conversely.
Balfour argued that the
retention of
Irish .embers in
Westminster hardly gave the
Irish enough representation
over decisions on general
tariff policy and foreign
policy.
He predicted that
undorrepresentation on these vital
iosues was bound to cause
disoontent.^^ In the course
of
the debates. Balfour was
especially critical of the government contention that the Home
Rule Bill was essential to
satisfy Irish nationalist
aspirations. He questioned the
very idea of a separate Irish
nationality on the grounds
that the Home Rule agitation
was the product of agitators
appealing to a sentimental and
mythical version of history.
If.

indeed, a genuine Irish nationalism
did exist, Balfour
asserted that the present aoasure was
too limited in its
powers and by its safeguards to
satisfy any

self-respecting

nation alist.

Balfour's Anglo-Saxon values and
imperialist"

5 aansard, xxxvii,
Balfour's anxiety about Iri=:h
underrepresentation is novel, although orator
ic all
clever, in view of his earlier
contention that tte^QO/^
'^^''^ representation 2t WestmLnster
Zl^Zlly^
was
laudable '^^r''
and understandable. Balfour to the Kir^
C-^S''V29/36.
Lord Selborne had sug:
mitted „ Cabinet memorandum in February
ISOk arguin-' that
°^°rrcpresented by 31 seats, and thft these
^^.llTVT
ought to be redistributed to lingland and
Wales. Selborn"
Memorandum on Redistribution. 9 February 190^f. CAB37/69/2?.
Walter Long supported this view, and was
disappointed
When plDJis to curtail Irish representation were
dropopd
from the King's speech in Koveraber, 190'+. CAB37/?3/ioii.

JlZT'l

19.1.

pride led him to proclaim that
the Union gave the Irish
full freedom, indeed more freedom
through their representation in the common councils
of Empire, than their numbers
legitimately entitled them to receive. ^3
course,

Balfour was missing the point that
many Irish nationalists
did not consider membership in
the councils of Empire a
valuable and noble privilege. Since
he had no difficulty
in reconciling his own Scottish
background and sympathies
with a larger British patriotism, the
former Prime Minister
expected the Irish to do likewise. He
claimed time,
patience and understanding had wiped away any
bitterness
and resentment which the Scots harboured
from English

expansion and the Union.

Speaking at the Royal Scottish

Corporation on St. Andrews' Day in November
1912, .Balfour
obviously referred to Ireland when he said that
no great
political fusion could be accomplished with the
stroke of
a pen. Any permanent political fusion was the
product of
preliminary toil, many misunder• .fmiich
standings, some difficulties, some frictions,
and when those difficulties and frictions
are over, the welding in that furnace cannot
be unloosened, and what has been joined together never can again be separated, o--^

Speaking at Nottingham on 29 January 1913, Balfour
emphatically denied that Ireland

v/as

either financially

or politically oppressed under the Union.
"^5

iliinaaril,

He claimed

xxxvii, 56,

'Thoughts on the Scottish Union", Balfour, QpXnLom,
^7.

p.
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that if indeed anyone was
exploited, he was the
B>.itish
taxpayer. He believed
the charges of political
oppression
baseless since unlike Poland.
Ireland did not have any
political independence or
'organic political past
as a
single great
taken away by the English
conquest.
Moreover, he asserted that
when Irishmen spoke of
rectoring Irish institutions, they
were in fact referring to
institutions established as a
subsequent result of the
British settlement. Rather
than resent the British
settlement, the Irish. Balfour
intimated, ought to be grateful
for it!

comity

fllw"? ^? Irishman asks

us to restore to

fin^l1^f 'fTr^''?^^^^^^"^-*-^^^
c..^

laalt

''''ill

always

the Irish; it iinc-lies no irferi^'^ cioes*ir,T.ly that th"
Z'-l^ S^'^i^^"
contact
between .Sngland and Ireland tooi.
place
civilization of England,
IL
the political organi.-.ation of finc^i.-.ncK
was
far more advanced than the tribal
system^ thPt
01

there are no Irish institutions,
there are
no ^rish lav;s, there is nothing
in existence
at this moment that could Dcssibly
be resto-ed
''''''
^^'^^ ^^^^^^^^^

Irisrori'in'^f

This passage illustrates Balfour's
Anglo-Saxonist disdain
for past and present Celtic values
and institutions.
In
the same speech Balfour asserted
that contemporary Irish

patriotism was caused by the perpetual nursing
of sriovances created by the mistaken English policy
of the six-

teenth and seventeenth centuries and the delays
in granting

Sh^ Hmjia, l February 19 13.
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Catholic Emancipation.

He claimed, however,
that t^venty-

five years of progressive
Unionist policy had done more
to remedy these evils than
an independent Irish
parliament
could do in a century. The
Irish, therefore, ought to
be
content with the British
connection.

After the third Home Rule Bill
passed its second
reading in the Coirmions on
9 May 1912 by the substantial
^mjority Of 101, Balfour displayed
an increasing tendency
to concentrate upon the Ulster
issue rather than on the
more academic and historical
objections to Home Rule. Moreover, he grew even more deterained
than before to
•

o^jtain

a dissolution and election by
questioning the ethics and
legality of proceeding with the bill
under the provisions
of the Parliament Act.
Both these approaches correspond

closely with the strategy which Bonar Law
and G. L, Garvin
devised after the second reading in hopes
of sabotaging
Home Rule.^^ In fact, as will be shown,
the evidence
suggests that Balfour was a principal agent
in developing
the argument that the unprincipled
actions of the Liberals
in not directly submitting Home Rule to
the people was

sufficient grounds for the King to demand a
dissolution.
Only

t.vo

weeks after the successful second reading,

Balfour foreshadowed tho increasing importance of the
Ulster issue v/hen he told the Earl of Oranmore that
irrespective of the general arguments against Home Rule, Ulster
^'^^Gollin,

Garv-nj p. 398-9.

»

19-!^

would never be reconciled to a
Dublin parliament/^ On
11 June 1912, the former Tory leader
raised the Ulster
issue again in support of T. C.
R. Agar-Robartes
motion
for the exclusion of Antrim.
Armagh, Down and Londonderry
from Home Rule. When this motion
was defeated by 6l votes
it appeared that the government
would proceed on the basis
of an all-Ireland Home Rule.
This possibility apparently
exacerbated Balfour's anger, for he
registered no objections to the highly passionate and
provocative speech
that Bonar Law delivered at Blenheim
on 29 July 1912p nor
to the obvious movements which the
Ulstermen were taking
to prepare themselves for open defiance
•

of the law.^^^

R.

C.

K„ Ensor suggested that Balfour would
not have enter-

tained such an abandonment of party control
to a small
Irish faction,
but in fact, Balfour agreed with

the tone

6?
MS'^^9^861^

fflSr"^

Oranmore, 23 Kay 1912, B. M. Add,

In his famous speech at Blenheim, Bonar law
proclaimed
that he ana his party would not be bound by ordin'^.ry
constitutional restraints in resisting Home Rule.
'We
^
^^^^'^^f whatever means seem to us most
^'i^
ej^eccive, to deprive them of the despotic power which
tney have usurped and compel them to appeal' to the
people
whom they have deceived. They may, perhaDS they will,
carry their Home Rule Bill through the House of Commons
out wnat then? I said the other day in the House of
Commons and I repeat here that there are thin/rs stronirer
than Parliamentary majorities,* As to the growinp militancy in Ulster, Bonar Law proclaimed '...I can imagine
no length of resistance to v/hich Ulster can go in which
I should not be prepared to support them, and
in which,
my belief, they would not be sut>ported by the overwhelming majority of the British people.* R. Blake, aiie
^Im^^m i^xiiasL lUnist^r,
Lifn ^uid Siimas. n£ A ndrew
Bonar Laii (London, Ji:;yre and Spottiswoode 1955), p. I30.
Hereafter cited Blake, Bona r hm,
^^Ensor, Sn£asjia» p. ^55

m

,

and substance of Bonar
Law's speech
opt,ecn, and v,..
.
was apparently
disposed to approve almost
anything that the Ulster
nil,tants planned to stop Home
Rule from beooming law.
His
consistent characterisation
of the Ulster.en as
peaceful
and loyal citizens over
the next two years, despite
their
obvious flaunting of the arms
restrictions laws, was an
abdication differing from Bonar
Law's only in degree.

Even more significant is
Balfour's letter to J. I.
Moore,
written only a few weeks after
Blenheim, in which he vir'
tually repeated with minimum
reservations the substance
Of Bonar Law's speech:
Ordinary canons of conduct necessarily
become open to question in extreme
and noboay, so far as I know, has cases;
yet been
a.Die to lay dovm any maxims
of universal
app.UGation saying where the right of
resistance to legal oppression beo-ins
or
there are such cases few would,
T
perhaps fewer still would
deny J
tnat the right of resistance is one
capable of great and dangerous abuse.
Let
me add xhat the Government have
done their
best by the whole treatiaent of the
Home
Rule question, and by their
revolutionary
attack upon the constitution (avowedly
designed to pass that measure over the
heads
01 tne cons-uituenoies ) to iustifv anv arti nn
loyalists 'may tLe"?o';^inv'??
tain .their
rights. 70

Stf

In all his public addresses on Home
Rule after 1912, Balfour
used language which practically gave a
carte blanche to

the Ulster Unionist Council and its
military wing, the

Ulster Volunteer Force.

For instance, in a major speech
''"^

f*

September 1912, B. M. Add,
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at Nottingha.i on 29 January I913.
Balfour, while admitting
that England bore some historical
responsibility for ore-'
ating the Ulster problem, asserted
that '...handing over
Ulster to the tender mercies of
the rest of Ireland is
surely dishonorable as well as
idiotic. '^^ According to
the former Prime Minister to
sacrifice British parliamentary institutions and Ulster to
Irish nationality was
an 'excess of insanity', and '...a
political crime compared with which all crimes of the past
sink into pale
insignificance.
j.^^^^^^ ^.^.^^^
^^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^.^
in a speach to the East Lothian Unionists
on 6 September

1913.

He then demanded, in spite of the
Commons' approval

of Home Rule in two successive sessions,
that the govern-

ment agree to

election before Home Rule went on the

statute book."^^
Public speeches vilifying the Liberals and raising
the Ulster issue were not the only tactics in
the anti-

Home Rule strategy worked out by the Unionists in
the

spring of 1912,

A very important element in the Unionist

plan of campaign was to give full, even exaggerated,
play
to the threat of civil v/ar and difficulties in the
army
so as to force the King to demand a dissolution and
elec-

tion before the Home Rule Bill reached its third reading
''^liia

lim^., 1 February 1913.

72
Unu?^.,

1

February 1913.

'^lii^ .YimeQ,

8

September 1913.

2h.Q.

xn the Cor^mons.
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Balfour was sympathetic
to these efforts

as his .varoh I912
.memorandum suggests.
the former Tory chief began

By autumn I913,

developing the rationale by

Which the King could insist
upon a dissolution. In early
September Balfour confidentially
suggested to Jack Sandars
that While it would be unwise
and imprudent for the King
to withhold assent to the
Home Rule Bill, it would be
permissible under the circumstances
for the monarch to
seek a change of advisers.
Balfour indicated his own
willingness to serve as a temporary
minister, since the
King could not send for Bonar Law
or Lansdowne without
appearing imconstitutionaJ.ly partisan.
Balfour argued
that this course of seeking a dissolution
and election was
the only .leans of educating the
British public to the depth
and strength of Ulster's resistance. The
temporary ministry would emphasize to the electorate the
exceptional

character of the crisis and free the King from
being an
accomplice in forwarding a policy which could
conceivably
precipitate civil war and military mutiny."''^'
Within a few
days Balfour prepared a formal memorandum
which he intended
for the King. Entitled 'Can the King Change
His Ministers?', the document defended the King's
perogative to
seek new advisers on the grounds that rare
use did not

constitute abandonment or obsolescence.
7 if,,

m^l^'^^^SS^ fT%8^'-l'^

September 1913»

The memo further

B.

M. Add,

'
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stressed that as the Liberals
had put the country 'at
the
m=rcy of a passing mjority
by crippling the second
Cha„*er. there was nothing
which the Executive could
not
do if the perogative was
deemed obsolete.

Even if

tlie

King personally favored Home
Rule, the circumstances
practically demanded that the monarch
insist upon an election
prior to proceeding further with
the Home Rule Bill, 75
This memorandum was intended
to provide the King with the
basis fron which to write a letter
to Asqulth

requesting

his ministry's resignation.

It is conceivable that Bonar

Law's recommendations of H May
1912 and of September I912
that the King change advisers may have
been encourafpd by
Balfour.
Although A. V. Dicey had defended this
course
of action for Bonar Law, there is no
question but that

this policy ran counter to accepted
constitutional practice, and that it was diametrically opposed
to tho principle
of Comirtcns' authority which the I910
elections and the

Parliament Act reaffirmed.

The novelty of the proposal-

illustrates again Balfour's unwillingness' to
credit the
Liberals with any political integrity in their
Irish policy
as well as his refusal to accept a Commons
majority
in

which the decisive votes rested with those he deemed
political intruders.
The difficulty which the Unionists caused
Balfour memorandum 'Can the King change his Ministers''
October, I913, B. iv]. Add. I-iS ^19,869, ff. 123-32.
76

Blake, Bonar

Lai£,

p.

133; pp. 150-53.

'
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the King by these
pressure
^^.ure tartir^c
tactics was attested
by Walt er
Birrell as well as by
^^^^S 2 biographer Sir
^ the Kir^'c,
Harold
Nicolson, '

In any event. Balfour
never sent his draft
proposal
to the King owing to
Sandars fear that this
idea would
be detected by «i„ston
Churchill in any letter
the sovereign wrote. I„ addition.
Sandars suggested that
the
proposal .,ight take the
Liberals off their Ulster
hook
and thereby rob the
Unionists of an issue.78
Even if this
plan had been carried out.
it is highly unlikely
that
Asquith would have agreed to
it.
He was aware of the
pressure the Unionists were
placing upon George V to
get
a dissolution and in September
he submitted two memoranduBS to the monarch defending
his resolution to proceed
with itee Rule. Ke contended
that the two I910 elections
and the subsequent majorities
in the House of Commons
demonstrated sufficient suppor.
for the govorru^ent policy.
The Prime Minister also
argued that an election would
not
abate the Ulster resistance,
for the Ulstermen had already
declared their indifference to
the ve:.d3ct of the English
'

Jenkins. AssmLih. N^coisonM^o^.^^'v?/'^^^"^f
Law attempted to influence
th^-Klng tiwild
of
the liberals by painting a dark
picture
of
armv
-^hi-m
and civil war v,hen he visited George
at Balmoraf in e^^rlv
"^^^
September. Bonar Law to Balfour.
16
Septemberiof3
B. i.5. Add. KS 1^9,
693; ff. 32-38.

'^^

alLiU

780

banoars to Short, k October 1913, b. m.
Add. P<3 ^9,-/68.
September
1913. B. a. Add.
MS ^UlsTfU 63-4?"°"'"*

"

2C0
2C

70
1
^
electorate/^

In any
anv event, +u
±n
the King had no
intention of
dismissing Asquith whil^
iixi. ne
he on-m',^^.^
conmcindod a n-u3.jority in
the
Coimnons, and he vreferv-d
^
ti.rr.c, to c-o^v
i>
soek a
compromiHe by a joint
conference of party leaders.
•

.

By late September I913,
Balfour ad:nitted to Bonar
law that the sovereign
would be accused of
partlson meddling if the dissolution
and election schene were
carried
out.
Accordingly, when George Y
sought Balfour's advice
on the Irish imbroglio,
the former Tory leader
supx^orted
the monarch's inclination
to work for a compromise
through
a conference. Balfour
suggested that a basis for compromise lay in granting Home Rule
for Ireland with an
Ulster exclusion. At this
jurxcture, Balfour was anxious
that the tactics of the Ulster
Volunteer Force would find
i^dtators amongst the Irish nationalists,
the suffragettes
and syndicalists.
This general loosening of the
ordinary
ties of social obligation he feared
threatened to break
up ^^ho v/hole fabric of srociety.
According to Winston
Churchill, Balfour was also worried
that the whole Home
Hule controversy was compromising
the crown
•

in the

'Asquith Memorandum "The Irish Situation:
the Constitu''''' Sovereign', September
1913?
OAr.37/116/60.
This IS reproduced in Jenkins. A'-,'ith
'^^^^'.-'^^ Ulstermen'w^^obabxy not be influ.:no&d
inn'"'^
by a iiritlsh election so his
QJirands for an election to end Ulster
resis t^nce 'were
aprjarently motivated by the hope that the
Unionists
coulQ use the isnue to return to power.

&rc^ -

1

Dominions.

Under these circumstances
Balfour thought
that Ulster exclusion was
'the least calamitous
of all
the calamitous policies'
which still remained open

"

to the

Unionists.

Carson's early October
reports that anxieties
over possible business
losses were making many
southern
Unionists reluctant to oppose
Home Rule vigorously probably was an additional factor
in leading Balfour to advocate a compromise on the basis
of Ulster exclusion.^^
The Cherkley Court talks
between Asquith and Bonar
Law resulted from the King's
growing anxiety over Ireland
as well as from Bonar Law's
reluctance to risk encouraging
civil war if the southern Unionist
opposition to Home Rule
was flagging. Bonar Law kept
Balfour fully informed of
the September and October negotiations,
and of the substance of his secret sessions with the
Prime Minister on
October, 6 November and 9 December
1913
After receiving Bonar Law's precis of the first
Cherkley meeting,
Balfour expressed some misgivings that
Asquith might succeed in working out a solution, and thereby
rob the Unionists of an election.
Balfour told the Unionist leader

U

e

that if Asquith offered the exclusion of the four
pre-

dominantly Protestant counties, the Unionists would be
in
80

Balfour to Bonar Law, 23 September 191 3, B. M, Add,
MS 49.693r ff, /^8-63.
Randolph S. Churchill, Winn tor. S.
.cai.yr£iix.U, ilie XQ]m:s ^-±ii:t££jDan» 2^Ql=13.lk
(Bostom
Houghton Mifflin, 1967)9 p, 461.

8

"Bonar Law to Lansdowne, 8 October I913, B, M. Add. MS
ii-9,693. ff. 63-i|j Blake, BmiaL
lOi, p'. I60.
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some difficulty.S^

Balfour and Bonar Law .oth
realized
that any Unionist demands
for a nine county exclusion
was
impossible, and that even
demands for Fermanagh and
Tyrone
tnight be hard to defend,
owing to their large Catholic
populations.

Nevertheless, the former Tory
chief

too],

some

encouragement from reports that
Redmond's opposition to
any form of exclusion would
place Asquith in so delicate
a position that a dissolution
^3
would be
required.

j,^

^.^^

.

same time, Balfour cautioned
Boziar law not to apprise
Asquith of their doubts about a
Unionist victory lest an
^'"^
election occur.
Balfour's attitude at this juncture,
while it displays an astute recognition
of the effect of
Ulster militancy upon the nationalists
of the south, and
of Redmond's difficulties in
considering any form of
partition, represents unwise and dangerous
political calculating in the midst of a grave crisis.
His correspondence

with Bonar Law suggests that he was not
above raising the
Ulster issue as the most convenient way to
force the

Liberals out of office.

Indeed, only three days before

the second Cherkley meeting of 6 November.
Balfour filled
in for Carson at a Unionist demonstration in
Aberdeen.

Instead of delivering a conciliatory speech which might
have eased the path of negotiations, the former Chief82

Balfour to Bonar Law, I7 October 1913, B. M» Add. f/IS
^9p693t f. 93.
'"^^Balfour to Bonar Law. I7 October 1913
B. M. Add. ivlS
^9»<393. f. 98; Balfour to Bonar Law, 13 October 1913.
B. M. Add. U>Z 49.693r f. 77.
^^Balfour to Bonar I^w. 13 October 1913, B. in. Add.
^9,693, f. 77.
»

I^'IS

203

Secretary waved the 'Orange
riag' when he charged
it was
disastrous to conpel the '.ost
orderly, one of the most
industrious, one of the most
able, one of the most loyal
portions Of the United Kingdom
deliberately to organize
itself against the attempted
legislation of the government.
If Ireland could claim
separate treatment from the
United Kingdo.., then Ulstermen
could demand the same from
the rest of Ireland on the
basis of their differing
religion, ideas, aims and ideals.
Returning
'

to the old

argument about illegal means, Balfour
then proclaimed that
unless Home Rule was preceded by
an election or referendum.
The attitude of the Unionist
party will be
that an immoral revolution in the
Constitu''5? c^iT^e^ out by immoral means, and
yna^ a^ter that was carried out
it wac
imrriorally used to force upon
thosp wj -s-h
whom they are in the closest agreement,
vvhose ideals are the same as
their own,
Ireland a forn) of government which the in
Ulsxermen abhor and which Englishmen
Scotsmen would abhor if they were put and
in
the same place. 83

After receiving Bonar Law's report of the
second
Cherkley meeting, in which Asquith said he would

take up

exclusion of the four or six counties with the
Cabinet,

Balfour wrote a revealing letter in reply.

Despite his

public insistence on Ulster's right to separate treatment.

Balfour expressed

hi-:

surprise that Asquith seemed uncon-

cerned about the finances of an "Ulsterlesc" Ireland.

Balfour believed such an exclui>ion would bring financial
8*5

'Ihu.

.Tim.gLS.f

^i-

November 1913.

disaster to the South and Westt
I take Devlin's view,
and were I an Irish
Nationalist, I think. I should
Rule under the terms proposed, refuse Hone
'^ith al?
"^'^^^y ^^^^
money left
ou? of^^nT'-^'in It Dut the xrish s^^nius
for T3arliap;ent^rv
organization I'drno?^
see thc^t they have much
sle^t^rth^v'^''^^"
prospect of plavins
a satisfactory part in the
world's his?o^yf
But I may be quite wrong, ^6

^

At the same time Balfour told
Bonar Law that the Unionist
Party might resent any compromise
over Ulster if skillful
negotiations or the pressure of events
ultimately forced
the government to go to the co^ontry
before
Home Rule

received the royal assent.
On the surface, Balfour's public and
private posi-

tions on Home Rule and Ulster as well as
on the merits of
compromise appears confusing and contradictory.
There are
perhaps two or three possible explanations for
this apparent ambivalence. Firstly, Balfour had always
maintained

that Home Rule was against the true interests
of the South

and West of Ireland as much as against England's and
Ulster 'So

He had often argued that nature obviously

intended Ireland to be joined to England.

To defeat

°"BaIfour to Bonar Law, 8 November 1913» B. IV), Add. IvjS
^•!'9,693» Devlin was a Nationalist member from Belfast
who
adaT?iantly opposed any form of Ulster exclusion.
Despite
his arfreement with Devlin, Balfour was probably influenced
by Jack Sandars report that the rank and file were elad
that Balfour went boldly for an election at Aberdc-.cn'.'
Sandars to Balfour, k November 1913. B. M. Add. i-iS ^^9,763.
'

f. 69,

87

'Balfour to Lord Oranmore, 23 May 1912, B.
Add. MS
^9»862, f. 154; Balfour at Nottingham, Tll£ Times ,
1 February 1913.
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Home Rule for all Ireland was
his major objective.
If.
in fact, Irish political and
economic considerations mde
Home Rule impossible without
Ulster, then the Orange Card
was the one to play. By
insisting on separate treatment
for Ulster, and by raising the
threat of Opposition-backed
Ulster resistance, Balfour hoped
to intimidate the government from proceeding with Home Rule
at all.
This strate,o:y
had been originally conceived by
Lord Randolph Churchill
in 1886 to defeat the first Home
Rule Bill, and Balfour
was obviously familiar with it.
Edward Carson's militant
stance on Ulster was originally conceived
in hopes
of

frustrating Home Rule for all Ireland.

In late I913. then,

Balfour's enthusiasm for Ulster's rights
was a tactical
iQeann

of frustrating the whole Home Rule
policy.

Secondly,

Balfour entertained the hope that a general
election on
Home Rule might lead to a Unionist victory,
which could be
followed by a repudiation of the entire Home Rule
policy,

the Parliament Act, and the social reform legislation
he

deemed conf iscatoj:y

,

He was, therefore, very worried that

Asquith's willingness to compromise at Cherkley might
cancel the possibilities of an election,

Moreover, Balfour

believed that even if the Unionists lost, the mounting
Ulster resistance would force the Liberals to alter their
proposals so drastically that Home Rule would be defeated.
A sustained refusal to accept the 'Home Rule within Home
Rule' or the fixed exclusion suggested by Asquith at

Cherkley would virtually force the government to go to

the country before they
could coerce Ulster.
explained to Bonar Law:

Gen^arElec ti^n

As Balfour

^

I'^^Mn'r'

HS\L-L-?h:^:iI^-

Uls.er in its present mood
under a Dublin parliament. 88can never bP nn+

Besides his general and long
standing opposition to
Home Rule, Balfour was
obviously growing impatient
with
his opposition role and
longed to return to power.
It
would be naive to eliminate
officer huiiger from Balfour's
motivations in any attempt to
explain his attitudes in
late 1913.

Balfour's anjciety over the political
benefits of
comproTnlse are very significant when
considered in relation
to the coUaps^e of the Cherkley
Court talks between Asquith
and Bonaw Law on 9 December I913.
At this third secret
meeting. Bonar Law refused to consider
either Home
Rule

within Home Rule or any fixed exclusion
with a plebescite
to join laterr
8

It is hir;hly probable that Balfour's

November I913 contention that a

liQS^'niiS

stance

would best secure party solidarity and a quick
election
v/as

a factor as importanr. as Lansdowne's objections
to the

sacrifice of loyalists in the South and
stance and the ending cf jhe talks,
88

Balfour to Bonar Law,
^9i693.

8

V.est

in Bonar L-w's

Bonar Law's d-jtailed

November 1913»

M. Add.

i.is
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reports to Balfour on the
negotiations leading to the
Cherkley talks and their
substance indicate that
he was
not indifferent to the
views of the former
party chief.
The announcement of the
collapse of the Cherkley
talks in early 191'. exacerbated
nerves in both the Liberal
and Unionist camps, and drove
the latter to consider
the

highly questionable, if not
unconstitutional, tactic of
crippling the army by amending
or defeating the Army
Annual
Bill. Moreover, the consistent
use of the Ulster issue by
Balfour and other Unionists in
their speeches undoubtedly
added to the resolve of the
Ulster Unionist Council and
the Ulster Volunteers to
continue their preparations for
armed resistance the minute Home
Rule passed.
The very
language which Balfour employed in
his speeches, describing tho government as criminals
conducting an immoral
revolution and the Ulstermen as loyal
and law-abiding citizens, exacerbated rather than
diminished the threat of
civil resistance in Ulster. Balfour
had enough experience
with the Orangemen to realize that language
such as
this

would be interpreted as a justification for
their illegal
activities. To this extent then, Balfour shared
aorae

of

the responsibility for the dangerous turn
of events in the

Home Rule crisis of
By early

igiA'

191if.

it was clear that the 18-month old

Unionist tacticS of forcing an election on Home Rule by

putting pressure on the King and by raising the throat of
ci'dl war in Ulster

hsid

proved fruitless.

After the

collapse Of the Cherkley talks.
Bonar Law and Balfour wore
especially frustrated because
they were convinced that
Asquith was deliberately letting
the Ulster
issue drift.

They feared that the Prime
Minister would succeed in makin
the Unionists appear
unreasonable and bigoted owing to
their refusal to accept a temporary
exclusion of Ulster or
Home Rule within Home Rule,^^
this atmosphere

m

of frus-

tration and panic, the Unionist
leadership considored the
most radical and unprecedented
means of sabotaging
Home

Hule.

The Unionists knew that there was
widespread sympathy for the Ulster resistance among
military officers.
Indeed, from late I913 Carson and
Bonar Law made speeches

which virtually invited the officer corps
to refuse orders
to disarm Ulster militants.
The Unionists concluded
that Home Rule could be smashed by crippling
the government's authority to use the army in crushing
Ulster resistance. Bonar Law proposed, therefore, that the
Unionist
peers amend the Army Annual Bill so as to
absolve from

military discipline those army officers who might be
ordered to crush an Ulster rebellion against Home Rule,
If the amendment failed,

the Lords conceivably could

89-

-Balfcur to Bonar Law, 18 Lcc ember 1913, B.
Add. MS
^9»693» r. I30; Balfour to Bonar Law, 13 Januar>v 1014.
B.
Add.
49,693. f. 138.

m
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Bonar Law did so at Dublin on 28 November I913, iinsor,
Carson used the same tactics in his
:£nsJ.snii, p. 475.
speech rejecting Asquith 's coii^promise offer of 9 iViarch
191'^ 5 H^nsanif lix, 937.

J
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threaten the suspension of
military discipline for
the
entire army corps for two
full years.
The Unionist leade
believed that in either case
Asquith could not coerce
Ulster, and would he forced
to concede a general
election
In late January Bonar Law
discussed this plan with lansdowne. He proved somewhat
reluctant to accept it owing
to his uncertainty that
the Ulster party would
accept the
verdict Of the electorate,
Balfour responded to Bonar
law's plan on 3 February
1914.
While he had reservations
that the proposal might create
dangerous precedents for
future labor members and might
open the Unionists
to

charges of preventing the government
from protecting
Belfast's Roman Catholics from Orange
rioters, he considered the proposal
.e.one of extraordinary interest and
importance,
1 fully realize how much there is to
""-"^ ^
greatly moved by
ILTt
What I gather is Lansdowne's objection.,..
i>ucn limitation of the powers of
the Grown
respect of the theatre of ODerations where in
the forces of th^^ Crown may be allowed
to actiSy I suppose, quite unprecedented.
For this
1 individually care little.
The circumstances
are unprecedented.

His reservations notwithstanding, Balfour
concluded,

need hardly say that whatever course you adopt
all

I

can to support it.'^^

I

'I

shall do

Balfour apparently based his

tentative support for this dangerous plan upon his
con-

viction that by this juncture Ulster resistance was
91

Balfour to Bonar to, 3 February 1914, B. M. Add.
49,693, f» 152-3? Blake, Bonar Law, p, 177.
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genuine, not bluff.

The increasing militancy
of Carson's

speeches, along with the Ulster
Volur.teers' abandonment
Of wooden rifles for modern
weapons in late I913. undoubtedly explain this conviction.
Balfour contended that
something very dramatic was
essential to emphasize this
danger and to force an election.
As he explained in his
opening remarks to Bonar Law.-

^^^^
Soing on in Ulster is
fS^ 1 ! V^^^
absolutely
outside the ordinary framework of
constitutional politics.- and every
le-iti^nate
means must be used to stir their
slug|ish
imaginations, 92
Three weeks later at the Cannon Stre-t
Hotel in

London Balfour attempted to stimulate
the people's sluggish imaginations.
In this major address to an audience
of 1000 Unionists which included Sir
Edward Carson, Lord
GoscheDf Lord Aldenhara and Lord Rothschild,
Balfour

reiterated his previous economic, strategic
and historical
objections to Home Rule.^^ He asserted that his
ministry
had conferred lasting benefits upon the Irish
population
and had left no great unredeemed grievances in Ireland.
The present Irish crisis he attributed to the Liberals'

policy of attempting colossal constitutional changes under
92

Balfour to Bonar Law, 3 February 191^+, B. M. Add. f.lS
^9,693» f. 1^)2. Since the Army Annual Bill v/as not due
for renewal until April, the final recommendation was
referred to a committee of the Shadow Cabinet.
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Balfour at the Cannon St. Hotel,
191^-.

.Thjg.

iim^,

19 February

a transitory and
inocnplete constitution.
He claimed thot
the Ulster i^ilitanoy
and dire threat of
civil war were
the natural products
of this Ho.e Rule
policy and Liberal
".ethcds.
Stressing his belief in law
and order, he
asserted that civil war
carried with it far greater
evils
than the mere destruction
of life and property.
^'^ """^t always carry
with'''f^^^^-"i^*''
with
It, wxdcsr.refid demornl i -/-i-ti ^„
1.
,.
tne shaking.
the Shattering" Of old i(°^^t^ +i
Of things tSat it ?s
far better lhou?d';r'^^
^questioned in any stable socL?y!""
'

Balfour then insisted that,
while he did not abate one
Jot
"
his Unionist principles, and
•though I think Ulster is
right, and though if I were
an Ulsterman I would do as
Ulsternien are doing....' civil
war could only be averted
by the complete abandonment of
Horr>e Rule or by the
complete
exclusion of all Ulster. Ruling
out Hoir.e Rule within Horns
Rule or a temporary separation,
he proclaimed.
The ambition, the ideal, the
.fixed
Ulster IS not to be given the power resolve of
to paralyse a Parliament in Dublin.
Their fixed
determination and their unalterable ideaJ
is
British Parliament on equal terras
with all otner citizens of the United
King-

He concluded by s.dv-ising the governments
they, must r.ake a clean cut, and nothin/^
bux a clean cut will do it.
If they reject
t'lifj advice... they v.'ili f
ind' themselvRs in
xiiG grip of a reiTiorseless
current, and before
xney kncA' where they ar- entan^-led in those
Gtrea-Tis , .they will have drafr^^od
the ship
of state for which they are recsponsible
into
irremediable and hopeless disa.^.te--.
J

.
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While Balfour's abhorance of
civil war was undoubtedly
sincere, his assertion of
Ulster's rightne.s and of
hi a own
inclination to fight if he were
an Ulsterman was v•fir<y
unwise, if not outright
provocative. Parenthetical c oraments of this kind Ulstermen
seized as proof of their
righteousness. More importantly,
the Ulster Volunteers
interpreted them to mean that the
Unionist party leaders
would back to the hilt their plans
for military resistance
and the establishment of a
provisional government.
When on 9 ^larch I9U Asquith
acknowledged the Ulster
difficulty by reluctantly proposing a
six year exclusion

for those counties which chose to
opt out of Home Rule,
Balfour echoed Carson's refusal to consider
a six year
stay of execution. Indeed, only four
days after Asquith's
county option offer, Balfour abandoned his
previous hesitations regarding the proposed amendment to
the Army Annual
Bill, As he explained to I^nsdowne;
The objections to the proposed course are

obvious f but certainly not conclusive, and
in revolutionary times, I suppose revolutionary measures are necessary I confess,
however, that they are rather against the
gram. 94
j

By this .juncture, Balfour

v/as

apparently so mesmer-

ized by his Ulster sympathies and his distrust of
Asquith

and his Cabinet that he had lost all sense of proportion
and statesmanship in responding to the Ulster issue,
9^

Balfour to Lansdowne, 13
^9,?03, f. 269.

i'.larch

191^t B, M, Add.

:.:S
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Certainly there was .erit
in Asquith's argument
that the
six-year exclusion would
offer an opportunity for
the

.

Dublin Parliament to assuage
the Ulstermen's fear of
oppression as well as to provide
the British electorate
with opportunities to register
their views

on Home Rule in

two general elections.

Balfour's knowledge of the
increasingly aminous international
situation^^ should have impelled
him to encourage Carson ejid Bonar
law to explore
the

Asquith offer so as to defuse Ulster
resistance and its
inevitably disastrous consequences
to military

solidarity.

Balfour's rejection of the

9

ferch proposals and his con-

tinued insistence upon a general
election cannot be
described as wise and responsible
statesmanship.
In fact,
brinksmanship is a more appropriate description
of his

policy as the Ulster crisis deepened
in

and April

.Viarch

191^.

Balfour and the Unionists were saved from the
folly
of amending the Army Act and from iirmiediate
criticism of
their rejection of Asquith's offer by the
controversy

surrounding the 'Gurragh Incident' of 20 March
191^.
After
being informed by General Paget that they might be
required
95 avmg to
his membership on the Committee of lmr)0>^ial
Defense Balfour was kept fully informed by Churchill
and
daldane of the growing dangers of a Jiurouean War.
Kenneth
loung writes that Balfour v/as convinced by 2 912 that
a
I'^uropean war would erupt by 191^K
r-irs. Dugdale, Balfour's
niece, recalled that his anxieties over v/ar caused him
to react when he heard a gunshot in the countryside
in
late 1913.
Kenneth roung, Actliiir ilaaas. Balfour (London:
Cr.
.oell, 1963), pp. 3^1-^6; Dugdale, Balfour
II, IO7-8.
,

,

^

to guard government installations
in Ulster against raids
by the Ulster Volunteer Forces,
General Gough and 57
Officers Of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade
at Kildare communicated to General Paget their intention
to resign their

commissions rather than participate in
operations against
Ulster.
Rather than accept any Unionist
responsibility for
this threat of military mutiny which
Carson and Bonar Law
had practically invited, Balfour justified
the actions of
Cough and his officers in the House of
Commons
1

There are times, and there have been times
in
the history of every country when
circumstancep
sometimes over which men >uive no control sometimes circumstances which are the result
of folly, and sometimes the result of
crime, bring about a condition of things in v/hich
ordinary rules and maxims that ought to govern
and must govern civil society, have to be laid
aside and each r^an has get to say to hi^nself
in these new and exceptional circumstances,
what IS my duty to m.y country and to society? '96
^

In attributing the Curragh episode to the
folly of the

Liberals* Irish policy and to a government plan to win

British sympathy by provoking Ulster,

Balfour failed to

acknov/ledge the degree to which extremist' and uncompromising

Unionist oratory and intrigue regarding the Army
96
^

5 H3J3isard,

ix,

Ar.n\^^l

93-^0

97
-^'5

Himssxii, Ix, 133^H1^I03.
Balfour related to one correspondent the Unionist theory that the orders to guard
installations in Ulster were all part of Churchill's
plan 'in one of his Napoleonic moods,. ofor so encircling
Ulster with a military and naval force that it could be,"*
as it v/ere, strangled into submission.
The proposed
movement of troops v/hich has led to all these resignations v/as designed to be the first stage of this ooeratioa,
Balfour to Mr. Leo, Z^- I^Jarch 191^» B. M. Add.
49, 863,

ff. 154.

'
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Act had precipitated and
justified the actions of the
Ulster Volunteer Force. When
his anxiety over the disruptive effects of the Curragh
episode on the military led
Captain Maurice Hanlcey of the
V.ar Office to ask
Balfour to
seek a compromise over Home
Rule in private talks with
Asquith or Haldane. Balfour
searched for an
excuse to

refuse.

Ke ultimately declined the
proposal on the ground

that this might prejudice any
talks which Asquith and
Bonar Law were having.^^ After
the Curragh affair Austen
Chamberlain and some of the federalist
sjTnpathizers of

1910 tried to revive the national councils
scheme in hopes
of averting a further erosion of
army discipline.

Balfour

however, again rejected compromise and
joined Carson,
Bonar Law and Lansdowne in vetoing the
idea.^^

In his

public speeches Balfour maintained his obstinate
refusal
to consider anything but an unconditional
Ulster axclusion
and a general election. "^-^^

When the Larne gun-running by the Ulster Volunteer
Q8-.

^^ante. Isian
Sj^orslS (London. Collins
^nnh'^^ ^°^'?H-^"
Balfour to Bonar Law, 28 Ivlarch 1914.
-fy/o>j pp. 1^2" 3
B.

M. Add.

99 Austen

m

1

49,693, f. 159.

Chamberlain, miiifiS
£ihi:mL£ils.»

iijai3

.tii.s

Ic^iilfis

ISLDon^Slli (London,

pn

Gassell, 1Q?6),
Hereafter cited Chamberlain, Politicq. Champ. 6J7.
berlain asserts that when he was pushing the devolution
Idea
fCay, Balfour was prepared to "cut Nationalist
Ireland wholly adrift and give it full colonial selfgovernment" if Asquith would guarantee full Ulster exclu
sion.
Balfour had registered his preference for such
an arrangement over Home Rule in his I913 Nottingham
speech, but there is no evidence that he pushed strongly
for^this.
The. lim&3., 1 February 1913? Chamberlain,

m

J:eIJlJ:j^,

p.

64i^.

•^"^Balfour at Hyde Park, Tho. Times

,

6 April 191^.

Force on 2^ April
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I9U

justified the. government' s
March

plans to deploy troops to
protect government installations
in Ulster. Balfour virtually
ignored the treasonable
implication of this arms importation.
In replying to

Winston Churchill's assertion of
Unionist responsibility
for the Larne. and to J. Walton's
demand for Balfour's
arrest,

the former Unionist Prime Minister
put his

stamp of approval on the actions of
the gun-runners:
The Right Hon, Gentlemen appear to
hold
view which, so far as I know, has never the
been held by responsible British statesmen
at any rate, not for centuries, that
there
are no circumstances in which it is
justiiiable for a population to resist the government.
They must be most rare. Such circumstances
any reasonable community must be
of a kind which could only occur in tv/o
or
three centuries without shatterin/^ the whole
fabric of society.
But they may occur; they
have occurred, and there has never been any'
question that the coercion of Ulster, in the
sense of compelling Ulster to leave a free
environment under v/hich she is happy, and
put her under a government which she detests,
IS one of those cases.
I hold now, and I held
30 years ago that if Home Rule v/as forced
upon Ulster, Ulster would fight and Ulster
would be right, 102

m

Balfour, cf course, coiweniently forgot that the Unionists'

refusal to compromise back in the fall had precipitated
the situation in which Ulster was faced with an all-Ireland

Home Rule,

Despite Asquith's promise to introduce an amending
a,

102

5 Hanssrjl,

Ixi, 1576,

1539-^+0.

ixi, 173^~5.

2.17

bill following the Curragh and
Larne, Balfour continued to
employ extremist language in
his domandc for a complete
and unlimited Ulster exclusion
and a general election.
In so doing, he completely
disregarded Asquith's difficulties in requesting further
sacrifices from John Redmond
and the Nationalists. Balfour was
ignoring the dilemma

Redmond faced in defending to the
more militant Nationalist
Volunteers any further concessions to
Ulster obstinacy
beyond the six-year exclusion proposed
on March
9.

Bal-

four's insistence on full and unlimited
exclusion is all
the more reprehensible in view
of his earlier appreciation
of Devlin's opposition to any form
of partition.
As late
as 12 June 191^, the former Prime
Minister wrote a memo
opposing any Unionist or peer cooperation in
developing an

amending bill so as to force the government to
take all
the blame for Home Rule„
Balfour went on to suggest

that

if the Unionists accepted an amending bill,
they could not

get an election until the next sunmier, nor could

Home Rule a living issue.

thej'

keep

He also maintained that unless

the Unionists refused to accept all responsibility
for an

amending bill, they could lay themse3.ves open to charges
of betraying their principles and abandoning their
friends
in the South and V/est of Ireland as well as in those areas

Balfour at Coventry, The Tlm^,
May 1914; also see
Memorandum on Ulster exclusion, B, M, Add, MS ^9,863,
f, ISij-j 5 liaiisarji, Ixii, 986-92.
Asquith had eliminated opportunities for suggestions on the bill. Balfour
criticized passing the third reading before the details
of the amending bill were published.
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cf Ulster included in Home

Rulc^O^

.For

Balfour to main-

tain this uncompromising attitude,
and to weigh the options
on the basis of securing an
election and the apprehensions of
the few loyalists in the South seems
almost wreckless in
view of the implications of the
Curragh incident and th(
increasing European tensions. It clearly
illustrates that
loss of a sense of reality and
proportion of which Dangerfield wrote. Although Austen Chamberlain
argued in his
memoirs that this Unionist militancy was
designed to avert
civil war by intimidating the government, Walter
Birrell

reported to the Cabinet in mid-June that the Unionist
leaders' demands for an election were in fact
sustaining
the resolve of the Ulster militants:

They have, of course, been told by the
British members of their coalition that a
General Election which may get rid of this
Home Rule Bill altogether is a likely event,
and until tliis contingency is removed from
the realm of probability it is impossible to
measure the full fighting force of the
Covenanteers . 105
It is clear, then, that Balfour and his Unionist colleagues

helped exacerbate the crisis which the German General

Staff hoped would diminish Britain's ability to aid France
upon the outbreak of World War

I.

Perhaps the best illustration of Balfour's loss of

Balfour's memorandum on the Lords amending the Home
Rule Bill, 12 June 1914, B, 1.:. 49,869, ff. 148-53.
105

Birrel

memorandum on his impression of Ulster, 15 June

1914, CAB37/120/70.

J

Objectivity in the Home Rule
controversy was his response
to the Irish Volunteers'
imitation of the Ulster tactics
When on 26 July 1914 they
landed arms and ammunition
at
Howth. with the resultant
incident at Bachelor's Walk.
Only moments after Balfour
attacked Birrell for not supproting Assistant Police Commissioner
Harrell's attempts
to disarm the Nationalists,
which resulted in three deaths
and serious injuries to 38 Irish
citizens, the former
Unionist chief again proclaimed the
righteousness
of

Ulster's resistance.

Despite all that had occurred in

Ulster over the previous three months,
Balfour attached
full responsibility for the Irish
crisis to Liberal obstinacy and unscrupulousness
I say that ever since 18S6
the third of
Ireland which was the most industrious,
Which nad the greatest industrial future,and
which was nearest akin to the Gentleman who
sit on the other side in blood, in
ooinion religious and political - have never' concealed
tiieir opinions and never concealed
the fact
that so firmly did thoy hold those oninions
that, rather than submit to be placed
under
a i-^arliament in Dublin, rather than submit
to being torn from the United Kingdom, there
v/as no persoml sacrifice to v;hich
they would
not submit.

Even after the outbreak of the

Vvar,

Balfour refused

to acknowledge the need to place Home Rule on the
Statute

book so as to encourage Irish enlistment and avert
the

possibility of a Nationalist rebellion.

Despite the post-

ponement of the enactment of the Home Rule measure promised
"^^^5

Hansacii,

ixv, 1055.

^

by Asquith, Balfour
described the £overr..enf s
decisi on
to carry the bill as
a Tnonstrous iniquity,
fact.
Balfour composed a lengthy
memorandum on ? August in an
attempt to block any action
on Home Rule, on
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the grounds

Of the absence of 90 M. P,

.3

in military service and
of

Carson's cooperation in helping
the war Office with
-^^"^
mobilization,
This discussion of Balfour's
reactions to and thoughts
on the IriGh Question between
I910 and 191^ lead to sone

important conclusions about the man
and the political and
social environment in which he
moved. Firstly. Balfour's
attitude toward the Irish Nationalists
expressed in the
Budget and Parliament Bill debates,
as well as his condescending remarks about the origins
and genuineness of
Irish nationalism illustrates a
continuing and uncompromising Anglo-Saxon disdain for the Irl.nh
people, despite
the great social and economic improvenient
achieved in
Ireland in the two decades before world War

I,

Secondly,

although Unionists in general, and Balfour
in particular
had accused Gladstone and Asquith of
majiipulating
the

Irish Question to secure office in 1866 and
1909-12

respectively, Balfour and his party did not hesitate
to
do the very s?7n& as a means of recapturing
power
The
e

former Tory chief's unwillingnoas to modify the
Unionist
107

Dugdale, PalllQur., II» p, 121? Balfour's memorandum on
Home Rule Crisis, '.var and Ireland. 7 August 191^. B, ivl.
Add. MS /^9,869, ff. 162-7.

principles in the direction of
federalism in 1910 lest
it expose the deep Unionist
divisions on tariff and social
policy clearly illustrates his
sacrifice of Irish interests to British party politics.
Perhaps even more serious
was the former Chief-Secretary
's reluctance to
encourage
Bonar Law to a sincere pursuit for
a compromise with regard
to Ulster in late I913, lest
it rob the Unionists of an
election issue. That Balfour could
retain this position
down to mid- June 19U. despite the
gathering war clouds,
illustrates a loss of perspective and reality
that contrasts markedly with his eax-lier
objectivity on such
issues as the Irish land or educational
questions.
Balfour's consistent heralding of the loyalty
and
progresGiveness of Protestant Ulster indicates
an AngloSaxon provincialism and rigidity that defies
Zebel's

assertion of Balfour's flexibility.

His simultaneous

defense of the Ulster Volunteers and Curragh officers
and

condemnation of the Nationalist Volunteers is yet another
example of inflexibility and hypocrisy. While Balfour's
general values and past involvement in the Irish Question
Kiade

him sympathetic to Ulster Protestant anxieties about

a Dublin parliament^ reason and common sense should have

impelled him to use his great political influence to mollify and arbitrate rather than exacerbate those feelings.
V/hile political and tactical considerations may offer

some explanation for Balfour's raising the Ulster issue iu

1912-14

p

there may we].l have been some unconscious
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psychological factors which drove
this distinsuished
Cecilian to abandon objectivity
and common sense in the
Irish Question during 1912-14.
Virtually every value and
institution Which Balfour had
cherished since early adulthood had been challenged by
the second decade of
the

twentieth century.

The status of the aristocracy,
the

sanctity of private property,
the value of religi.on, and
the boJ.ief in a common European
community devoted to
the

pursuit of peace had all been
severely shaken between
1900 and 1914, When faced with the
disintegration of
cherished beliefs and values, it is
not uncommon for even
the most rational and educated
people to lose perspective
and fall inxo a pattern of rigidity
and simplistic explanations of the root of society's troubles.
That Balfour
my have capitulated to the kind of rigidity and anxiety
described by George Dangerf ield, by Walter
Houghton and
by Samuel Hynes ;ls a distinct possibility.
Moreover, in
1911 Balfour was driven from his almost hereditary
position as )iead of the Unionist Party as a result
of the

combined challenges which the Liberals, the
Irish. Labor
and tiie people mounted against the old order
from I909 to
1911.

Balfour's speeches over the Budget and the Parliament Bill show that he attributed these attacks
on
the

establishment not to real and deeply felt grievances,
but
to the combined manipulation and artifice of
Irish and

Liberal conspirators.

It is possible that his uncomprom-

ising attitude on the maintenance of the Union in 1912-14

owed more to an unconscious but
strongly felt need to
avenge the loss of his party leadership
than to the strategic, historical and academic
arguments he raised against
Home Rule. To sabotage Hom.e Rule
and drive these arch
conspirators out of office seems to be
an important governing factor behind the former Tory
chiefs attempts to

inflate royal perogative and his
manipulation of Ulster
provincialism.
The tragedy is that whatever the motives
of Balfour

and the Uniohists between 1912-14. their use

oi'

the Ulster

issue provided enough time and justification
for the Ulster

Volunteer Force to arm and entrench itself so that
Home
Rule was frustrated for all Ireland by the threat
of civil

war.

Had even a temporary exclusion been accepted in I913,

it is possible that the common sacrifices that both
sides

made in the Great

V.'ar

might have obliterated the provin-

cialism that existed in both Belfast and the South.
Curragh Incident

»

The

the Larne gun-running and the Bachelor's

Walk IrilDings, as well as the postponement of even truncated Home Rule, destroyed the possibility for a united
and nonsectarian Ireland.

In the long run, Balfour and

the Unionists did not prevent civil war, for the issue of

Ireland's ns.tional integrity led to a bloody civil war in
the 1920

's

and is currently being fought on the streets

of Belfast and Londonderry.
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The Rising and Its
Aftermath

Britain's entry into the Great
War put the Home Kule
crisis on ice.
The mutual accusations
and recriminations
that had Characterized
parliamentary debates over the
previous t.vo years were replaced
by promises of full cooperation and consultation during
the Allied war emergency.
Reassured by Asquith's promises
of an Amending Bill for
Ulster exclusion and of the
postponed implementation of
Home Rule until the war's
termination, the Unionist peers
allowed the Home Rule Bill to
complete its parliamentary
sojourn..
It was placed on the Statute
Book in September
For the next two years, the larger
1914.
war pressures,
along with John Redmond's efforts to
prove Ireland's
loyalty by encouraging enlistment,
led to a gradual withering of Unionist anxiety over the
Irish Question. Balfour
was no exception to this tendency.
His papers contain
very few references to Ireland from
the opening of the war
until the Easter Rebellion of ?Ji April I916.

Even those officials intimately connected
with
Ireland enjoyed a respite from the tensions

and anxieties

which

tJie

Home Rule Crisis of 1912-4 had nurtured.

-

Irish

enlistments gave no cause for complaint up until I915,
and
the police reports attested the peaceful and
prosperous

condition of the country.

P'armers wore reaping great
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profits from the escalating
prices that food scarcity
brought. The industrial
segment of the Irish economy,
especially shipbuilding and
linen in the North, enjoyed
the benefits of high wages
and low unemplojnnent. ^
While
the Irish government noted
a decline in recruitment
in
1915, and more frequent Volunteer
parades, there was very
little evidence to suggest that
a rebellion was imminent.
Only a few days before the
rising, Ifethew Nathan, the UnderSecretary in Dublin Castle, pronounced
the country quiet
and safe. Even the leader of the
Irish Volunteers, Owen
MacNeill insisted in Feoruary I916
that the country was
not ripe for rebellion.
The military officials in Ireland
Showed some anxiety by early 1916 about
the activities of
the Irish Volunteers, but were unable
to impress Birrell,
Nathan or Wimborne, the Lord Lieutenant,
of the danger of
a rising.

Yet behind the scenes ominous developments
were

unfolding^

Since 1912 the Irish Republican Brotherhood

.

had gradually been gaining a more militant
posture and they

accomplished a slow but steady infiltration of the Irish
I'olunteer Movement by

The details of the gradual

subversion of the authority of Owen

IvlacNeill

by Patrick

Pearse's militant republicans need not detain us.^

Suffice

^Lyons, Ireland Sijic£ ±hii
pp. 359-60,
^Leon O^Brion, Uiil2lin Castls and ±h£ Risliii-, rev. ed.
U-^ondont Sidg-v/ick and Jackson, 1970).
Chapters One and
Tv/o,
Roy Jenkins asserts that Birrell was warned about
a risingt but chose to ignore these warnings. A squit h,

P«
-^Lyons.
,

e

IrjslaM

^.Ixisji.

JiM iimlnsi, pp. 329-5S.

226
to say that the Easter
RebeUion, commencing with
the
daring seizure of the
General Post Office and
the subsequent six days of ^xreex
street fighting
ficrh+i^o. and
^ v
.
y
bombardment, was to
shake England and its leader*?
xeaaers n-p
of +>,^-;
their complacency and
indifference to
CO Irish
irish a-r-poi,^-,
affairs. Balfour, in the
Coalition
Government as First Lord
j-u yi
of the
cne Adrri
r--.!
Aamiralty,
v/as once more
brought into the vortex of
the Irish Question.
-d

Until the Irish Republican
Army surrendered on
30 April, Balfour like other Cabinet
members received only
fragmentary reports on the Dublin
revolt.
Nevertheless,
his past Irish experience
as well as his position
as a
leading Unionist in the Coalition
virtually insured that
he would be advised and
consulted on the Easter Rebellion
by all Bides of the political
spectrui., from Unionists to
Nationalists. Trinity Provost,
Archbishop John Bernard,
who offered the college's facilities
to General

IWell's

troops during Easter week, wrote
Balfour expressing his
am:iety that the rebels would be let
off lightly. Although
five days earlier the Cabinet had
instructed
Ma:>:;vell

to

commute any capital sentences on women
and to conclude
speedily ijhe executions .^^ Balfour showed
no inclination
toward leniency in his 10 Ivlay reply to
Bernard*
Tlie degree of severity, or
clemency which ou.-ht
to be shown in cases of rebellion such as
that
which has recently disgraced Dublin, is difficult to determine? but I do not think you need
fear that the present Government have the least

^^CAB3?/147/13, 5 May I9I6.
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idea of relaxing the sentences
as fin-llv
penai?res^UT>on
Which he
which
h^' tT""^^
has resolved have been or
v;ill be
fully carried out. whether it be
the
death
sentence as in the case of those
who
have
already been executed, or penal
servitude as
in the case of the others.

Speculating on the probable causes
of the outbreak. Balfour
suggested that "...mixed up with the
forces of disorder
Which indulge in purely Separatist
ideals,
there is a good

deal of Syndicalism at work among
the Dublin

rnob."-^

There

is no evidence that Balfour was
familiar with James Connelly

and his advocacy of socialism, but,
like many of his class,
ever since I900, he was inclined to suspect
the hand of
syndicalists and anarchists in any manifestations
of popular discontent.

During

tlie

next six weeks v.tdle the Government

v/as

desperately wrestling with numerous alternatives
for an
Irish policy, Balfour's hardline view was
gradually

modi-

fied as more information on the rebellion and its
impact

filtered into Whitehall,

After his six-day inspection

tour of Dublin and Belfast. Asquith told the Cabinet that
some concession on the lines of the 191^4 Home Rule Act was

essential to meet partially the government's pressing man-

power needs through Irish recruitment.

Voluntary recruits

from the Nationalist areas could not be expected othenvise,^
5

-^Balfour to Archbishop John Bernard, 10
Add, MS ^19,86^, f. 275.

Asquith 's memorandum on Ireland, 21

Llixy

r.lay

1916, B. M.

1916, CAB37/1^^8/l8.
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Moreover, Ulster Protestants
would no longer flocl: to
the
colors for fear of a
Nationalist invasion of the
province.
Indeed, by late summer, most
Northern Unionists wanted
conscription as the price for
accepting Lloyd George's
Heads of Proposals.^ Balfour
could not be indifferent to
the manpower arguments used
by Asquith and Lloyd George.
In 1915, the former Tory
chief had drafted a Cabinet
paper
outlining his ideas for the most
efficient use of manpower
during the war crisis. }le had long
been concerned with
questions of manpower efficiency in
the military and industry.

Secondly, Horace Plunkett appeared
to favor concession When he told Balfour that the
rebellion was more
against the failures of the Irish Parliamentary
Party than
it was an anti-British one. According
to the energetic

founder of the Irish cocpDrative movement,
the Sinn Feiners
were motivated by 'an old love of Ireland
with a new
desire

and belief in the opportunity to serve her.

'

The First

Lord of the Admiralty undoubtedly attached more
importance
to Plunkett

's

contention that American public opinion was

badly affected against Britain by the recent rebellion.^
Indeed, the effect of the rising and its suppression
on
7

Hugh de F. Montgomery to William Coote, M. P.,
5 September
I916, Dod/627A29/58; Montgomery to Mary Folliott,
2 August
1916, Dod/627A29/51, Montgomery Papers, P. R. 0. N. I.

Plunkett to Balfour, 22 Lay I916, B. M. Add.
f.

100, f. 106.

I^IS

^9.792.
'

American opinion was a .ey
factor in.radually
.oderatin^
Balfour's position. By
June Balfour threw all
Ms wei,.^
behind the Ho.e Hule
proposals eventually worked
out by
i^loyd George.^
Very early in his career
Balfour recognized
how the Irish Question
hindered cordial Anglo-A.erican
relations,
hopes of neutralizing
Irish-A.erican hostility, Balfour took time
from his busy schedule as
ChiefSecretary to write an article

m

for the

M

A.^^

r^^,

explaining the provisions of
his prospective I890 land
bill.^*^ Shortly after the
Anglo-American dispute

over
Yenezcla. Balfour said he
recognized that ^.. large numbers
Of the most loyal citizens
of America are either not
of
British descent, or if of British
descent, come from that
part of Ireland which has never
loved England.
Having
been so sensitive to the Irish
factor in Anglo-American
relations in peace time, the disaffection
of American
public opinion following the rebellion
was bound to have a
profound impact upon the taciturn Cecilian.
By early June
1915 Britain's financial and supply difficulties
had

^

-Siilan (London:
Routledge Keegan and
^Paul'
i-aul, 1068^''^'
196a
p. 397.
Hereafter cited Lyons, DJLUjQn.

Balfour to William Henry Rideing. AutograTDh
File, Houghicii Licrary, Jiarvard University;
Curtis,

C^xciiii, p. 353,

-^^Balfour to Henry White, cited in Alan Ward,
Ir^lsnd and

MaSL:M^rXQ^jl.R^2^,

.ISo.9-1922

(LondoArnriidenfield

and lycolson, I969;. p. 261, Hereafter cited
Anri^Ml^Qm^ :^^lsLn.Qn.^', Denis Judd. BxUsmr snil Ihe~Ward,
British
£ mpA r £ (London: iViacmillan, I968
pp. 312-13.
.

) ,
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convinced Balfour that an Allied
victory over the Central
Powers depended upon drawing
the United States to
their
support. Eustace Perry's
report that the Irish
Catholic
clergy were preaching 'no
friendship with England the
Tyrant nor with France the
Apostate' was only a prelude
to
the disastrous effects of
the rebellion on American
attitudes to Britain.
While the Irish Inspector General,
Sir Neville Chamberlain, reported growing syiapathy
for the rebels among the
Dublin and Leinster population,
more ominous for Balfour
were the Cabinet-circulated despatches
from the British
Ambassador in Washington, Sir Cecil Spring
Rice.
On 26 May
Spring Rice cabled that ',..the executions
in Ireland have
very greatly added to the bitterness
of the Irish voters
here, and any steps taken against Britisn
action will be
hailed with enthusiasme
Three days later Sir Edward
Grey, the Foreign Secretary, circulated
another message
that further executions would stimulate a
dangerous German-

Irish-American alliance.

Such an alliance might conceiv-

ably produce an anti-British government in the
approaching
Presidential election, or at the very least, hinder
chances
of a favorable United States policy to Britain.
12

Kustace Perry to Balfour,
ff.

Ivis

6

After

June 1915, B, M. Add.

52-6.

^^CAB37/i47/38.
14

Arthur Link, wUsjon, Campai^ lor I^rQ&xi^Sislylmii aM
P^^a^Lfe (rrinceton: Princeton University
Press, I965},
p.

14.

t

2.31

Grey emphasized to his ministerial
colleagues the necessity
of publicizing the British
government's version of the
rebellion to the American people.
Balfour wrote the Foreign
Secretary:
was painfully impressed by the
views expressed
^loyd George and yourselFon
^r^i^Sthe effects which the Irish
rebellion has had
upon Araerican public opinion esDecially r^tnapproach of a Presidential
^.^^-^^
efeolr^f
election... sv/aying f rom ^side to side
in the most
disconcerting fashion. 15
I

.

^

Balfour was undoubtedly concerned by Spring
Rice's
mid- June report that the government's
propaganda

had done

nothing to sway Americans toward Britain,

Tht-:

futility of

such efforts was explained succinctly by
the British Ambassador:
The fact that there was a re^-olt in Dublin
that an encounter took place betv/een Irish
revolutionaries and British troops, that
leaders were taken and executed by a British
court-martial - this is sufficient to o>-v.',v
the vast majority of the Irish here in ar/'
attitude of determined hostilitv to ev^pv^ything English.

Even more dangerous and significant were Sprinrc dice's
reports that influential people with close coni^ections to

British aristocratic circles, such as Bourke Cockran and
Mrs. y^hitelaw Reid, wife of the former "United States Ambas-

sador to the Court of St. James, were making speeches and

inspiring articles sympathetic to the rebels.

Spring Rice

further alleged that Catholic educational establishments
^^Link,

'ililzim*

pp. 14-3.
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were becoming hotbeds of
anti-British agitation, and
he
posited that: 'There can be
no doubt that the
confessional
IS also used for the
purpose.'
conclusion the British
Ambassador urged that Sir Roger
Casement's execution

m

be

deferred since the American
people tool, a dim view of
political executions. 1^ Non-Irish
Americans, he warned, would
not favor executions carried
out two months after the
successful suppression of the
rebellion.^''

On 12 June Lloyd George, who
had been appointed on
26 May by Asquith to negotiate a
settlement agreeable to

John Redmond and Edward Carson,
published the results of
his deliberations.
The Lloyd George scheme called
for the
immediate implementation of the

Home Rule Act, except

in the six counties of Antrim.
Armagh, Down, Fermanagh,

Londonderry and Tyrone.

In these areas, a Secretary of

State responsible to tho British cabinet
would exercise
governmental authority. Irish representation
at Westminster would be retained. These arrangements
would
re,(nain

in forca for one year following the war's
termination,

provided that Parliament had made no other
arrangements by
that juncture.
The whole Irish Question would be referred

ll-l-^^I^^^

^'i^iP^i^is-l

Conference for a final solution.

i>pring Rice xo Grey, 12 June 1916, CAB
37/1 49/3 3.

^^Spring Rico to Grey, 30 fey I9I6, cited in Stei^han Gv/ynn,
ed,,
and. £j:leri^sJiij2a
Qes^il Smdns: Rice (Boston:
Houghton mfflm, I92.9), ii, 335. Hereafter cited Gwynn,
ahese proposals are described in detail in Lyons, Dilij^n,
pp. 485-6.
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While the Unionist members
of the coalition, most
especially Walter Long/?
created tremendous dimculties
for Lloyd George during
the negotiations and
after their
results were published.
Balfour was not a part of
the

Unionist cabal that sought to
undermine the proposed settlement.
Balfour -s refusal to join in
the sabotaging
activities Of Long, Lansdowne
and F. E. Smith^O derived
from the importance which he
attached to American good will,
and hopefully, to an alliance
which might insure Britain's
military and financial survival.
Spring Rice's despatches
to Grey continued to reinforce
the seriousness
of the

American position.

The British Ambassador even
reco^nended

that the government adopt a lenient
attitude toward the
distribution of American funds to those
injured or displaced by the revolt. As for Home
Rule. Spring Rice told
Grey
J

If we are able in some measure to
settle the
Kule question at once, the announcement
will have a beneficial effect here,
althou,-h
cl^.npt think that anything we could
do would
conciliate the Irish here. They have blood
oheir eyes when they look our way. All
the
same the moderates, who have joined' the
extremists would leave them again if they could
find
a reasonable excuse for so doing.
Ivlany of our
bitterest enemies do not wish to take the side
with the destroyers of Belgium. At the same
tirae we must remember that our cause
for the
present among the Irish here is a lost one.^l
Korne

'

m

'

19

''Lyons, Pillcu,

pp. 39^.

20
liLLd.,

p.

396.

RiS?"iif 338?

"'^

"^"^^

''^^''^

^Prj.n.s

In addition to this
conciliatory advice from America,
Balfour received a lengthy
letter from George Russell,
the
poet known as A. E. Ru,,ell
asked the former Unionist
leader to exert his influence
in both the Cabinet and
Unionist party to secure colonial
self-government for
Ireland.
The poet believed Balfour
could convince the
Ulstermen to propose such a solution,

thereby saving

Nationalists and English Unionists
loss of face.
Russell
held that colonial self ^-government
would have the advantage
of preserving Irish unity.
It would also secure Irish
ports during the war.
The Irish, he believed, would
accept
membership in the Empire in return for
guarantees of Irish
unity.
The mystic poet urged an immediate
concession
as

the only means of checking Redmond's
declining popularity

and thereby saving constitutionalism.

Russell believed

the majority of the Irish would accept
colonial self-

government with relief.
democrats, the poet said

As to the objections of ultraI

.their voices would not be lis'tened to.
an ultra-democrat myself and I sacrifice a good many ideals in making this
suggestion and postpone them fortjie nillinniui.1,
Irish nationalists would accept with
gratitude any measure which Ulster would
accept and which would include Ulster. The
fact that the scheme was an Ulster scheme,
proposed by Ulstermen would go far to make
Ulster predominant in a self-governing Ireland.
They would have the prestige of finding a solution which the Nationalists could
not find,^^
..

I^ain

George Russell to Balfour,
49,865, ff. 3-/f.

1

June I916, B. M. Add.

iV^
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While no record of Balfour's
reply exists in his papers,
his later statements in
support of the Lloyd George
scheme
suggest that he was influenced
Dy Russell's contention
that Ireland could accept active
and loyal membership in
the Empire.
On the other hand. Balfour
was not receptive
to A.E.'s warnings about
partition.
Meanwhile the pens of the militant
Unionists were
not idle.
In early June when Lloyd George
was deep in
negotiations with Carson and Redmond,
the Southern Unionists mounted a most effective propaganda
campaign against
the Heads of Proposals, and Lloyd George
reported to Dillon
that they were 'moving heaven and other
places to thwart
a settlement. '^^ Using a barrage of letters,
inspired
newspaper articles and a series of deputations,
the Southern
Unionists attacked the Lloyd George scheme as a
betrayal
of the party truce promised in August,
191^^.

They accused

the government of exaggerating the importance of
the Ameri-

can argument, and maintained that the Minister of
Munitions
had misled them into thinking all the Cabinet favored
immediate Home Rule.

These Southern loyalists held that

an iinmediate grant of Home Rule would be interpreted as
a

concession to rebellion, and would do nothing to bolster
Redmond 's^eclining popularity.

"'

The intensity and vigor

'"3Lloyd George to Dillon, 12 June I916, cited in Lyons,
£ii.lQn» p. 39^.
Oh
Patrick Buckland, irisJi Unipniaii] It Ths. Anrlo-lrigh aDi

ihe

2MS iQ .1522 (Dublin: Gill and I^aclvfillan,
Hereafter cited Buckland, Irlsii Unix^ai^ni.

Ir_eJ.ii.n(i»

19?2;, p. 73.

Of this Southern
Unionist offensive was
effective in

getting long and Lansdowna
to be their advocates
at the
Cabinet level, even though
Long, in particular,
had not
oeen especially hostile
to the idea of
negotiations in
early June. 5 i„ ,,3
^^^^.^^^^
^^^^^
Government Board, Long was
the focal point of this
Southern
Unionist campaign. Closely
linlced to Ireland through
his
mother's family. Long had
been intimately associated
with
militant Southern Unionism
ever since he replaced George
Wj-ndham as Irish Chief
-Secretary in I905.

Once convinced

Of strong Southern and
Western Unionist opposition
to
immediate Home Hule. Long told
Balfour and

Lloyd George

that he could not support the
scheme.

Long wrote a bitter

and lengthy letter to Balfour
repeating the general arguments of the Southern Unionists.
He seemed to resent
especially Lloyd George's use of the
American
argumenx.^'^

Long's resentment probably derived
from Sydney Broo::'s
m.essage that he was '...absolutely
positive the Irish
Americans and the German Americans would
not obtain an arms
embargo...,' and that the Americans
would '...never sacri^^^^^^ policies. '2?

!^!-!!!!!f
Biicitiimd,

1 1

27

•

.1.0

(

concluded

Irish .ilaiaaiam, p. 73.
\j »

Long to Asquith,

8 June I916. cited in Link, Wilson,
estimate of American opinion was based
on his presence
the United States for the previous
^
SIX months,

p.

i.;>.

iiroolc s

m

'

by telling Balfour that
Ireland needed a good dose
of
resolute government. Balfour
was not the only recipient
Of Long's protests.
Lloyd George reported to

John Dillon
that Long had told the
Ulstermen that they were
induced
to accept the Home Rule
scheme under the false
pretense
of the war emergency and
American opinion.

Balfour received protests from
other representatives
Of Southern Unionism.
Lord Midleton, who was
encouraging
Long and Lansdowne in their
efforts to thwart a settlement,
warned Balfour of the dangers of
confiding governmental
powers in the hands of the weakened
Redmondites .^^ Arthur
Slliot of the Irish Unionist Alliance
sent Balfour a copy
of an address allegedly representing
^00,000 loyal people
who begged cancellation of any Homo
Rule scheme.
The

address criticized the proposed partition
as contrary to
Unionist and Nationalist wishes. -^^ Long's
efforts to discredit the American argument apparently made
little impression on Balfcur, for on 20 June Lloyd George
wrote Dillon
that AJB would stand by Asquith and himself as
long as

Carson stuck to his side of the bargain and
brought Ulster
along,
^^LyonSf DjXUa, p. 396.
29Midleton to Balfour,
June I916, B. M. Add.
^+9,7?1^''^a^^^owell, ^iia ixl2h CxmireixiiQn (London!
S'^'^Si''!®
Rcutledge, Keegan and Paul. 1970), p. 56. Hereafter
cited I/.acDowell, T]i£ IrXsih jSiiiii^siiJu^a.
30Arthur Elliot to Balfour, 15 July I916, B, hU Add. IfS
^9,865, ff. 16-20.

m

^••Lyons, Dillfin, p.

396.

238

Austen Cha.berlain joined
Long in trying to
convince
Balfour that Uoyd George
had gone too rar in
negotiating
a Hce Rule scheme.
Lord Unsdowne submitted
a lengthy
Cabinet niemorandum arguing
that Home Rule was futile
because it would not satisfy
the rebels.
He

thought that
Redmond's position was too
weak to carry partition.
Similar to Long, the Kerry
landlord contended that the
American
complication had been exaggerated,
and that the only result
to be gained from Home Rule
would be further disloyalty. 33

Ions submitted a Cabinet meraor.^dum
virtually echoing
I^nsdowne's objections.
The Irish Attorney-General,
James Campbell, having regained
his Unionist convictions
after a brief flirtation with
concession during Asquith's
visit. 3i sent Balfour a copy of
his Cabinet memorandum in
which he attacked the partition
arrangements as an administrative nightmare. He insisted that
partition had been
reluctantly agreed to in the North.
Campbell then identified a.s the scheme's major wealcnass
the Ulster Unionist
belief that the partition would be
irrevocable, and the
^'Nationalist belief that it would be
ten.porary.

'^rS^w^Sf ""Sr^oi?

Balfour, 22 June 1916. E. M. Add.
r-'ieraorandum

^"^Sbt^/SoA

on Ireland, 21 June I9I6,

Long Cabinet Memorandum on Ireland, 23 June
1916,

^%uckland, Irish

iJaioaisia,

p.

6^f.

,
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The Attorney-General predicted
that one side or the other
v;ould be driven to further
agitation when this ambiguity
Of the duration of partition was
removed.

Campbell charged

that John Dillon's 11 May speech in the
House of

Coiranons

and Bishop O'Dwyer's characterization of
the rebels as
heroes and martyrs had increased the Irish
people's sym-

pathy for Sinn Fein.

Campbell told Balfour that to proceed

with the Lloyd George scheme would convince the Irish
that
rebellion pays,-^^
Despite the vigorous opposition of Selborne, Long and
Lansdovme-^^ and these various Unionist protests, Balfour

threw his weight behind the Lloyd George plan during the

critical v/eek of 21 June I916.

Preparatory to the Cabinet

meetings of 2k, 27, 28 Jime, the former Unionist chief
drafted a lengthy paper refuting the catalogue of objections enunciated by Long, Lansdownc, Campbell and Austen

Chamberlain in their memoranda,-^

Balfour began by aclmow-

ledging the impossibility of a complete reversal on Home
Rule.

He favored an immediate implementation of 'the Lloyd

George proposal because it gave the six counties exclusion

by mutual consent.

He doubted whether equally favorable

-^^Jaroes Campbell to Balfour, 19
r.S ^'-9pB65, ifo 31-8;
see also

June 1916, B„ M. Add.

CAB37/I50A.

P. O'Connor to Dillon, 21 June I916, cited in Lyons
Dillon, p. 39?.

^"^T,
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Balfour's Cabinet Ivlemorandum on Irish Situation,
1916, CAB37/150/I7.

2^1

June

2.1^0

terms could be secured if
the settlement were
delayed
until peace was declared.
Balfour emphasized especially
his belief that the present
scheme offered the best opportunity to avoid civil war and
bloodshed.
^hat rather than submit
right.
But I hfve never
di^rui^Pd-^r^'^
disguised from myself that this
measure would be so permanently extreme
damaging to
the orderly constitution of a
civilifed
country that the least of the eviJs
^hich
It would entail would be the
sacrifice of
life and property, by which alone
its obiects
could be accomplished. Very stron-,
therefore, must be the arguments which
Sould'
induce roe to run the hazard of civil
when we have offered us voluntarily war.
all that
successful civil war could give.

Having seen the Ulstermen and many English
Unionists on
the brink of civil war in 1914, Balfour
apparently believed
these circumstances might recur again.
After witnessing
the further disintegration of his class
and societal values

under the war pressures, the aristocratic Cecilian
was not
prepared to risk further erosion by engaging in the
brinkmanship that had characterized his actions in 1913-1/^,
In reply to some of the specific objections
raised in the

Cabinet, the First Lord of the Admiralty confessed that,

while conditions in Ireland might indeed be bad, he
doubted
that the Irinh representatives v/hen established in Dublin
...are going to eat all their own words, or are
likely to adopt the suicidal policy of taking
Germany's part against the iimpire.
I call it
suicidal because it was certain to fail and
because in its failure it will drag dov/n the
whole policy of Home Rule with it. ^9

39Balfour's Gc'binet Memorandum on Irish Situation,
1916, CAB37/150/17.

2i4-

June

2^1

Balfour reminded his colleagues
that the government's
present military strength and
control of police provided
a far better position to
deal with potential
difficulties
than would be possible in
peace time. Arguing that
delay
would only increase the
potential for serious intervention
by the Central powers, Balfour
saidi

At the present moment no hostile
Dreparationhave been made which could be
of the^least use
00 our enemies except the
introduction of
'^^^^""^ ""^^ ^^"^
submarine stations:
?hli
there are no aerodromes; through
and military we can retain controlthe oolice
of' all mecui-communication.
If the Home Rule larliament is
ever likely to
be a military danger, it is after
years of
quiet preparation have put it in a
position
to Threaten our ocean trade.
^

Since continued disorders were to be
expected during the
war, Balfour preferred to charge a Home
Rule government
with their suppression. Unlike his colleagues,
Balfour
did not believe a Home Rule administration
would tolerate
disorder:
If in the very first months of a Dublin
parliament Irishmen of the South and the
West prove conclusively to th3 world that
they are as incapable as i^iexicans of carrying out the elementary duties of a civilized
state, and prove conclusively to the Empire
that they are an Imperial danger, Home Rule
will perish p never to be revived. Personally,
I do not think that there is the least
chance of the Irish representatives deliberately making themselves willing instruments
in the hands of our enemies, and this particular danger may, I think be ignored.

Moreover, Balfour argued that the Nationalists' hope of

ultimately wooing Ulster depended upon their controlling

Sinn Fein and preventing the republicans from seeking

further German aid.

Balfour was certain that John
Redmond
and his followers were astute
enough to realize
this.

Balfour urged his colleagues
not to reject this 'unique
opportunity for settling peacefully
and permanently the
problem of Ulster.
Balfour's memorandum suggests that
the war had
altered his political priorities
and his view of the Irish
Parliamentary Party, He clearly recognized
that extremist
support would increase if the constitutional
nationalists
did not secure Home Rule, An immediate
concession was the
only way to prevent further Nationalist
defections to Sinn
Fein republicanism. Indeed, after the
initial shock
of

the rebellion faded, Balfour, like a few
Southern Unionists, began to support Home Rule as
infinitely more toler-

able than any system the Sinn Feiners might
set

up./''""-

Second^.y, Balfour's memorandum shows that he
was not dis-

posed to risk American and dominion cooperation by
capitu-

lating to the clamour of the militant Southern Unionists
as automatically as

hv2

had done in 1910 and during 1913-4.

On the other ha.nd, the memorandum clearly illustrates
that

in 1916 as in 1914, Balfour was determined to secure an

Ulster exclusion.

This is explicitly shown in the strong

emphasis he placed on Redmond's and Carson's agreement
40

Balfour's Cabinet Memorandum on Irirsh Situation,
1916, CAB37/150/17.
Buckland, Irish ilrumlsiUi Chapter Four,

2i|

June

that exclusion of the six
counties would be an essential
component of the settlement.
Despite the Nationalist
belief that partition would be
temporary, Balfour undoubtedly hoped that its very
enactment would provide a validity
difficult to challenge after the
war. At this point.
Balfour was ignorant of the
discrepancies in the period
Of exclusion promised to Carson
and Redmond by Lloyd George.
Balfour obviously had changed his
opinion of John Redmond^
and the Irish Parliamentary Party,
Redmond was now portrayed as a practical and sensible
man, rather than the
corrupt blackmailer of English Liberal
politicians.
Undoubt
edly Redmond's recruitment activities
helped to mitigate
Balfour's former hostility. The former
Unionist chief
astutely observed that the goal of a u.nited
Ireland depended
on Redmond's fighting religious intolerance
and disloyalty
to England as energetically as he had
fought the Castle
system.

In fact, the Irish leader proclaimed this
when

speaking in support of the Lloyd George proposals/''-^
The Cabinet finally considered the Irish
proposals

on 27 and 28 June,

In two days of stormy debate, Balfour,

like Austen Chamberlain, Curzon, and Bonar Law,
did not

waiver in the face of threatened resignations from Long
and Lansdowne.

According to Lloyd George, Balfour fought

In fact, Balfour was not consulted at all by Lloyd George
during the negotiations that preceded the publication
of the proposals,
Balfour to Salisbury, 1^;- June 1916.
B. M. Add. r.:s 49,753, f, 309,
^^Inish IM^-QSMriXit, 24 June I9I6.

for the settlement '...as
if he had been a iio.e
Ruler all
his life.'
Asquith. Who believed Balfour
was responsible
for the failure of the Buckinghara
Palace Conference,
reported to the King that;
Mr. Balfour delivered the
most effective
pronouncement in this prolonged conclave.

Unionist, he disassociated
-^'^^ "^^^ position taken up
Lni^ ^^^^r^^
by i.ord
x^ansdowne and iv.r. Vvalter Lons;.
Ke
"^^^ proposed arrangement^^ould
~r]v^h-:^ regarded as a 'concession
to
SfSfiT^^
"^^^ contrary, in his view,
T?^J-nif'>^'
It might be far more fairly
represented as
triumph,- the exclusion of the
then the
dplnd^nr+S''''n^^^^^^^"S
demand of the Unionist members at maximum
the
ingnam i-alace Conference. He pointed Buckwith unanswerable force the absurdity out
of the
contention (already refuted by Sir J.
ilaxwell)
tha t the estaoiishment
of a Hom.e Rule
Parliament would seriously embarrass our
acTion in the War. Sir J. I^axwell had
already
declared tnat with one Division we could
hold
in check or repress any possible
rebellious
rising, i-ir. Balfour laid stress on the
importance of not alienatin-^^ the American
opinion at this juncture, and declared"'^
himself a whole-hearted supported of the
policy of Sir S. Carson.

hLlJt

'''^'^

r

.

.

.

Balfour's written and vocal support for an

irranediate

settlement was undoubtedly helpful in reinforcing
Asquith 's
pleas against the threatened resignations. The
views of

the former Chief -Secretary probably persuaded
Bonar I^w

and Robert Cecil to abandon their staunch opposition,
and
to sit on the Cabinet sub-committee established to

Lyons, DiJj^Qn, p. 399.
•'4

5

-^Asquith to the Kingf

2? June I9I6, CAB37/150/23.

.

:
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investigate possible alterations
in the scheme.
Despite continuing protests
from Southern Unionists^'^
and reports of English rank
and file reluctance,
^^^^^^^
urged the party regulars at
the 7 July meeting to
accept
the Cabinet plan as a wartime
necessity.^^ However, the
Southern Unionist propaganda
campaign was so effective that
the seige mentality in Ireland
was paralleled
in the cor-

ridors of the Carlton Club.

According to W, a. S, Hewins

The speeches of the Ministers
justified the
Hardinge heport.
They were just old stuff
ana showed no knowledge or
appreciation of
the situation in Ireland or
anywhere eLe.
present
llfl
sta.te rr\'^^^
of Ireland, no analysis of
rein movement, no account of the the Sinn
proposals.
no discussion of the military
aspects 0^ the
proposed settlement. It was just
oolitics
Lansdowne^and waiter Lone: repudiated all
responsibility for the iDroDosals. The' -re'-li^iAamongst the rank and file was very
fene^-al
against the proposals ... .50

.

^^In his Cabinet Memorandum of 26 June
1916. Robert Ce-n
said he felt obliged to defer to
Balfour's ??ews cors.dering the latter's wealth of Irish
exDerienne.
Cecil's
Caoinet I'^emorandum 26 June I916 CAi337/l50/21,
' Jenkins
MriUU^Ja,
401; 31ake, Bon^j: L^w, d. 236.
oelborne was
rn^nister who followed through on his
resignation
threlu^
^'l^^^^oe to Balfour, 28 June I9I6,
^"^'^
•'^•^•te^ Cluinoss to Balfour
?A
t'
30 June
1916, B. M. Add, MS 49,865. f, 59? Buckland,
AlLLSh -kJll^IliJLffi, Chapter Tliree,
B^'^M '^f^\''-f^''io''lt^

'

^'^^r^!'to''i'?^"^i^''?o^°
i;;-^
49,t355, f.

58.

^^-ilf"^^* 28 June 1916, B. M. Add.
i.laitland was the Tory <x^cnt at the

Central Conservative Office.
^^Carson and Boiar La.w spoke in favor of the Lloyd George
arrangement,
c.Q.
.V

-SX

A. S. Hewins, Ai^^IULi^
msJ.r^ iiPJj^^ { London
1

MConstable,
bj2

Il3iLGjd,a2ifi.t

:

I929),

llor.t^ Yej^rs
ii',

83'.'

.
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After this party meeting
Balforr.
i'^
^aiiour nn
no longer
pushed for an
Irish settlement in lyiD.
1916
Tn the
+v,^ last
^
in
analysis he was
probacy unwilling to go again.t
English Unionist feeUng
Moreover, his old friend
lord lansdowne was
t

Mtterly opposed

to the Lloyd George scheme
as a concession to
rebellion.

After I^nsdovme insisted
in his 11 July speech
on a permanent Ulster exclusion,
there was little chance of
continued Nationalist support.
Shortly after Lansdowne's
speech.
Robert Cecil, Herbert Samuel
and Walter long emphasised
in
memoranda the dangers of proceeding
with Horn. Rule during
^
the war.51 Reports of rising
Sinn Fein popularity
from

Long, 52 and from the Inspector
General of the Royal Irish

Constabulary, may have been an
additional factor in Balfour's
reticence after the Carlton Club
meeting. Sir Neville
Chamberlain believed that the rapid
gains made by Sinn Fein
in Belfast, Cork and eastern
Galway was evidence tliat
the

Irish people were now convinced
that physical force was
more effective than constitutionalism. ^3
a private correspondent, Sir Lancelot Storr, seemed
to confirm this when
he told Balfour on 21 July 1916 tliat
the Sirm feiners had
increased thirty-fold since Easter, and
that the country
"

r^o^^^"^^-^'^ Cabinet Kemorandun,
Cabinet

CAB37/i52/lo'

1? July 19I6,

We.mo rand urn,

20 July I916,

Long's Cabinet Memorandum, I5 July I916, CAjb3?/l
52/52
''^^'''^'^

^"Sb37/15^^^^^

''''

^""'^^

conditions, 20 July 1916.

24?

wao a veritable arsenal.

Storr maintained that
the cler,y
were encouraging the
people to prepare for
another rebellion.
He warned that the
arrival of sufficient German
and American funds would
precipitate new outbreaks.
Storr
echoed Long's sentiments
in his pleas for resolute
government rather than leniency. 5^*
These reports were probably
enough to convince Balfour
that a Home Rule settlement
was
ise\erxn£.lebs,

the common hostility which

Nationalists, Sinn Feiners and
Southern Unionists showed
for partition did not alter
Balfour's conviction that an
Ulster exclusion was essential
to any Irish settlement.
In reply to Horace Plunketfs
lament over the abortive 1916
negotiations, Balfour wrote:
...the point where yuu and I aiwavs
differ -Wreached When the alternative has to
be
faced"'
of keeping Ireland one under
Home Rule and a
non Home Rule fragment. 35
In any event, by mid- July the
fate of the Lloyd George

proposals was sealed, when Asciuith's
capitulation to Unionist demands for reduced Irish
represencation at Westminster
and a permanent Ulster exclusion forced
Redmond to break
negotiations to save his remaining credibility.
The Cabinet
officially abandoned the scheme on 2? July.
The old Castle
system was reinstituted with the appointment
of H, E.
Duke

'^''^y

li''t4]865^'^7''7l''

19^^' 3. M. Add.

^|-Ifour^to Plunkett. ? September I916, B. M. Add.

21^8

as Chief-Secretary and
the return of Lord
Wi.borne as Lord

Lieutenant.

Nevertheless, Irish matters
continued to
agonize and divide the Cabinet
regarding the fate of Sir
Roger Casement who had been
captured off the Kerry coast
three days prior to the
rebellion. Although Spring
Rico
had warned the government of
the disastrous effects which
further executions might have on
the prospects of drawing
America to the Allies, Balfour was
not among those advocating leniency.
ii)

During
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fall of I9I6 disastrous military
reverses

and the gradual erosion of confidence
in Asquith's leadership diverted attention from the Irish
Question.
Yot the

very gravity of the military, manpower
and supply situations soon forced the government again to
seek an Irish
settlement.
Pressure to reopen negotiations came from the
United States, the dominions, and from Ireland
itself.

'

The restoration of Castle government and
General Maxwell's

martial law had

onl.y

succeeded in driving many moderate

Nationalists into Sinn Fein.
Ireland virtually ceased.

Consequently recruits from

Moreover, frequent rumours of

'.Balfour had received a letter from Iviajor North,
35 Fitzroy Square, '.Westminster, which included a statement
by
a i-ather Ryan that Casement was ax tempt in.'^ to stoD the
rebellion.
North to Balfour, 16 July I9I6, B. Ivi/Add.
49,865, ff. 65-70.
f.^axwell told Asquith to disregard^ Spring Rice '3 warnings for '...although U. S.
feeling would be bitter, it was not of great importance
to Great Britain or the U. S....' v.'ard,
Anglsi-^orlsiJMl
RfiJ^aii^ma, pp. 112-13,

m
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imminent risings kept badly needed front
line replacements
in Ireland.
With the collapse of Rumania, the
stalling
of the Russian army at Moldavia and
the virtual deadlock
on the Western front. Britain faced
an extremely dangerous

manpower shortage by late 19I6.

In his very first speech

as Prime Minister, Lloyd George said
an Irish settlement

was imperative to facilitate the utmost American
and

dominion cooperation.-^"^

He also stressed that the general

principles of self-determination demanded a renewed effort
to solve the Irish imbroglio.

After visiting the front,

Sir Maurice Hankey of the War Office echoed the Prime
Minister's viev/s when he insisted that Irish negotiations
were essential to free the 150,000 troops stationed in
Ireland and to enlist additional recruits in the dominions
and Ireland. -^^

Cecil Spring Rice confirmed the Prime

assessment of the American situation when he

Iv'iinister 's

v.'arned i3alfour

upon the latter 's assumption of the Foreign Office in
December:
...the Irish question here assumes a most
dangerous form.
The Irish leaders are in the
pay of Germany and the ?rank and file of the
Irish are no longer indifferent but hostile.
It is interesting to remark that one of the
chief parts of the joint Irish-German programmes is the establishment of a naval base
in South-Vvest Ireland under German auspices,
to be an outpost of the Central powers on the
^''5

HlDSfira,

^^MacDowell,

Ixxxviii, 1338, 1353.
Ttua

Irish Convention, p. 68,
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^^^^
British tyranny at
not seem to be pe-ceived
that
German base against
^
?he Uni^^f
the
sr^'^ as much as against
united states
i^n^iland.
But: It 13 significant
that this is part^'of
the programme, and it would be
difficult
exaggerate the ferocity of the language to
held
laeetings.
I understand
that^ i.he attitude of the lower clergy
is fullv
^
as violent, although the official
heads of
the Church try to Maintain an attitude
of
neutrality. But this recrudescence of
the
Irish question has a very unfortunate
effect
on puDlic opinion, on Congress, and
on the
press. However favourable to France,
public
opinion here is, it cannot be said to be
favourable to iingland.59
^o^^^'^'tS
sea.
It T'^
does

Although aware of Spring Rice's tendency to
exaggerate,
the new Foreign Minister fully appreciated
that, in addition to the manpower and supply problems.
Britain faced a
financial collapse v/hich could only be averted by
an

American rescue operation.

Balfour told the United States

Ambassador, V/alter Hines Page, that he saw 'blue rain'
unless the Americans rendered assistance .^^

Something

had to be done to keep Irish-American anger from manipu-

lating Congressional and public opinion into an anti-

British posture.

Balfour's primary foreign policy objec-

tive from January to May 191? was to secure additional

American aid
tion on

tj-iF.

telegram on
-

60

5

and, if possible, direct American interven-

Allied side.
2^j.

Jfii.^

forwarding of the Zimmerman

February was designed to secure this

Gwynn e , Spxin^

I^i oe

Burton Hendricks,
P^-^e (Garden City:

ii

,

,

366.

IW^ Slid L^_t<2i:a 51 'ilPj^tiir: hlms.
Doubleday and Fage, 1924), ii, 261.

Ttxs.

251

American intervention.

However, during these tense
month s

Balfour was continually reminded
that the Irish Quosti on
hindered Wilson's efforts to swing
American opinion behind
Britain. At a luncheon on 2?
Llarch 191?
Ambassador Page
stressed this as the cause of
anti-British
.

feeling, and

asked Balfour why the question was
left unsettled for so
long.
Although he admitted the problem, Balfour
offered
Page no encouragement that he could
effect a solution.
These informal approaches to Balfour
and his colleagues soon gave way to more official
communications

regarding the American government's difficulties
with the
Irish-Americans, Ever since the rebellion, Judge

Cohalan,

John Devoy and other influential leaders in
the Irish-

American Democratic cominunity had put great pressue
on
Wilson to use his influence on Britain, while initially

Wilson

v/as

reluctant to respond to these requests, the

American President saw clearly in the Congress ioiial Debates
on tho War i^e^ol^ticn ths gravity of the Irish issue.

During these early April debates, many non-Irish Congressmen displayed marked sympathy for Irish self-determination
Moreover, V/iison had received in early March a direct appeaJ

from John Redmond on benalf of the Irish people.

Conse-

quently, on IC April 191?, Wilson ordered Ambassador Page
to tell Lloyd George that the only obstacle hindering
^^r.'iacDoweii, Ths. Irish c^iiYfiniiPii ,
8, 9 rv:arch 19^6.

p.

71

;

Thsi Jiiisa,

.

2 '' 2

cordial and enthusiastic
cooperation with Britain by
practically all Americans was
the failure to secure Irish
self-government,
i^he President
concluded by saying that
quick and successful action would
divorce the Irish-

Americans from the German sympathizers
with whom they had
been associating/^ Page conveyed
the message to Lloyd
George, and the Prime Minister
replied,
'God knows,

trying

I'm

'

By early I917 support for
renewed Irish negotiations
emanated from some English and Irish
circles.
In February
L. S, Amery called for a
conference of all segments
of

Irishmen to hammer out a federalist
settlement .^^

A month

later Archbishop John Bernard acted as the
spokesman of a
grov/ing number 01 Southern Irinh Unionists
when he called
for an open Irish convention in a letter to
Th^ limegi.^^
After the initial shock of the rebellion subsided,
many

Southern Unionists began to reassess their former
opposition to Homo Rule.
that

som.e

The :.9l6 proposals had convinced them

form of Dublin self-government was inevitable.

The Lloyd George scheme had demonstrated the
willingness
of li'nglish and Northern Unionists to sacrifice the
southern
62,

«^ard,

An^-Aii]£xiii5.n ^i5LtJ^>*iU» p.

^•^liia ^Cime^,

6^

1-^^6-7.

18 February I9I8.

Tixa ^ijnaa, 21 March I9I8; 5 H^ii^-cd, xci, 201^-5.
The
Cabinet had discussed the possibility of a convention
on 2, 7 and 22 Karch and announced tJiis on 22 I-iarch.
Cabinet Iviinutes, CAB23/2.
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loyalists in exchange for an Ulster exclusion.

Many

Southern Unionists, being dedicated Imperialists,
favored
a renewed effort at settlement to facilitate
active Irish
cooperation in the imperial war effort.

Of equal signifi-

cance was the probability that the first postwar
elections

would produce a more radical Parliament which would
be
indifferent to Southern Unionist claims for protective
devices.

Lastly, many southern loyalists now believed that

an immediate settlement was essential to stem the growing

moderate Nationalist defections to Sinn Fein.
By late March Lloyd George apparently felt that

Carson and Balfour were the chief ministerial obstacles
to renewed negotiations.

the 27

iviarch

He v;arned Carson, who attended

luncheon with Page that

the Irish question now

-

'V/e've

inspite of you.'

got to scttlcj
Pago reported

to Secretary of State Lansing that the Prime Minister

fully appreciated the Irish difficulty, and that ho vranted
V/ileon to communic£ite his views to Balfour as soon as the

latter arrived in V^ashington.

Page stressed that since

Balfour had been a leader in the Unionist party before the
War, the Prime Minister believed a frank explanation of

American opinion by
negotiations.

-

yv'ilson

would ease the path of renewed

Three days later Spring Rice v;arned

Balfour's chief Foreign Office assistant, Sir Robert
^^ward, AazlQ~Airi.eri£an Jklalipni, p. I'l?. Balfour was
scheduled to journey to -Vashington for military and
financial consultation.

Cecil, that V/iison would
undoubtedly raise the Irish
difficulty as the root of English
troubles with the United
States,
The British Ambassador
stressed that Ireland was

continually quoted against the
English as proof that the
war was not being waged for
the sanctity
of treaties or

the independence of small
nations.

In conclusion he warned,

^^^^v^'^^ an Orangeman and
Dy education a Presbyterian.
bv%ducat?nn^'p
Eut he

is a

^^^^^y

the
he is bound
^ive consideration to their

lrKr.?L'S^^'^''^^^3^^
prominent part, and
in evpSv w.,^

dernlSr^

-^^-^^^

Spring Rice's predictions materialized
when two days prior
to Balfour's arrival in Washington.
Joseph Tumulty asked
Wilson to put some pressure on the
visiting British Foreign
Secretary,
Lloyd George and Lord Northcliffe had
asked
Sydney Brooks to insure that Tumulty
urged Vvilson
to talk

to Balfour.

^"^

A few days after Wilson duly raised the Irish
issue,
Balfour attended a meeting of influential
Irish-Americans
arranged by Sir Horace Plunkett in New York.

In attend^njice

were Morgan O'Brien, a former New York Supremo Court
Justice, Colonel Robert Temple Emraett of New Yoriv,
John F.
Fits'.gerald. I.^ayor of Boston, and Lawrence Godkin,

journalist.

These men v;arned of the steady erosion of

^*^Gwynn, Sx!.ning Rioa, ii,

6?

J.

the

393.

P. Tumulty, Woodrow.
lis on aa I Emm Him (Garden City,
Doubleday and Page, 1921), pp. 398-9. Hereafter cited
Tumulty, ilils^.

^33

Hedmonite support in Anierica caused
by the repeated Home
Rule postponements.
They gave equal emphasis to
their
abhorance of partition.
Having been apprized of the
gravity of American views on Ireland
in Washington. New
York and on other occasions,
Balfour acknowledged
that

demands for an Irish conference could
no longer be ignored,
and he cabled the Prime Minister:
The Irish question is apparently the
only
difficulty WG have to face here, and its
settlement would no doubt greatly facilitate the vigorous and lasting cooDcration
of the United States Government in the
war. 70

Notwithstanding Balfour's ignorance of growing
American sympathy for Sinn Fein,^^ the support of
this distinguished Unionist removed the chief barrier preventing
Lloyd George from announcing the Cabinet's desire to

attempt an Irish settlement.

Accordingly, on 21

I.lay

191?? the Prime Minister emphasized the military dangers
of neglecting Ireland any longer, and told the House of

Commons that the wartime cooperation of
68

Mm.

tlio

Irish race

In2Zk ILLraGii, 5 -^ay 191?
Ward, Au-lQ-Amacicoii Rela pp. lif8-9; Plunkett Diaries. 2^ April 1917,
i

iJLQUS.,

Plunkett House, London,

^9 One of the mission officials wrote 'You hear a terrific
amount of the Irish question discussed and we get shoals
of letters about it.'
Dugdale, Balfour, ii, 203.
^^Balfour to Robert Cecil for the Prime Minister, 7 May
1916, cited in Ward, An^Q-Aiaerili£in Relations, p. Vyj,

72

Cabinet Minutes, 22 Miarch 1917

»

CAB23/2.

256

throughout the world depended upon a
rapid settlement. He
was anxious to enlist the Irishmen's
'passionate love of
liberty' in the Allied struggle for
freedom. ^3

Balfour apparently did not take much
interest in the
initial proceedings of the Irish Convention,
even though
his name was suggested as a possible
chairman. "^^ In any
case, he was far too involved with the
details of AngloAmerican financial and military cooperation upon
his return
from Washington. Despite the Sinn Fein
boycott. Sir Horace
Plunkett, the convention chairman, drove the
95 representa'

tives to find a compromise which would avoid partition
and

preserve the fiscal unity of the United Kingdom.

The

levying of customs, excise and income taxes by Westminster was a crucial issue for Ulster business interests and

Southern Unionists who feared a Dublin parliament would
tax thera out of existence.

The Nationalists, fearful of

incurring additional Sinn Fein criticism, asserted that
any respectable self-governing scheme demanded full taxing
pov/ers.

Both sides considered customs and excise powers

important symbols of nationality.

Since most of the initial

discur.Gions centered upon this fiscal issue, the Ulstermen

and tlieir chief spokesman. Lord Barrie, were able to con-

ceal until

mid-I'.^arch

their absolute determination to remain

^^5 Hansard, xciii, 1999.

Plunkett to Balfour, 19 June 191?
f.

128.

»

B.

\L,

Add,

L:S

49,792,

'
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independent of a Dublin parliament. "^^

When Lloyd George was informed
of the convention's
serious customs impasse, he ordered
his chief-assistant,
S. Adams, to try to salvage
the convention by personal talks with Barrie, Carson and
the Ulster

leaders.
In fact, the Prime Minister met
with Bonar law, iwidleton.
Dr. Bernard, Lord Desart and
Carson het-.veen 6 and 13

February in hopes of encouraging an agreement ."^"^

Ax this

point Carson and the Ulstermen were under
heavy pressure
to appear cooperative, and Carson
subsequently toyed with
federalism for the United Kingdom as a means of
preserving
Ulster's connection with Britain.
If V/estminster s supremacy was active, Carson believed that the Ulster
Unionists
'

might accept federation.
^^acDov/ell, ThR Xcisii
76

Undoubtedly Carson was cognizant

.aonv5.2i.tiQii,

p.

170.

Dennis Gwynn, iXlJhn Efiiiiafmii, 1932 ed. (Freeport, N, Y.,
Books for College Libraries, 1971), p. 583? Buckland,
ll^J^li ilTLLXmsiil, p. 122; LiacDowell, Tha I rish Convention
p.

156.

''^Lloyd George told them there were only three considera-

,

tions essential to a settlement: first, United Kingdom
fiscal unity must be preserved during the war; secondly,
there would be no partition, and lastlv safeguards were
to be included to protect the industrial, commercial and
religious interests of Ulster from the agricultural and
Roman Catholic South and v/est, KacDowell, The iri^ih
O^liysJXtdsixif p. 1^2.
David Savage maintains that i^loyd
George consistently believed federalism to be the best
means of reconciling Irish nationalism with the need to
maintain unity and centralisation on fiscal, economic
and strategic policies.
David Savar^e, 'The Parnell of
Vv'ales has become the Chamberlain of £nrland; Lloyd George
and the Irish Question,' Jourml J2l Brlii^ih ^tiidi^, 12,'
No, 1, 86-108.
Hereafter cited ravage, 'Lloyd George and
the Irish Question.
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of sympathy for a federal solutionamong certain Southern

Unionists, notably Dunraven, as well as
from Austen Chamberlain and Walter Long.^^ Although Carson
doubted an
Irish settlement could await a general British
federation,
he forwarded his ideas to Balfour and Lloyd
George on
1

February 1918.'^^

Balfour's reply demonstrated his con-

sistent belief in partition as the only acceptable
solution
for Ulster. Emphasizing his equal disdain for Home
Rule

and federation, he advocated keeping the six counties
and
.disinteresting ourselves from the South and
except, in so far as it may
be necessary to prevent its coast lines being
used by enemy powers.
I fear, hov/ever, that
this bold piece of surgery will find little
favour an;^^.vhere. I recommended it in I913
before the war rendered a solution impossible .^0
.

.

V»est of Ireland,

Despite Lloyd George's February warnings of the mili-

tary and political urgency of an Irish settlement, Barrie

clearly told the Irish Convention that Ulster would insist
upon exclusion from any Dublin scheme the Convention might
devise.

It is probable that in 1918, as in 191^+, Carson's

knowledge of Balfour's views on Ulster may have provided
MacDowell, Iha Irish Il^mzaniion, p. 1^2; Tom Jones, W hite IrelaM, 1918-25, ed, Keith Middlemas
(London
Oxford Univ. Press, 1971), pp. 6-7. Hereafter
cited Jones, .wbiitsJiall .Diary; D. G. Boyce, En^lishrr,en
siM .L^iiili TrOillil^ (London
Jonothan Cape, 1972), p. 38
Hereafter cited Boyce, j^>i-xlishmen.
iiaii Diary:,
J

J

'^Carson to Lloyd George, B, K. Add. K3 ^9»709, f. I63.
80

Balfour to Carson, n. d,,
f.

166.

B,

W, Add.

^9,709,
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additional incentive for the Northern
Unionists to resist
the Prime Minister's pleas for
concessions through taxes
or federalism.
Despite Barrie's declaration, the Convention recommended colonial dominion status
to the
Prime

Minister on 5 April 1918.^^-

Meanwhile the Government was

wrestling with a critical manpower situation
following
the vigorous German spring offensive against
Amiens.

Staggering British losses beginning on 21

iviarch

forced the

Cabinet to consider extending the conscription age
limit
from 42 to 50 years.

Since Ireland had been exempt from

the first call, the government anticipated great domestic

opposition to the new limit unless Ireland was required to

bear some of the burden.

It

v/as

tion would be especially serious.

feared that labor opposi-

When on 28

l.-arch

Lloyd

George suggested a simultaneous introduction of Irish con-

scription with the Irish Convention's anticipated Home
Rule scheme, Balfour along with Smuts and Curzon supported
this plan.^'^

It was> of course, a delicate decision.

One

of the last resolutions of the Convention opposed Irish

conscription vdthout the prior approval of the future
legislature.

8

"

second thoughts.

Within a

fc;W

days, Balfour apparently had

On 1 April, he warned his colleagues of

8l

MacDowell, T2l£ Irish Convention, pp. 181-2; Buckland has
a full dsscription of the convention recommendations.
IrisJi Unionisiia* p. 127.

^^Cabinet Minutes, 23 r.arch I9I8, CAB23/14.
^^MacDov/ell, Shs. Irisli Ci^iimiLls^. p. i?6.
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possible American opposition.

Balfour was delegated to

explain to Colonel House the British
government's dilemma.
His telegram is interesting as
an illustration of his
doubts about the possibility of
satisfying the contending
factions at the Irish Convention, and
as an illustration
of his astute awareness that
conscription might engender
more domestic and international difficulties
than it would
solve.
Nevertheless Balfour told House that an
Irish
measure was essential to the proposed British
extension:
The severity of the sacrifices that would
be
imposed on iin,^land and Scotland are obvious
and
oo asK this island to bear added
burden while
Ireland bears no burden of conscription at aJl
seems almost an insult. At this moment Ireland
has not only suffered less than any iiuropean
belligerent, she has suffered less than rny
^.'uropean neutral,
^/ouid i:;ngland and .Scotland
toxerate merely continuance of this unfair
distinction but its serious aggravation? On
the other hand, objections from a practical
point of view to include Ireland in a measure
of conr^cription are manifest.
It is certain
that the j.aw can only be enforced at cost of
rioting^ and possibly bloodshed.
It is not
cei-tain that the 150,000 troops we may expect
to obtain will prove useful and trustworthy.
Against conscription will be united priests.
Parliament, nationalists and ^inn Feiners, and
the only scheme for mitigating their objections v;hich we can devise (i.e. Convention
scheme) may not impossibly alienate Ulster
and all that Ulster and shipyards of Belfast
means for the effective conduct of the v/ar.
For this scheme consists in associating a
bill for giving immediate effect to the forthcoming report of the Irish Convention with a
bill for extending Conscription to Ireland.
The report will be out this week.
Unionists
and ilngland and Scotland may accept it but it
is far from certain that Ulster will.
It is
even doubtful if it will satisfy Irish rJ..tionalists, for there is a powerful nationalists
minority on the Convention including all the
•
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0^!!^;!^^^^^°^^^ bishops Who want more than the
Report propoGes to give them.
If. therefore
we quarrel with the North
of Ireland o^er one
Of these associated measures
and with Se
^^^^
°^
war
clTLi^n
Uo puc a.t mildly) will not be bothfthe
improved. .. .8/^

Two days later Balfour still
appeared anxious over
the probable impact of Irish
conscription, and he told his
colleagues that if they decided against
it, they would have
to tell the British people the naked
truth that, '...Ireland
is a sheer weakness, but it would
be a greater weakness if
we did something than it was if we
did nothing. '^^ Balfour's

anxieties were echoed by Colonel House and
Lord Reading,
the new British Ambassador, both of whom
feared increased
German-Irish intrigue in the United States.
The Frime

Minister, however, followed the advice of William
.viseman,
a British diplomat in Washington, that Americans
would

tolerate a delicately handled conscription if it were

accompanied by Home Rule.

Wiseman believed most Irish-

Americans were still Redmondite Home

Rulers.^'"''

Encouraged

by Wiseman, and under great pressure from the generals
and
the Unionists, Lloyd George announced Irish conscription
on 9 April I9I8.

84

To sweeten this bitter pill, he promised

Balfour to Colonel House,
^1-9,

1

April I9I8,

092, f, 228.

B,

Add.

T-'iS

-'Cabinet Minutes, 3 April I917, CAB23/lJlf.
86
Ward, AnglG-AiQorixian R^ialifina, p. 159; Cabinet Minutes
16 April I9I8, CAB23/6.

87
'Ward, AnpOja-Am^riGan i^slaileas, p. 169.
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a simultaneous measure of self-government
based on the

Irish Convention's recommendations,^^

Balfour's anxieties were realized when,
following the
passage of the Military Service Bill on 16 April,
John
Dillon led the Irish party cut of the House of
Commons and
into alliance with Sinn Fein and the independent
Nationalists.

A common national front against compulsion
developed

in Ireland within a few days.
the Lord

I-.'^yor

On 18 April, Laurence O'Heill,

of Dublin, led various nationalist groups

in planning a one day general strike and a nation-wide

publicity campaign protesting the right of England to conscript Irishmen.

This

i^-lansion

House Committee eventually

requested the use of British diplomatic channels to register their protests

v.'ith

President

\'iilF,on.

Balfour, ever

consciouR of the inflam.atory Irish issue in America,

arranged with the American Embassy in London, that the
Irish resolutions receive no publicity.

Secretary of State

Lansing quietly handed the messages to the V/hitc House on
13 August 1918.^^

McanwhilG, in early Way, Lloyd George attempted to

appease Southern Unionist complaints of disorder with the

appointments of Lord French and Edward Shortt as LordLieutenant and Chief-Secretary respectively.
^^5

Hans^JTii,

civ, 1.337-1366.

^^The Zimaa, 23
p. 16^.

Niay

1918; Ward, Anglsi-i
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Officials recommended one
last voluntary enlistment
campaign in hopes Of avoiding
further Irish alienation.
They
set a goal of 50,000 by
1 October I9I8.
Balfour, worried
about British domestic reaction
and resentful over minimal
Irish help in the war effort,
agreed to the voluntary

campaign provided the principle
of conscription was not
abandoned. 90 in any event, the
combined impact

of Irish
resistance and American warnings
turned the postponement
into an abandonment.

By early June, the two major
planks in the government
Irish policy, conscription and the
implementation of the

Irish Convention's recommendations, were
opposed by too
many factions for any parliamentary success.
The Ulstermen
remained unalterably opposed to any rule from
Dublin.
Although imperial and military consideration
made him

desperate for a settlement, the Prime Minister
soon realized that this Ulster opposition nullified
the 'substantial
majority' necessary to obtain a settlement. Sinn
Fein
strength had increased during the conscription
crisis, and
their dem.ands for full customs control were not
acceptable
to Lloyd George. 92 On ^- June I9I8, the
Cabinet postponed
ciny

action on the convention recommendations,

Balfour did

not lament the collapse of the proposed scheme, for,
90

91

Cabinet Minutes 10

r.ay

I9I8, CAB23/l/f.

Jones, Ihiieimli Siaxi:, iii, 9.

IlUii.,

p.

9;

'.vard,

AniO-Q-Ameriiian

i^-B.tJ.j?ris ,

p,

163.

contrary to that of I916. there was no
provision for
Ulster exclusion. The scheme rested too
firmly on federalist principles which Balfour always
maintained were

inappropriate to the Irish situation.
iii)

Preparing for Partiti on

By early fall I9I8 the government returned to
its

traditional law and order policy.

No new initiatives

emerged until the last stages of the Paris Peace Conference.
Balfour's only public comment on the Irish Question from

May I9I8 until November 1919 was a rebuttal of Joseph
Devlin's accusation that Britain was hypocritical in simul-

taneously fighting for self-determination and exercising
tyranny and militarism in Ireland.

Balfour labelled

incredulous Devlin's contention that Ireland threw herself
into

tlxe

war as vigorously as r^ngland and Scotland.

Undoubtedly, the government's recent conscription diffi-

culties and the abortive voluntary enlistment campaign

explain the Foreign Secretary's vehement reply. ^'^^

Balfour

had been kept informed of the campaign's progress and

v/as

able to cite figures supporting his view.^-^

Balfour's December 19I8 election address concentrated
^^5 Jisns^, cix, 696-703.

Hansard, cix, 708-7l^K
^•^F,
FiS

L.

Frawley to Balfour

A'9,768,

ff.

172-77.

»

9,

20 August 1918, B. M. Add.
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on postwar economic recovery
and international security

problems.

There was no mention of Ireland.

However,
the December elections in Ireland
clearly emphasized the
high cost of failing to settle, through

constitutional

means, the Irish Question.

The Irish Parliamentary Party

was virtually annihilated in the wake of
the anti-conscription campaign and the failure of the Irish
Convention.

Joseph Devlin and Captain Redmond, John Redmond's
son, were
the only successful candidates against Sinn Fein
opposition.

The four additional parliamentary nationalist
seats

were captured as a result of a Nationalist-binn Fein
agreement

o

Sinn Fein won 73 seats, while the Unionists captured

26 seats of which 23 represented Ulster constituencies.^'^

These results were probably highly significant to

Balfour.

Firstly, the geogx-aphic solidarity of Unionists

in the Northeast must have strengthened his conviction that

Ulster must be given
ated scheme.

'a

clean cut' from any Dublin domin-

Secondly, the election results clearly

demonstrated the obsolescence of Home Rules and that Sinn

Fein would never accept the limitations on Irish autonomy
proposed in

191'4,

1916 and 1918.

Republicanism had become

too deeply ingrained in the Irish populace for anything
less than full independence.

The Sinn Fein boycott of

Westminster and their support for the Easter Proclamation
^^Iho Ticisa,
97
^^v.acDoweil,

2

December, 1918.

Irii^ llonyjeatlon

»

p.

162.
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at the first Dail Sireann session
on 21 January I919 left
no doubts about the growth of Irish
republican sentiment .^^
Over the next two years, Balfour took
full cognizance of
this in his written and oral contributions
to Cabinet

deliberations on Ireland.

During the first half of I919 the government's
Irish
problems increased tremendously. The guerrilla
warfare
initiated by the 21 January attack on police at Solsheadbag, Tipperary soon spread across the country,
and created
a first-class military crisis.

The Irish people boycotted

British administrative and judicial organs, and threw their
support to the embryonic ^inn Fein units.

A Sinn Fein

republican cabinet was formed in April, and by summer Sinn
Fein represented the

'

def acto' government of Ireland. "^^^

However, Lloyd George and his Cabinet colleagues were so

absorbed by preparations for and attendance at the Peace
Conference that they sought no alternatives to the traditional law and order formula.

Now that the military

urgency of the war was over, most British politicians

showed more concern for unemploirment, housing and labor
problems.
98
^

Even xhe attempts of the Irish and Irish-

Lyons, Inaljind

^Insio. ihs. iilamina,

p.

^00.

'^Balfour's Cabinet I'emoranda on Ireland, 25 November
1919, CP 193, CAB2V93; 19 February I920, CP 69I,

CAB2V98.
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Growing republican strength is described in Lyons,
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Americans to use the Paris meeting,
as a forum to publici:.ze
Irish claims failed.
In I919, John Devoy and Judge
Cohalan again urged Wilson to use
his influence
on the

British.

The passage of a Senate resolution
sjonpathetic to

Irish independence impelled Joseph
Tumulty on 6 June I919
to cable Paris that Wilson should do
something quickly.

Wilson replied he could do nothing because
the British
delegates were enraged by the press release
of the American
Committee of Irishmen which accused Britain of
barbaric
^"^^
cruelty in Ireland.
In any case, Wilson was
loathe to

stress the Irish issue lest he lose British support
for
the League of Nations.

However, by the fall of I919 it was clear that an

alternative to coercion was essential.

Rather than crush

Sinn Fein? the repressive measures of the Royal Irish

Constabulary and the British Army increased the fighting
resolve of the Irish people and invited widespread foreign

and domestic criticism of Britain's Irish policy.

American

pressure for an Irish settlement increased in the last
stages of the Paris Peace Conference.

warned Balfour, who
factions

v.'ere

v/as

William Wiseman

still in Paris, that the Irish

cooperating with Senator Lodge's anti-treaty

foixes, and that they might support isolationist Republicans in the approaching elections,

Wiseman suggested that

Lloyd George inform the Commons that some settlement short
^^-^Tumulty, WiI.s.Qn, p. ^02.
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Of a republic should be
attempted soon.^O^

^^^^
had accepted his American
ambassadorship on the condition
that an Irish settlement would
be forthcoming.
Upon
his arrival in Washington, the
new British envoy lost no
time in re-emphasizing the need of
a new Irish initiative.
On i| October he cabled Curzon
that the Irish Question was
poisoning Anglo-American relations. He
warned that, but
for the peace treaty controversy and
labor troubles, the

Irish-Americans might succeed in organizing a
serious m.ovement critically affecting Anglo-Am.erican
relations. Althou
he reported that opinions differed as to
an appropriate
Irish settlement, Grey concluded that because
...Irish hostility is at present an active
and might become a critically unfavourable
influence in American politics... a statement
of Irish policy on self-government lines is
now very desirable and might at any time
bee ome urgent 1^^^
,

While Grey acknowledged that the Sinn Fein goal of complete

separation was impossible, a fortnight later he directly

warned Lloyd George of growing anti-British feeling.

Grey

argued that the time was ripe for renev/ed negotiations
since many Unionists had dropped opposition to Homo Rule
and many Home Rulers had now recognized the claims of

m

^^^E. L. Woodward, ed., DosijnerLjS
Irliisil Jicrej^'rn Policy ,
1st Series (London:
H, M, S. 0., 195'^), v, 982.
Hereafter cited Woodv/ard, Docu m ents
.

103

999-1000; Cabinet Minutes, 11 November I919,
CAB23/I8.

'^^Voodv/ard, Dacuinenis , v, 1003-^.
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Ulster.

The British Ambassador' obviously
overestimated

the acceptance of partition among
the Irish in America and
Ireland. As Balfour had respected Grey's
judgment on

American opinion in I916, he was not
indifferent to these
warnings when the fate of the League of Nations
was hang-

ing in the balance.

Indeed, by October many Unionists

began to favor a reexamination of Irish policy
because
the 1914 Hom„e Rule Act did not provide an Ulster
exclusion,

Bonar Law reminded Balfour on I9 October that some-

thing had to be done for Ulster security before the
rati-

fication of the last Paris peace treaty made the
operative,

191/+

act

^'^'^

Lloyd George seemed to be searching for an alter-

native to coercion in early August when he acknowledged
to the Cabinet the critical state of American and dominion

opinion.

problems

The Prime Minister believed that Britain's labor
v.'ere

partially the result of Irish agitators

stirring up their British counterparts."''^^

The Prime

Minister, therefore, established a Cabinet committee to

formulate Irish proposals consistent with imperial unity
"

^Grey to Lloyd George, 1? October 1919, CP 89, CAB2V92.

Balfour's iviemorandum on Ireland, 25 November 1919,
CP 193 CAB2V93.
f

107

Buckland, IrJjLll Unionism, p. 208; Blake, Bonar ioEi
1^8; Jones, v/hitghall Piary, iii, 9.

p.

'^^Cabinet Minutes, 5 August 1919, CAB23/15,
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and acceptable to Ulster.

This was no easy task, as is

evidenced by the committee's six month
struggle to carry
out their assignment.
The basic skeleton of the Government of Ireland Act. I920, more commonly
known in Ireland
as the Partition Act, emerged from
these deliberations.
The committee, chaired by ^Valter Long,
first eliminated

continued British control of Ulster as inviting
world
criticism,
Overrepresentation of Ulster in an all-Ireland

parliament was vetoed as undemocratic, and as an
open
invitation for Ulster to frustrate an Irish Parliament's
work.

The committee finally concluded that the best
solu-

tion lay in establishing two Irish parliaments, one in
Dublin, and one in Belfast for the six counties.

British

domestic rule was to be eliminated from boUi aieas.

The

committee believed this would satisfy
...the fundamental demand of the overwhelming
majority of Irishmen ever since the days of
O'Connell.
It is entirely consistent both
with the fact that there is a majority in
Ulster as opposed to Dublin rule as the
nationalist majority in Ireland- is opposed
to British rule - the fact which has wrecked
the three Home Rule Acts,,.,
The committee argued that the call for Ulster to govern

herself was not coercion, and was, therefore, consistent
with government pledges to Ulster.

A Council of Ireland,

composed of representatives of both governments for questions of mutual interest, was to be established as a

stimulus to ultimate Irish legislative unity.

Authority

over agricultural and technical education, transportation.

Old age pensions, health
and unemployment
insurance was to
reserved to the Imperial
Parliament for one year, and
then delegated to either
the Council of Ireland
or the
-parate legislatures. Ireland
was to bear lAo of
imperial
expenses, while customs and
excise would be retained by
Westminster to recover the war
debt. As a gesture of
good
will, the Irish v/ould >-eceivp i^n^s r^,,v,«'
_Lcei\e land purcnase proceeds.
The

retention of 6k Irish seats at
Westminster was designed to
preserve imperial unity.
The committee hoped this
scheme
would soothe Anglo-American and
dominion relations ^"0?
Balfour attacked these proposals
from the very beginning.
Although he admitted the failure
of Unionist
.

policy,

and that pledges to Grey and the
public made retreat
impossible^ he preferred to keep
Ulster an integral part
Of the United Kingdom.
The rest of Ireland could have
independence, provided British naval
privileges and the
imperial debt were secured. By this
juncture, Balfour was
apparently interpreting the December election
results at
face value.
Unlike his Cabinet colleagues, the former
Chief-Secretary willingly accepted that separation
was the
desire of Sinn Fein and the Irish people,
excepting, of
course, those in the northeast corner.
There was just no
way of reconciling Sinn Fein opposition to
partition with
109

Committee on Ireland, 6 November I919,
nTnof^/?^"^
30, OaL^/V92.
The financial arrangements and temporarily reserved powers are fully described in the
report, 2/.". November 1919 C? 190, CAB2V93.
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Balfour's consistent belief that
an Ulster exclusion was
essential to any settlement. The
former Unionist chief
strongly attacked the committee's
assumption that their
proposals could or should pave the way
to a single Irish
legislature.
His dissenting memorandum^^O
succinctly
summarizes his views on Ulster and the
general Irish
problems

My objections to this have thoir roots
in the
strong dislike I feel to the doctrine
assumed
throughout the Committee ReDort, and more
than once explicitly proclaimed, that Ireland,
all Ireland has a desperate national existence,
and should naturally and Drcperly be
orranized
as a single undivided political unit.
The
committee admit, of course, that so lon^^ as
Ulster remains the Ulster as we know, such
an ideal cannot be realized. Hence, their
very artificial scheme of Home Rule Parliaments
and^an Irish Council. But they rer^ard this
division as a misfortune; and evidently think
it rather perverse of Ulster to throw obstacles
in the v/ay of complete unification.
In their
recommendations they carry this view to such
length that while, on the one hand, they make
it as easy as possible for Ulster to join
itself with the rest of Ireland in forming a
Dominion state, on the other they give it no
power what ever to remain what it is, and as
I think, ought to be, an integral part of the
United uingdom.
This they call resoecting
the principle of self -determination and following the Peace Conference.'
The Peace Conference has done some odd things, but never,
I submit anything quite so odd as this.
'

According to Balfour, the Committee had misread Irish
History and failed to appreciate a basic British right to
remain in the United Kingdom until overwhelming reasons
made separation necessary.

Defining United Kingdom

Balfour's Cabinet MemiOrandum on Irish Proposals,
25 November 1919.
193, CAB2V93.

membership as a 'noble
privilege

Balfour felt it

v.
/as

intolerable to deprive the
Ulsterrnen of it simply bec=
:ause
they lived on the same
island with 'those who
proclaim
their disloyalty in every
quarter of the world...' Having
developed this two-nations
theory. Balfour recommended
cutting the six counties out of
the bill and requiring
the remainder of Ireland M:o
endure Home Rule',
This would
eliminate that 'singular political
experiment', the Council
Of Ireland, as well as Irish
representation at Westminster.
Balfour opposed continued Irish
attendance lest they determine the composition of future
British governments and
influence important labor, land, church
and educational
questions affecting England, Scotland and
wales.

If the

Cabinet would not agree to 'turning disloyal
Ireland out
of the Empire', Balfour preferred
domination status over

The committee's recommendations.

Besides confining

'Southern Irish talents for parliamentary strategy
to a
domestic tJieatre
dominion status would end British finan'

,

cial obligations to Ireland.

The former Unionist Prime

Minister argued that, in the event of renewed war,
dominion
status would free Britain from the humiliating decision
of

compelling Ireland to do her duty or yielding to the
clamour
of traitors.

Balfour believed that it also would liberate

Britain from the recent 'monstrous attacks' by iCnglish

speaking countries across the seas.

He alleged his scheme

was in strict harmony with the principles and practices
of the Peace Conference, and that it would make Ireland as

27 k

free as Canada and Australia.

Regarding Ulster he claimed.

No one can think that Ulster
ou.-ht to join the
^^"^ ''^^'^
that Jugo olavs
''k''^^/?'^
should be separated from Austria. Ho
one can
thinl: that Ulster should be divorced
from
Britain wno believes in self-determination
ihe only people who will ./-rumble are
those who
imagine that this scheme deprives lrela.nd
of
a unity to which she has a historic cJaim.
But these people ignore the fact that such
unity as Ireland possesses is mainlv the work
of ^ngland, that she has never in all the
centuries, been a single, organized, independent
state, and that if she were not surrounded by
water, no human being would ever think of
forcing the loyal and i-rotestant North into
the same political mould as the disloval and
Roman Catholic South.

Balfour's memorandum illustrates his appreciation of
the strength of Sinn Fein separatism.

Ke favored dominion

status for the South as the best means of ridding iingland
of the perpetually expensive and embarrassing Irish probleiT),

rather than because Ireland earned or deserved it.

Similar to

T.

w.

Freeman in 1886, the former Unionist

chief apparently favored the bolder course to keep the
Til

'Paddies* out of London."

Although Balfour admired the

war-stimulated Canadian and Australian nationalism as
imperially constructive, he would not credit contemporary
Irish nationalism with any legitimate or progressive

elements.

The mounting intensity of the Anglo-Irish

v/ar

along with the wartime experiences of the Easter Rebellion
and the anti-conscription campaign undoubtedly added to

Balfour's bitterness and hostility at this juncture.
"^^""Curtis,

Anglo-SaxQua

ancl

Q.^s., p. 139, n. 17.
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Balfour's memorandum appears,
to have influenced the
final Shape of the Government
of Ireland Bill,
.vhen the
Cabinet's original aim of ultimate
Irish unity^^^ ^^^^
reaffirmed at discussions on
3, 10 and 19 December.
Balfour requested that '...it be
placed on record that he
was not in agreement with this
view.'^^^ ?rom these early
discussions until the March introduction,
he continually
stressed his partition views. This
provided convenient
Cabinet leverage for those Ulctermen
who wanted to insure
that partition would be permanent
if they could no longer
prevent a Dublin parliament. The duration
of partition
obviously depended on the area of
jurisdiction assigned
to the Northern Parliament.
If all Ulster was included,
eventually there would be sufficient Catholic
and Nationalist electors to overturn partition, or,
at least, to

agitate constantly toward that goal.^-^

If only the six

northeastern counties of Amargh, Tyrone, Antrim,
Fermanagh,
Down and Derry were included, Nationalist strength
would
be insufficient to challenge the Unionist
political estab-

lishment, and consequently partition,
1

12

1

13,

when, despite

Fourth and Final Report of Cabinet Committee cn Ireland.
2 December 1919, CP 2/^?, CAB2V9^.
Cabinet Minutes,

3,

10,

19 December 1919, CAB23/18.

^"Cabinet Minutes, 10 December 1919, CAB23/18.
-^oaD3-net iwemorandum on

situation in Northern Ireland,
January 1920,
CA]32V97j
The i-^ontgomery .^apers
571,
are full of expressions of support for the six as opposed
to the nine counties.
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Lloyd George's reports that James
Craig and the
leaders preferred the smaller Ulster/^^

J

ster

the 19 December

Cabinet ceerrodto favor the larger Ulster,
they were of a
prior agreeiaent that the final decision would
be conditional to the Ulster leadership's views, ^""'^
In addition,
it

argued that, while the geographic Ulster seemed

-was

more logical for parliamentary defense, the
six county

would command more general acceptance.

schoir^e

tutions

j

Few consti-

it was stressed, were theoretically perfect.

While only the Prime Minister^ s remarks are identified
specif ically» xhese objections were expressed in typical

Balfourian phraseology.

It is possible that Balfour, who

attended this session, was responsible for preventing a
definite Cabinet commitment to the larger Ulfiter at this
point

0

Iloyd George's 22 December speech describing the

government's Irish proposals shows a striking resemblance
to Balfour's thinking on the Irish Question. -"-^^

deccribing the financial arrangem.ents of the

I91/J

After

Act as

obsolete, xho Frirae iviinister emphasi-/.ed some of the stock

points which characterized Ualfour's rhetoric on Ulster.

Maintaining that the Ulstermen were alien in religion,
'1

2.6

Craig expressed this view on I5 and I9 Decem.ber 1919,
Cabinet Minutes C/il-23/l8.

-'-''^Cabinet ICinutes,

1^8
5

Hsi}.sa2.is:U

10 December 1919, CAB23/I8,

cxxiii, 1169-83.
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culture and outlook to the re.t of
Ireland, the Prime
Minister charged it would be an outrage
against selfdetermination principles to place them
under the South and
West.
The Prime Minister employed a I917
statement of
Father O'Flanaghan, a Sinn Fein Vice-fresident,
that sentiment and religion, rather than geography,
were the major
determinants of nationality. After building
this argument
for partition, Lloyd George presented the six
and nine

county optio2is.

The government, he said, preferred the

six county scheme so as not to deprive the Roman
Catholics
of Donegal, Monaghan and Cavan of association
with their

co-religionists.

This was a rather disingenious argument*

considering the prospects of Catholics in the six counties.
No mention was made of the Northerners' contention
that a

larger Ulster would facilitate a Nationalist challenge
to the Unionist establishment,

.vhile

Lloyd George may

have had some personal sympathy for the two-nations theory,

Balfour was probably influential in reinforcing them, or
at leastp making the Prime Minister more receptive to

Craig and the Ulster leaders.
By early February, considerable criticism of the

f:ix

county scheme emanated from Southern Unionists, Nationalisxs and the Irish bishops. 120
J 2
"

9

120

5 Hanaaxiij

These groups were also

cxxiii, 1171,

Buckland, Iriiih UllionirLH: p. 226? see also Cabinet
Memorandums on Irelfcind, January 1920, CP 57I, CA132 V97;
»

8 IViarch I920,

Ci-

825, CAB2V100.

1
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convinced that future Irish unity was
impossible unless
the Northern Farliament was cancelled
or was assigned
historic Ulster. Accordingly, at Lloyd
George's request.
the Irish Cabinet Committee entered a long
deliberation
on 1? February I920 and emerged recommending
the larger
1

Ulster.

3

2

The subcommittee also recommended that
the

Imperial Government finance the completion of land
and

transfer the yearly profits from completed purchases
to
the Irish government.

As soon as Balfour heard that the

Cabinet approved these recomraendationG

,

he fired off a

strong dissenting paper in hopes of reversing the decision.

3

22

This memorandum is especially significant because

five days later the Cabinet reverted back to the six county
123
scheme.
Balfour began by asserting that the inclusion
of the homogenous Catholic areas such as Donegal in the

Protestant state would violate the Peace Conference principles.
the

The six county scheme, he argued, would diminish

'chronic nuisance' of Irish agitation in English speak-

ing countries, and would '...show the world that the prin-

ciples we apply to other peoples are those we accept for
ourselves,'

121
122

Developing his rationale further, he saidi

Bonar L&.w's I'-lemorandum for Irish Cabinet Committee,
17 February I920, CP 664, CAB2V98.
Balfour's l.lemorandum on Ireland, 19 February 1920,
Ct 681, CAB2V98.

Cabinet Winutes, 24 February 1920, CAB23/20.

279
If you have a Hibernia Irredenta
within the
province Of Ulster, you will greatly
difficulties Of the Ulster parliament,add to the
you will
reproduce on a small scale all the
trouble
which
we have had at Westminster during
the forV years
oetween the advent of i^arnell on the
stage^in IS78, and the blessed refusalpolitical
of the
to take the oath of allegiance
in
^o"??
1910 and you will throw on the ii:xecutive at
ijelfast the same embarrassments from
which the
i^xecutive
Dublin is now suffering.
If this or anything like this haopens,
there
will be no Irisn settlement. Vvhereas,
if
carry out logically the princit)les of self-you
determination, you need fear no effective agitation either outside Great Britain or in Iri-land
for re-unitmg the two fragments of the Ireland
which you Home Rule Bill divides. Any movement
on behalf of the oouth and west to force the
North-east into an unnatural unification wilJ
be without excuse, and will appear to be what
it really is, a mere struggle for domination.
{

m

Regarding the Committee's decision on finances, he hoped
that
...we shall not be absurdly lavish.
I have not
the least desire to be vindictive, and I would
treat the rebels as one gentleman treats another
in matters of pure business.
But 1 would neither
give them more money xhan they are entitled to,
on the wholly false ground that they have been
ungenerously treated in the past, nor would I
overpay them on the principle which induces a
T^an to give a large sum to an organ-grinder in
order to induce him to play his too familiar
tune in somebody else's street rather than in
his o^'/n.
I would pay neither conscience money

nor blackmail.
Besides illustrating his continuing disdain for the Roman
Catholic Irish, this memorandum shows Balfour as an effective advocate of Ulster Unionist interests during the

drafting process.

His November and i^ebruary interventions

appear to have been crucial in determining that the final
Government of Ireland Bill provided for the six counties

,
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and very limited powers for
the Council of Ireland.
Balf our
undoubtedly helped to foil the
Southern Unionists' att erriDts
to have Lord Midleton secure
either the abolition of the
Northern Parliament, or a significant
extension of the
Council Of Ireland's powers. ^^z.
3^,,^^^.^ objections to
continued Irish representation at
Westminster as well as
those of his cousin, Robert Cecil,
may have been effect
in. influencing Lloyd George to
reduce these seats from the
original 6^ to 1,2^^5 ..^^ Cabinet's
decision to turn over
000, 000 in land annuities rather
than the
,

000 000 to
,

^5.000,000 originally suggested^^-^ by the
cabinet committee,
may have been due to Balfour's warnings
about
'conscience

money' or 'blackmail' as much as to ordinary
Treasury thrift
During the second reading debates on the
Government
of Ireland Bill, Balfour's influence seems
evident in the

government speakers' insistence on Ulster's right
to remain
separate as long as she liked. Considering his
contributions to the Cabinet deliberations in November
and February,
it appears that Balfour must share some of the
responsibil-

ity traditionally assigned to Lloyd George as the
villain
of the piece in the 1920 partition.

As his public speeches

2 2^f-.^

Auckland, rdJih Unimisni. pp. 226-30. i/Iidloton had met
several times with the sub- committee and with the rrime
Minister and Long in hopes of preventing partition, or
at least to insure that it would be as short-lived as
possible

12

'5

-^Cabinet Minutes,

126

10 December I919, CAB23/18.

Cabinet Minutes, 22 December 1919, GAB23/I8.
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in 1913 and subsequent cabinet
memoranda indicate. Balfcour
was a stronger advocate of
the tv;o-nations theory than
the Prime Mnister.
Lloyd George, on the other
hand.
1918 and during the 1921 treaty negotiations,
was willing
to work for Irish unity if Sinn
Fein would accept imperial
membership in return.
^ ^^^^^^
^.^

m

experiences

with Ulster during the Home Rule
crisis, in I916 and during
the Irish Convention, the Prime
Minister had no great

affection for the Ulstermen.

Patrick Bu.ckland had shown

that the Southern Unionists

influence and prestige in

's

Tory and ministerial circles was most
effective when they
had advocates such as Long and Lnasdowne in
the Cabinet. ^^'^
By 1919-20 only Long remained to defend
the southern loyalist desire to preserve Irish unity.
Iviidleton attempted to

protect his southern colleagues from his position in
the
Lordr^,

did

T.iuch

Hov^ever,

Balfour's presence in the Cabinet probably

to override the strenuous Southern Unionist efforts

to prevent partition.

associated with the

As a senior party man intimately

Iris}i

Question for forty years. Balfour

was bound to have a considerable influence over the Irish

policy of the Prime Minister.
127

Balfour had been, after all,

Boyce, SrisliSiinLGll Chapters Six and Eight: Savas^e,
•Lloyd George and Ireland,' J^umai oX British Siidiss.
12, i\o. If 80-103,
*

^Patrick Buckland, 'The Southern Irish Unionists, the
Irish Question and British Politics.' Irish iils-tiirixal
No. 59 (March, 19^7 ), 228-255.
SliUlisrir 15
f
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a close colleague of Lloyd
George X>oth during the v/ar and
the peace negotiations, and his
view must have been

respected.
The Ulster Unionists were undoubtedly
grateful to

have a distinguished minister who
espoused the two-nations
theory, and who insisted that Ulster be
allowed a -clean
cut' if a Roman Catholic dominated Dublin
parliament was
inevitable.
That the surgery was arranged to prevent

future nationalist agitation in Protestant
loyalist areas
was in no small measure due to Balfour's
influence.
In

1919-20

»

Balfour emerged again as the strong and effective

champion of allegedly threatened Ulster Unionist
interests.
Even if Lloyd George can not be completely absolved
of the

partition of Ireland, Ealfour must bo rscognir.ed as a
major accomplice in this crime against the republican
idea of 'Ireland, a Nation',
iv)

From Partition to the Anglo-Irish Treaty

The introduction of the Government cf Ireland Bill

in

Iv'iarch

only encouraged rspublican zeal and precipitated

more frequent and fierce attacks upon the Crown forces by
the Irish Republican Army,

Between this intensified

guerilla v/arfare and Sinnj'ein's total usurpation of Irish
governmental functions, Lloyd George's ministry was in a
quagmire over its Irish poJicy by early I920.

international enthusiasni for

'

Contemporary

self-determi.nation

difficult xo apply a poJ.icy of 'thorough'.

'

made it

Nevertheless,
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Lloyd Gecrge, weary of the
parliamentary and international
difficulties engendered by the
Anglo-Irish war, was constantly urged by Generals Sir Henry
Wilson, Sir Neville
Iv:acGready and Tudor as well
as by southern loyalists
to
apply full martial law. 1^9 ,,.^3,^^
Churchill, now i.iinister
of vVar, also wanted to abandon
'leniency' for vigorous
measures against the rebels. ^30
Criticism of the Home Rule
proposals along with this concern over
chaotic Irish conditions impelled the Prime Minister to
appoint in late
June yet another cabinet committee,
the Irish Situation
Committee.

After a month of weekly meetings, the new
committee
called for full martial law.
Only this policy, they

main-

tained, would convince the world, the Southern
Unionists

and the Sinn Feiners, of England's determination
to suppress the republican movement.

Minimum recommendations

included limiting railroads to government usage, closing
post offices, cancelling pensions in Sinn
and rounding up all Sinn Fein activists

i'ein

counties,

"^^"^
.

Two lines of thought, one coercive and one

129-

C. Caldwell, Diary P£ sir Mnry.
iillsm (New York:
ocriDners, 192?;, ii, 329-31; Bonar i^aw's reoort on
^^uthern^ Unionist deputation. 29 April 1920,*Cr 1195,

ii.".

2

30

On 22 April 1920, Churchill circulated to the Cabinet
General F. Shaw's plea for a more forecful government
policy.
CP 1672, CAB2VIO9.

13.1

-^"Report of the Irish Situation Committee,
CP 1672, CAE2V109.

22 July 1920,
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conciliatory, emerged from the ivdnister's
lengthy 23 July
deliberations on the Irish Situation Committee's
recommendations.
On the one hand, IvlacGready, Tudor,
Chiefsecretary Greenwood, and Winston Churchill pushed
for
country-wide martial law.
In addition. General

KiacCready

supported General Strickland's proposal to arrest
and
deportr under the new Criminal Justice Bill, all Sinn
Fein

agitators.

Churchill advocated raising 30,000 Ulstermen

to supplement the Black and Tan forces approved by
him in
TOO
late May.
There was even a proposal to regularize the

Ulster Volujiteer .^orce to fight the republicans

.

-'"^^

Viewing

martial law powers as the most violent conceivable, Balfour

recommended that martial law be confined to districts only
where absolutely required

.

"^^'"^

He was also opposed to

Churchill's proposal to recruit Ulstermen as well as

another suggestion to fill the depleted Royal Irish Constabulary with iinglishmen.

The former Unionist chief

feared these extreme suggestions would further weaken the

government's position before the world.

Three days later

Greenwood wanted to establish military- manned courtmartials to deal with ordinary and extraordinary crime
in these Irish areas where juries refused to convict and
132

134

Jones,

V/Jiiiejiail

Diary, iii, 22.

Report of a Conference of Ministers on Ireland, 23 July
1920, Ci- 1693, CAB 2V-O9.
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judges were reluctant to impose the
death sentence.

Again Balfour questioned the application
of extreme
measures as potentially damaging to Britain's
already
tarnished international reputation. Greenwood's
proposal
"...to use war machinery after peace is declared
.and
hand over the administration in Ireland to soldiers..."

absolutely staggered him.

Balfour warned that such steps

were appropriate only when

ment to apply it.

necessity drives the Govern-

This is going to be attacked in this

country and the Dyer debate has not helped us to govern
by soldiers.

It Is a most tremendous power.

""'"'^

Balfour's

anxiety did not derive from any recognition of the Irish
Republicaii Army as gallant soldiers waging a justifiable
v/ar.
Ills

He considered them murderous, criminal rebels,

cind

hesitancy emanated exclusively from his concern for

the ministry's domestic and international prestige.

Bal-

four evidently appreciated the mounting domestic criticism
of Irish policy by labor leaders as well as from leading

intellectuals such as J, K. Green, Sir John Simon, Arthur
F»

Basil

V^HliaimvS

invol\''t;r-ent

in

and James Bryce,

t}ie

Irish Teace Council's efforts to ter-

minate the Anglo-Irish

v/ar

by negotiations had some impact

upon nis distinguished cousin.'
J ones,
^'^''Ihi^..t
'

.,^Vj2ii£]i§jj.

p.

Perhaps Robert Cecil's

His own experiences as

Diacy. iii, 27.

33.

Boyce, .::^nglishmen, Chapter Ihree*

.
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Irish Chief-Secretary apparently taught
Balfour the
dangers of investing more power in the
police and the

military than was absolutely required.

He had spent many

nights in the Commons defending zealous constabulary
men
from Nationalist and Liberal attacks. The failure
of the

generals to secure at this juncture Lloyd George's
per-

mission for full martial law may have been partially
due
to Balfour's hesitant views.

Support for a conciliatory solution to the deepening
crisis came from the Irish civilian administrators attending the late July deliberations.
Mr. J.

0.

Sir John Anderson,

wylie, the Law Advisor, and Mr. Alfred Cope urged

the ministers to seek a dominion Home Rule settlement by

negotiating with Sinn Fein leaders
the

'de facto'

.

They acsertod that

Sinn -ein government had proven the Irish

capacity for self --government
people's support.

Indeed,

,

iVir.

and that it commanded the
Cope predicted that Sinn

Feiners would be loyal imperialists v/ithin two years, and

added that Cardinal Logue was inclined to the dominion
solut:,onc

138

Curzon and Fisher were sympathetic, the

former urging consultation with Sinn Fein leaders, the
latter positing that Sinn Fein might be satisfied by an

immediate or future addition of excise and customs powers
138

Anderson's iuemorandum on Irish Situation, 25 July I920,
CP 1639, also conference notes of 23 July 1920, CP I693,
CAB24/IO9. Anderson v/as Under-^'Ccretary to the Viceroy.
Cope was an assistant Under-^:>ecretary

to the Government of Ireland
Bill.

When these various

suggestions for concession seemed to
be gaining Lloyd
George's sympathy, ^^9 Balfour
abandoned his silence and
vigorously attacked any deviation from
the government's
established bill. He did not believe
Fisher's customs
and excise proposal would mitigate
republican separatism.
You can not stop there if you go so
far.
broad lines of the Irish case were clear. The
It
was based on the idea of 'Ireland a
nation',
and thjs was at the back of the growth of
the
Republican Party. So far as the South was
concerned, he would like to go as far as possible, but the giving of Customs and Excise
was a ruinous concession, and if frranted we
would be forced to go further. It had never
been^ thought that Customs and Excise should
be given to the states in America or evGn in
the Dominions.
At the heart of Sinn Fv.m the
real ideal was a separate Republic, and nothing
would^be got by seeing their leaders but
humiliation.
It m^jy bo that you can hold on
a little by grasping at one tuft of grass
after another in hope that you will not go
over the precipice, but over the Drecipice
you will go, and the tufts of grass wil not
help you.

Moreover, Balfour opposed negotiations lest Ulster's posi-

tion in the present bill be compromised:
In his previous policy Ulster was to remain
part of the United Kingdom, and his worst
opponents were those who hated the idea of
dividing Ireland, whereas he liked it. It
was a geographical accident that Ireland was
surrouiided by sea.
This should be ignored,
and their inveterate religious and rr^. a
prejudices recognized.
On any other
an Irish settlement was a pure illusi

Jones, WJiiigiiali piajcx*
'lid,!.,

p.

30.

2?
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To reinforce his oral objections,
Balfour immediately

drafted a Cabinet memorandum to prevent
the advocates of
conciliation from endangering the six
counties' separation
from the South.
He charged that neither negotiation
toward dominion status nor the abandonment
of the northern
parliament would diminish the Sinn Fein campaign
of out-

rage and assassination.

He insisted upon retaining the

Home Rule principle in the current bill, not
out of love
it, but because an abandonment at that stage
would bring

serious discredit, disgrace and infamy upon the
government.
It would be viewed as a concession to organized
assassina-

tion.

The former Unionist chief reminded his colleagues

of Craig's recent declaration to the Cabinet that
Ulster

now intended to make their northern parliament work.
Balfour believed that reverting back to six-county union

with England would play into Sinn Fein hands.

He feared

that Sinn Feiners would be able to manipulate the small

frictions and petty jealousies between Ulster representatives and English members to create even some Protestant

sympathy for reabsorption into the Irish system.

He again

charged that concessions tov/ard dominion status or some
'new Utopia' would simply invite continued agitation in

Ireland and among the Irish abroad.

It v/ould diminish any

remaining chance of the current bill settling the Irish
l'|]

'Balfour's Cabinet Memorandum on Ireland, 2k July 1920,
CP 1683, CAB2V109.

,

«

'
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Question.

Ke was also concerned that
granting additional
powers to the southern legislature
would produce an

irresistible deraand for similar
concessions to the northe
legislature. As a result, he predicted,
'Ulster, unwillingly, will be driven far along the
road to separation,

Balfour concluded by emphasizing the
persistence of
republicanism in Irish agitation, and of the
futility of
eradicating it by limited concessions

All through Irish history since the rebellion
of 179« the men who have been Dremred
to run
most risks and to commit most crimes on
behalf of the Ireland of their drea.ms are
the extremists; and to them nothing short
of
a Irish republic will be really acceptable.
This party has constantly been crushed, but
It has never been destroyed.
It has formed an
essential element in all the movements for
destroying the Union.
The leaders of these
movements have first silently used it and
then openly denounced it; and all in turn,
after having denounced it, have themselves
lost po>//er and prestige.
If when we let it
be understood that our Home Rule Bill is no
more than an installment, we invite further
agitation; we give the extremists the occasion
they seek; and we shall have before us a long
perspective of Heme Rule amendment bills to
which no term can be assigned exceot that of
complete separation. Holding this' view, I
have to admit that neither the present nor
any other Home Rule Bill is going to settle
the Irish question.
The party of assassination will still be there ready for action
under some new alias whenever" the opportunity
occurs.
The most we can hope for is' to v/eaken
the chances of an alliance, always temporary
but alv/ays formidable, between them and the
moderates
Although it is difficult to determine exactly the
impact of Balfour's viev/s, some conclusions can be drawn
on the basis of ultimate government policy and' written

.
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evidence.

Lloyd George's decision' to limit
the Criminal
Justice Bill to specific areas and powers
may have been
influenced more by Balfour's response to the
generals'

recommendations than by agreement with the
conciliationist in the Irish administration.

Having disregarded

Castle advice on conscription in I9I8, the Prime
Minister

probably was no more inclined to accept it in
1920.

On

the other hand, Balfour's opposition to extending
the

proposed Dublin parliament's powers toward dominion
status,
and his insistence on the preservation of the
northern

parliament seems to have been crucial,

waiter Long,

Chairman of the Irish Situation Committee reported on
2.5

July that his colleagues were impressed by Balfour's

rationale, and that they wanted to proceed with the bill
intact.

l'-!2
"

This is significant in view of Long's acceptance,

albeit reluctant, of a more moderate Unionism in I9I8
Besides checking the conciliatory views of Wylie, Anderson, Cope, Fisher £md Curzcn, Balfour was undoubtedly

influential in frustrating Tom Jones' efforts to press a

negotiated dominion solution upon his boss, the Prime
Minister.

Immediately after sympathy for concession was

aired at the 23 July Cabinet, Jones suggested conferring
full powers to Dublin, excepting only those over defense
1^?
"Walter Long's report of Irish Situation Committee keeting,
25 July 1920, CP 1689, CAB2V109.

Balfour,
197-98.

•^^'\.ong to

ff.

l''r

A^ril 1918, B.

ivi.

Add.

I.'IS

49,777,

,
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and ports.

Jones, closely linked to the
imperial federationist Round Table movement, already
had sounded America
and dominion opinion. Ke told the Prime
Minister this

would probably be accepted abroad as a
just Irish ^.ettlement.

The dominion solution commanded support
.from

some Irish quarters.

On ^ August 1920, Richard Beamish,

a prominent Cork Unionist told Lloyd George
this was the

only alternative to the present anarchy.

Sir Stanley

Harrington, a Roman Catholic Home Ruler, recommended

scuttling the present bill as the only means of preventin
civil

vs'ar.-^^'^

However, Lloyd George still refused to

negotiate with Sinn Fein and to contemplate any increase
in the powers assigned under the Government of Ireland

Bill.

In defending his position, the trime Ihini

strategy, imperial fiscal needs as well as the

promises that Ulster would be protected.

ir cite
.

3ated

He argued that,

to retain Ulster in the United Kingdom, would constitute

financial coercion since Irish and Ulster taxes probably

would be substantially lower than British -taxes

.

This is

the kind of difficulty which Balfour anticipated if the

northern parliament were abandoned.

Now that the Ulster

Unionist Council and their leader, Jaines Craig, were con-

vinced that their salvation lay in a northern parliarnent

Balfour

v/ris

again available to prevent Ulster interests

Jones, w^j-tejiaJJ. Diax^r, iii, 32.
'-^Ibld.f p. 35.
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being sacrificed to British and
dominion opinion.
Given
the heavy Tory complexion of
the Ministry and the Commons,
Lloyd George could not afford
to ignore
the views of the

eldest and most distinguished Tory
leader.
Lloyd Geo]
)rge
maintained his hardline approach
well into 1921, and i,Ln so
doing he was in full agreement with
Balfour.
These faltering attempts toward negotiation
in July
were followed in the autumn by the most violent
episodes
of the Anglo-Irish War of which the incidents
at Balbrir'-aan

Croke Park and the burning of Cork are

tlie

most infamous.

The government's reprisals for republican violence
only

served to drive the moderates, whom Balfour hoped would

accept the government bill, into the republican ranks.
Despite his distaste for country-wide m.artial law, and
even

thou-7;h

he preferred transportation of Sinn Feiners as

opposed to execution, -^^"^^ Balfour's unfaltering opposition
to concessions in July I920 means that he shared with

Lloyd George a major responsibility on the British side
for the prolonged Anglo-Irish War and its attendant costs.
In April I921, prior to the elections scheduled for

the

two parliaments, another move to extend the Government

of Ireland Bill's powers was initiated.

This would have

necessitated postponing or cancelling the first elections
under the Government of Ireland Act.

Balfour opposed this

idea, and also any truce negotiations with Sinn Feiners,

146

Jones, ibiisiisil Dj^ary, iii^ 76.
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whom he considered murderers, not
belligerents

Refusing

.

to recognize any group not sanctioned
by the Imperial

Parliament, he considered a southern parliament,
not Sinn
Fein, the proper machinery for negotiations.
An additional
motive for Balfour's desire to proceed with the
schedule'
was probably the idea that a completed election
would give
a Belfast parliament and the six county exclusion

status.

a 'de

facto'

The long and delicate negotiations between Lloyd

George and the Sinn Fein leaders during November and

December 1921 eventually proved the trem.endous difficulty
of challenging this northern regime's existence after June

1921.

Again on 12 Kay

vihen

Edwin Kontagu, H. A.

L.

Fisher,

Robert Munro, Christopher Addison, and even Winston Chur-

chill favored investigating possibilities of a negotiated
truce with Sinn Fein, Balfour insisted upon implementing
the Government of Ireland Act.

He reiterated his belief

that concession v/ould only :lnvite further agitation by

irreconcilable republicans for full independence.

Although

acknowledging the salutary effect of a 'beau geate' on

English opinion, he v/arned it would demonstrate '...we've
never stood in any entrenchment we dug..,'

He wanted to

end '...this uphill, sordid, unchivalrous

loathsome con-

flict.

,

not by concessions, but by making '.«.our Irish

policy on all fours with our European policy of self^^'"'^^

J ones, iL]ijj;r.}--j2

Ilisxr^.t

III, 61.

29^

determination.'

The Home Rule Act, he believed,
would cut

away the American, Australian and
Canadian supporters of
Irish agitation.
Balfour's insistence that ^in Feiners
had no right to expect concessions^^^
was undoubtedly
reinforced by the detailed weekly reports on
the AngloIrish War which Hamar Greenwood and General
LlacCready

submitted to the Cabinet.

Immediately following Balfour's

speech, Lloyd Georf^e echoed his colleague's
hardline

approach.

By a vote of 9 to

5 the

Cabinet dashed any

hopes that the recent decline in violence and
the

5

May

1912 talks between DeValera and Craig might generate
pesice^^^
V/ithin a few weeks, however,

Lloyd George was forced

to recognize the futility of repression.

The combined

impact of General Crozier's rebruary resignation, Asquith's
pleas f and rising domestic and dominion criticism, demanded
that the Prime Minister attempt to open truce negotiations

with De Valera.

VAhen,

on the eve of the Imperial Confer-

ence, General Smuts identified the Irish Question as the

greatest obstacle to imperial solidarity and loyalty,
Lloyd. George agreed to extend an olive branch via the

King's forthcoming speech at the opening of the Belfast
parliament.
'""^

J ones,

1^9 These

After Balfour objected to the 'gush' of smut's

WhiicJiall Siary, iii, 65,

reports are in CAB
till miQ-1921.

2^;-,

"^^BoycG, j^islishm^Uf pp. 131-33

and date from early I920
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suggested draft,

the Prime Minister assigned the
elderly

Cecilian with the revision.

Ironically, it was Balfour's

version that was delivered by King George V
on 22 June
which led to the 11 July 1921 truce, and the
subsequent
British offer of dominion status to De Valera tc
iays

^

later.

Over Tom Jones' protests, Lloyd George

i

\

^Ived

Balfour in drawing up the truce and dominion proposals
because he '...believed in implicating in the negotiations
'thxi

most extreme exponent of his policy .' '[^^

Balfour

seems to have exerted some critical influence even at this
stage.

In arranging for the truce negotiations, a three

way conference between De Valera, Craig and the Prime
Minister was suggested.

De Valera had asked the Southern

Unionists of Midleton's Anti-Partition League to persuade

Craig to meet with him a second time."^^^

Balfour, anxious

that British and dominion pressure might lead to an Ulster
sell-out, vetoed the tripartite meeting saying '...he was

all for meeting De Valera apart from Ulster and doing

everything to mark the division between
••^\ioneSf :?lbit(ihall Diary,

iii, 80;

them,'^-''-^

Once

Cabinet Ldnutes, 24 June

1921, CAB23/26.

Jones, 'Iihii^h2ll Diiiry, iii, 87.
D. Fair, 'Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921,' isi-i^nml
British ^iu3J.ea, xii, No. 2, p. I37.

"^•^-^John

'-^'^Buckland,

Irish Uni^mlsjB, p. ^39.

vVhiteh all Diary
Even if Craig had met
iii, 86.
with Dg Valera, the Irish republican leader v/ould still
have insisted that he v/as SDokesman of the Irish nation,
and therefore that he should conduct the direct negotiations v/ith the British government.

-'-55jones,

,

2Q6

again the Ulstermen apparently
benefitted from Balfour's
advocacy of their cause. Thus De
Valera never got an
opportunity to attei.pt a via media
with Craig by modifying his republican demands in
exchange for Irish unity.
The eventual truce and treaty
negotiations remained separate, and the resulting Anglo-Irish
Treaty
of 1921

preserved the partition which Balfour
had believed essential since I913,

Although undoubtedly pleased to secure
Protestant
Ulster's exclusion from a Dublin parliament,
Balfour was
not enthusiastic about the dominion status
offer.

Tom

Jones reported that Balfour had been the most
'irreconcilible Minister' during these negotiations

On 22 Julv

follcvdng the Cabinet's approval of the offer, Lloyd
George
commented that
...Balfour squirmed
.when the terms were
discussed preliminary to sending them to
De Valera.
They were so contrary to all
the views the old man ever had on Ir-eland.
But he gave in gracefully in the end.... 157

Despite Balfour's absence in America during the treaty

negotiations, the Nort}i9rn Ireland Parliament was protected

by Austen Chamberlain and Bonar Law who supported Craig's
refusal to ccnsider Lloyd George's suggested compromise

"^^^Buckland
]

57

,

Irisll .Unionism,

p.

xi,

Francos otevons on, Lloii^ Geoil^e, A
laylor (London:
Hutchinson, 1971),

D.la.ry,

p.

cd. A.

231.

J.

P.
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of an all-Ireland parliament within
the Empire.

Balfour demonstrated his strong sympathy
for Protestant Ulster in 1922 when the bloody
Belfast pogroms
and the proposed Free :3tate constitution
absorbed Lloyd
George in the Irish Question again. Although
concerned
lest the world think Britain approved Belfast
sectarianism, Balfour opposed an official inquiry which
put Ulster

in the dock and called the South to V/itness.^^^

When the

constitution submitted by the Bail cabinet seemed too
republican for the British Cabinet, Balfour recommended
stern warnings by Britain.

Ke suggested blockading the

North against potential republican incursions, and even

called for refugee centers for

soutJ).ern

loyalists

"'^^
.

Afraid that the republicans were securing arms from Belgium,
the United States and even England, Balfour told the

Cabinet of Craig's anxieties that a great republican con-

spiracy was aj-ming to destroy Ulster by exacerbating

Catholic-Protestant tensions in the North for its propaganda

effect.''"^"''

Balfour's prior advocacy of the North

made him the logical person to carry to Craig Lloyd

George's v/arning that the Belfast

pogroms were threaten-

ing the whole Irish settlement and the resulting
J

ones, sihLLehall Difiryr

p.

iii,

15^^-

Blake, Bon?.r Law,

i|'32<.

159Cabinet Minutes, 30

I^iay

I922, CA323/30.

-'^^^Cabinet I-dnutes,

1

June 1922, CAB23/30.

i^lCabinet L^inutes,

2

June 1922, CAB23/30.
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improvement in Britain's international
reputation.
was not uncharacteristic that in
reporting

It

to the Cabinet,

Balfour again echoed Ulster's suspicions
and disdain for
the Southern Irish.
Balfour had been instrumental
in

laying the foundations for the Unionist
dominated six
counties, and the next fifty years were to
prove just
effective.ly this political monopoly of the
Protestant

loyalists and partition had been secured.
"^^^Cabinet Minutes, 2 June 1922, CAB23/3C.

hov/
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Arthur Balfour's response to the Irish Question

between 1835 and I921 leads to a number of important
conclusions about his statesmanship and his ability to
rise above class and environmental prejudices in pursuit
of a permanently constructive and realistic Irish policy.

His thoughts and actions provide useful insights on the

general Unionist posture towards Ireland and help

to

explain England's failure to solve the Irish Question with
the success which was simultaneously marking the evolution
of the British Commonwealth.

Although one of the foremost champions of the Union

during this era, Balfour never really accepted the idea
that Ireland and

j^lngland

could or should be integrated into

the free and equal partnership v;hich the Act of Union

allegedly intended.

When first forced to take cognizance

of the Irish Question, Balfour thought that the native

Irish were inferior to the British in virtually every

respect.

His disdain was exacerbated by the apparent

prevalence of clerical influence and persistent rural disorder, both of which offended his intellectual and aristo-

cratic sensibilities.

Despite the significant improvement

in Irish economic, Locial and political conditions by 1910,

Balfour had not significantly modified his Anglo-.Saxon

disdain and contempt for Hibernia.

As the Budget and
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House of Lords controversies illustrate, he
resented the
Irish members' ability to use their legislative
equality
to influence British politics and achieve
their own cherished goal, Home Rule.

.Lven

though some of the Irish

representatives of the early twentieth century, like
John Redmond, had acquired respect for and skill in

British parliamentary traditions, Balfour would have

preferred in 1912 to jettison all but the irotestant
Kortheaat.

This is hardly consistent with theories of

equal partnership, or for that matter, with his previous
contentions that time, patience and mutual tolerance

would create a bond between the Irish and the iinglish
similar to that between the iinglish and the t.cotch.

while

his hostility to J^edmond and hi? c-.ollepgues had mellowed

during the

vvar,

Balfour's support for the I916 Home Kule

proposals was predicated more on the American factor than

upon recognition of legitimate Irish nationality or the
rights of

s!i:all :-i3ticns.

In his inveterate suspicion of

the Irish, he considered the anti-conscription campaign

simply as another manifestation of Fenian disloyalty.

He

refused to see this cainpaign as Ireland's attempt to
uphold the principles for which the Allies allegedly were
fighting.
Vv'est

to

t-v:

V/hen.

the Sinn Fein victory in the

in I9I8 gave j.nconter^tablc

Gutservient to Britai;:;

ric-oof

.L-a.i.iOui'

^:>outh

of Ireland's refusal

reiterated

liis

preference for cutting out the Roman Catholic Irish
instead of working for a comprcmije on

and

V.Ui

basis of

.
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equality and Irish unity.

The evidence cugsests that this

erudite Cecilian could accept democratic nationalism only

when it subscribed to traditional British values and
institutions.

His praise of Canadian and Australian

nationalism, during and subsequent to the war, undoubtedly
was facilitated by the common British assumption that the

dominions were inherently loyal to the British imperial

connection and all its as:-5ociated traditions and values.
Since the Irish did not accept automatically, especially

after I900, the allef;ed superiority of British civilization, Ba3-four's response to rising democratic nationalism

across the Irish Sea lacked the flexibility and magnanimity which characterized his attitude toward the dominion:;.
His opposition to the I.iorley-kinto reforms in India tends
to substantiate the degree to which his advocacy of par-

liamentary democracy was conditioned by Anglo-Saxon
racism.

If Balfour's inclination to

,iud,9;e

the Irisli

people as well as their institutions and achievements

exclusively by Anflo-Saxon standards was typical of most
British politicians, it is small wonder that a successful integration of Ireland and England under the Union

was neve r ac h i 0 vc. d
:L'hrou{;;}ioat

his career Balfour dealt with the Irish

Question principally from the English perspective.
from

never

htr.
v/as

Aside

response to the land and educational issues, he

motivated to a pen-

in,vesti<";ati on of

.'..tin;^

and sympathetic

other causes of contemporary Irish

30?

alienation.

Although he acknowledged the disastrous

effects of English policy in the seventeenth
and eighteenth
centuries, after I903 he consistently
asserted that
con-

structive unionism had redressed all legitimate
Irish
grievances.

Similar to G. M. Trevelyan, he often attrib-

uted continued disaffection to the remarkable
historical
memories of the Irish people.

This attitude demonstrates

his insensitivity to consistent political nationalism
as

well as to the growing manifestations of cultural nationalism which surfaced in Ireland in the two decades prior to

World

v/ar I.

His English and aristocratic perspective

prevented him from responding more generous ].y to the
plight of the Irish town and urban laborer.

critical mistake

^

This was a

for after I903 the separatist ideas of

the Irish Republican Brotherhood and Sinn Fein were enthu-

siasticclly received by this neglected segment of the
Irish population.

While laborers' grievances received

some satisfaction through the local government reforms,

•

the Irish urb^n. workers alv/ays resented that the farmers

had been
ment.
lanci

his

CuOre

liberally dealt with by xhe British govern-

V/hile Balfour

recognized the importance of the

question in the Irish Parliarstentary Party's i)rogram,
.'Un'id

purchase schemes were essentialj.y conservative

measures designed to save the English private property

system from an rillegedly contagious socialistic challenge.
Besides delivering the Irish landlords from financial
ruin, the conservative intv-rntion of land purchase is
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illustrated by Balfour's contention that ownership
would
convert the Irish fanner into a staunch advocate
of law,

order and private property

,

In other words,

farmer would become more English.

the Irish

The reprimands which

Balfour hurled at recalcitrant landlords did not emanate
exclusively from altruistic sympathy for the tenants.
They derived also from Palfour's recognition that accounts
of evictions and hi.eh rents during depression tended to

justify, in the mind of the British public, the policies
of Michael Davitt and his lieutenants.

That land pur-

chase was part of the Nationalist program tends to cast

Balfour's land policy in a more generous and responsive
light.

Certainly Balfour deserves recognition for his

consistent tenacity and determination in

implem.ent,i

ng this

policy arcainst the objections of conservative colleagues,
radicals

J.

the Treasury and some Irish landlords.

Kevei-

theless, the beneficiaJ. c.ffects of land purchase on the
Irish political

arid

eoonorrlc scene siiould not obscure the

fact that this program served English interests to an
equal, and perhaps greater, degree.
Iri

the last stages of the Anglo-Irish imbroglio,

Balfour's anxiety for Britain's international reputation,

rather than sympathy with the innocent victims of guerrilla
warfare, was the principal factor causing his reluctance
to apply full martial

lav/.

Likewise in 1921, he accepted

truce negotiations with bimFein

i^niy

Amerlcarx and some domestic pres.^ure.

because of dominion,
The former Unionist
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chief never accepted the legitimacy and
capability of Sinn
Fein leadership, despite the overwhelming
evidence
of

popular support and his professed belief in
self-determination.

This inclination to view the Irish as
inferior

and alien, and to approach the Irish Question
principally

from an English perspective, suggests that, in the
last
analysis, Balfour considered Ireland more a subservient

colony than an integral part of the United Kingdom.

Of

course, the economic, geographic, demographic and politica

realities made a consistent colonial approach difficult
and inappropriate.

This ambivalence in determining

exactly the nature of Ireland's relation to England

undoubtedly hindered a consistently constructive and
realistic Irish policy.

This ambivalence was not the

monopoly of the Unionists, for there were many Liberals
v;hose support for Heme Rule emanated from their disdain

for the Irish os much as from traditional liberal tenets.

Balfour's involvement in Irish affairs provides

evidence of a common British tendency to use the Irish
QuGi-rcion

for partisan political purposes.

During Vne

winter of 1885"6, he enthusiastically supported Salisbury 'i
tactic of forcing Gladstone to commit the Liberals to the

perilous Kome Rule course.

The Conservatives rejected

bipartisan efforts to solve the pereiiniai Irish difficulty on the assumption that Gladstone's conversion would
precipitate a liberal fissure.

The Conservative's antici-

pated thereby a

rather than the precarious

stror"'; i^.sjority
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position which they held during the Caretaker
Ministry.
Balfour's espousal of democratic local government
reform
for Ireland in 1892 was largely predicated upon
the need
to preserve Liberal Unionist support.

Although constructive

unionism continued during the tenures of Gei-ald Balfour
and George v/yndham, it would be naive to eliminate the

importance of the Liberal Unionist factor, or Balfour's
hopes of remoulding Irish character according to Anglo-

Saxon likes.

When this policy seemed a party liability

after 1903, Balfour withdrew his previously enthusiastic
support.

During 1910-11 Home

Paile

provided a convenient

issue to camouflage the deep divisions within the Unionist

party over questions of tariff and social reform.
of the Ur.ion, however

s

v/as

Defense

a policy which could command

support from both the conservative and liberal wings of
the Unionist party,

iiven

though there was evidence of

federalist sympathies in boxh parties, partisan political
considerations destroyed perhaps the last chance for

a

•

peaceful solution of the Irish Question. 'As late as I913,
when war clouds hung ominously over Europe, Balfour's
response to the Cherkley meetings illustrates a tendency
to use the Ulster aspect of the Irish Qu.es ti on to engineer
a Liberal defeat.

Notwithstanding the complicated

(eco-

nomic,- i^eligious and social dimensions of the Irish Ques-

tion during this era, the persistent refusal of Balfour

and other Unionist politicians to seek a bipartisan solu-

tion exacerbated Irish alienation toward

i::ngland

and

helped to precipitate the dangerous Ulster
crisis of
191^-1'.

The separatism advocated by ^inn Fein
before 1916

probably derived as much from their refusal to
be the
pawns of British politicians as from the
Fenian republican
tradition,
Balfour's role in shaping the character of early

twentieth-century Irish society was considerable.

His

anxieties about the effects of Irish rural disorder in

conjunction with his economic interpretation of Irish
discontent encouraged him to devise a more constructive
and practical Irish policy than had any Irish
tion in the late nineteenth century.

adr.iinistr-.-

His economic and

social amelioration was an important antidote to the indifference which had characterized Irish policy during

Disraeli

'ii

ministry.

lie

was astute enough to realize

that represoion had to be tempered with concession.

Although conciliation did not quench Irish nationalist
aspirations, it did alter significantly the features of

rural life,

rlie

economic and political conservatism of

Irish rural cOi^munities is largely the result of the success of Balfour's land purchase program.

Constructive

unionise effectively eroded the foundations of agrarian
socialism which Michael Davitt and his disciples struggled to build during the land agitations of the late
'seventies and early 'eighties.

Although peasant propri-

etorship has not proved especially appropriate to the
realities of tv/entieth-century economic organization, the

30?

land purchase policy was a tremendous success from
the

perspective of the late Victorian British Establishment.
The Local Government Act of I898 delivered a decisive
blow

to the political and social power of the Protestant

Ascendency.

The diminishing influence of the gentry

along with improved educational facilities and land purchase increased the economic, social and political oppor-

tunities of many Irishmen.

Moreover, the ostracism of

the Anglo-Irish encouraged a more Celtic, if not provincial, atmosphere within the local power structure and

among the people.

At the same time, constructive union-

ism generated in many Ascendency people and in Protestant

Ulster a siege mentality which proved incapable of accepting democz-atic Irish nabionalism.

Balfour's appointrr.ent

of V/alter Long in hopes of soothing ultra-Unionist discon-

tent in 1905

»

nevertheless, gave a temporary sense of

security to the disgruntled Ardiluan clique.

This delayed

and complicated the inevitable accommodation which the

resident Anglo-Irish would have to make

alism and modernization.

v/ith Irish

nation-

Moreover, the abandonment of

conciliation during 1904-5 encouraged the Ulster Unionists
to believe that their English Unionist brethren would

respond favorably whenever Belfast raised a hue and cry.
As the events of 1912-14 illustrate, Protestant Ulster was

not disappointed.
The partition of Ireland is the most dominant and

disturbing feature of modern Irish society.

Balfour's

role in encouraging and manipulating
Protestant Ulster's
anxieties about Dublin rule was considerable
during the

debates on the second and third

Koine

Rule Bills.

Although

the social, political and religious
cleavages in Ulster

were the products of multiple factors, Balfour's
actions

from 1912 to 191^ helped to perpetuate and exacerbate
these divisions.

He made no sincere attempt to heal this

breach by lowering the temperature of political debate or

by serious mediation during 1913-^.

Thus the leaders of

Ulster resistance were given a unique opportunity to

frustrate the Home Rule policy which commanded the sympathy
of the majority of the Irish people and the House of Com-

mons.

Unionist strategy having paralyzed the Army and

the Asquith ministry in 191^-, it was inevitable that some

form of partition would accompany
establish a Dublin legislature.

-any
'2he

future efforts to

Rebellion and the

subsequent growth of Sinn Fein support apparently deepened
Balfour's conviction of the validity of the two-nations

theory

r

At the same

ti.in?,

he never admitted how greatly

Unionist policy had nurtured and encouraged the religious
tensions in Ireland and especially in Ulster,

Iff

from

the beginning, Balfour and other Unionists had emphasized

the rather more significant differences in economic struc-

ture and organization as well as the more urbanized
Cxharac tor of the Northeast,

perhaps the violent passions

and emotiont-i complicating the Ulster issue might have been

defused, and a compromise found.

As the Cabinet discussions
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illustrate, however, Balfour played an important
role in

insuring that the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 per-

manently institutionalized these cleavages in Ulster and
in Ireland as a whole,

/roia its

birth in I921, the poli-

tical history of Northern Ireland has been dominated by
partition.

The constant manipulation of the border issue

by the Ulster Unionist leaders has proved disastrous to
the interests of Northern Catholics as well as the poorer

Protestants,

It has perpetuated the rule of a narrow clas

and sectarian clique in the Stormont government.

The

strength and longevity of this .monopolistic Northern Irish
regime is the result of arranging partition on the basis
of six counties as opposed to the historic nine or the

predominantly Protestant four counties.
trao.e tha origins of the

In attempting to

contemporary violence anl destruc

tion in Northern Ireland, one is inevitably drav/n back to
the decisive legislation of I920.
in

conjuriv:;

tion v-ith Stormont

's

The six county division

abolition of proportional

represontrrrion for local and r)o.rliam.entary elec"'*ons in

1922 and 1929 respectively. conderiLncd Northern

.o.'j.cc

to a perpetual and futile minority status

"^r,

mad')

,

1^.

it

the one party Unionist regime virtually impregnable.

xhe periodic re/ival of guerrilla warfare by the 3rish

RepuL'ilcan Aray during the past fifty years was perhaps

the nitui-al sequel xo the political cstracinm suffered by

Northern Roman Catholics and nationalists.
th?.t the

current

r;orth^:r:T

Irish tragedy is

To the extent
t>ie

product of

the Government of Ireland Act, I920, Arthur
Balfour

c

tinues to exercise a pervasive influence on twentieth

century Ireland.
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